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美国政要第7课

所属教程:美国政要

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The origin of RMA
--Interview with Dr. James R. Blaker, Senior advisor to Former Vice Chairman of Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. (Re.) William A. Owens (March 26, 1998) 访美国参联会前副主席欧文斯上将(退役)的高级顾问詹姆斯•布莱克博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: It’s a pleasure to have this opportunity to gain your insightful ideas on military revolution, future warfare, and the U.S. national defense development. I would like to begin our interview with the concept of RMA. I noticed that the term of military technical revolution (MTR) was used in the beginning discussion. Then came the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). What is the defining concept or the exact meaning of RMA? Why was RMA used instead of MTR?
DR. BLAKER: I think the change in terminology1 occurred for two reasons. The first reason, which was not as important, was to distinguish what the United States was trying to do from the Russians. The term “military technical revolution”, MTR, was initially coined by some Soviet military writers. I think the term emerged as early as the late 1970s.
When it began to appear in Soviet military writings, some of the Americans who followed Soviet military writings closely picked up on it. Because it started to appear in the writings of a number of different authors, largely among the lower ranking authors in the Soviet military academies-the Fruenza Academy, among others, --analysts here became interested in trying to see what was behind the apparent prominence2 of this term, “MTR”.
We initially thought the term MTR had to do with some kind of a technical change, then the Soviets thought that would have some bearing on what they called the correlation3 of forces.
So for a period in the early 1970s, we Americans spent a lot of time trying to figure out what it was that the Soviets were talking about. Our initial conclusion was that the Soviets were announcing that they had achieved some kind of a technical advantage. There was a lot of speculation about what that could be, that centered on the possibility the Soviets had a way of combining a satellite space-based surveillance4 system with a missile delivery system that would jeopardize the American ballistic missiles submarines. That, of course, would have a significant effect on the strategic military balance as it was perceived to have been at that time.
So we spent a lot of effort trying to see if that was true, if the Soviets had somehow discovered a way of tracking ballistic missile submarines, with enough precision and enough timeliness, so that they could sue some of their land based nuclear missiles to attack the U.S. ballistic missile submarine force when it was deployed.
By the late 1970s, the people inside the United States planning community had decided that that was leading the Soviets to a fascination5 with this term; that there did not exist such a reconnaissance strike system, and that in fact, what the Soviets were writing about was a series of developments that the United States began to talk about in the 1970s, particularly, the concepts and some of the technology that was associated with what ultimately became the American air/land battle concept. Bill Perry, who was the director of defense research and engineering during the Carter administration, was talking in the late 1970s about the ability to have real-time tracking capabilities sufficient to enable long-range targeting of Soviet ground forces with precision weapons. Others, notably Donn Starry at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Center6, postulated that would allow the Americans to attack the Soviet second echelon7 forces. This suggested the Americans had solved the problem caused by the fact that the balance of conventional military power in Europe lay in the Soviet’s hands. The members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, after all, had a very large active duty force strength and the ability to choose the time and place of attack. Earlier western strategy had been based on attrition8; the basic concept was to confront an attack from the east with “a wall of steel”. But that strategy had always been suspected because the attacking force might be able to achieve a local superiority sufficient to break through the West’s defensive line. Western analysts had always worried about the East’s ability to choose where to attack and then do so with a series of echelons. But , by the mid-1970s, the American military theorists were claiming they had a means of defeating the echelon attack, because they were developing the capacity to strike deep into enemy territory and disrupt the flow forward of the second and follow-on echelons.
So by the early 1980s, certainly by the mid-1980s, the United States thinking about the term “military technical revolution” evolved to the point that there was a general consensus that what the Soviets were talking about were some of the things that the Americans were doing.
But what the Americans were doing was more than just a technological development, because they were starting to say that technology could lead to a very different type of strategy. They postulated a shift in ground force operations, from one of attrition, toward maneuver.
In other words, it was an argument that technology would allow a shift away from attrition warfare toward a new way of fighting. So it was more than technology. It was technology coupled with the idea of a change in the military doctrine.
I believe Andy Marshall was one of the first people to use the term “revolution in military affairs”, or “RMA”. He did so to dismiss the idea that technology by itself could bring about a major change, and to argue that what is really required for a major change was technology wedded to a different doctrine and perhaps different military organizations in order to better carry out this doctrine.
So, certainly by the late 1980s, the term became “revolution in military affairs” and it was a term that the Americans used to signal it was a more complex phenomenon than simply developing the technology.
When the Cold War ended in the late 1980’s it turned out to be quite a shock to American military thinking. Despite the view that containment ultimately would result in a change of the Soviet Union, nobody inside the Pentagon really believed that would be the case, and instead assumed a protracted conflict that would probably last for everybody’s lifetime.
So when the Soviet Union collapsed, it was quite a shock and quite a surprise to people inside the Pentagon. Over the years we had started to believe that the Cold War would never end.
When the shock occurred there was this scramble of intellects, trying to figure out what do you do now, because we had 40 years planning against a threat that no longer existed. We had optimized our military organizations and doctrine for a threat which no longer existed. It wasn’t clear whether or not these forces were applicable to the new era.
So Andy Marshall and a number of other people began to say, well, maybe we have to change things, and maybe we really are pushed into a rapid change, a revolutionary change of military affairs, and what is such a thing. So they spent a lot of time in the early 1990s looking at what historically seemed to have been similar changes of the past.
They looked at things like the blitzkrieg9 that the Germans developed in the 1930s. they looked at Peoples’ Wars concepts10, what the Chinese were developing in the 1930s and 1940s, to see how do you go about making these sorts of changes. And the ultimate conclusion was that revolutions in military affairs, as opposed to technological developments, are massive undertakings; very difficult and very unusual, because they result in changes in the institutions. They really are revolutions in the sense that they are not contained within a technological area. And as such, the Andy Marshall view was that they usually take periods of extended time in order to occur.
Owens, who came in believing that it was necessary to make changes, ended up on the other side of his debate. He became an opponent of the conventional wisdom, particularly the conventional wisdom that said, “these are big things that take a long time to occur. Don’t push them. Let us evolve carefully.”
Owens’ contribution was the counter argument that said that, “no, they don’t take as long as you’re complaining. The claim that says that they take a very long time is simply a means of trying to hang on to something that is no longer applicable to the type of military that we could have. And we should make a leap ahead, because the Americans are on the cutting edge of the technology which will allow it.”

WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 词汇提示
1.terminology [] n. 术语
2.prominence [] n.突出
3.correlation [] n.相互关系
4.surveillance [] n.监视
5.fascination [] n.着迷
6. the US Army Training and Doctrine Center 美军训练与纪律中心
7.echelon [] n.梯队
8.attrition [] n.磨损
9.blitzkrieg [] n.闪电战
10.People’s War concept 人民战争思想

QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 听后答题:
1. When did the term “military technical revolution” emerge?
A.In the late 1980’s. B.In the late 1970’s.
C.In 1985. D.In 1979.
2. Where did the term “MTR” appear initially?
A.In Soviet military writings.
B.In U.S. military writings.
C.In German military writings.
D.In Chinese military writings.
3. When did the U.S. make sure that a reconnaissance strike system did not exist in Soviet Union?
A.In 1969. B.In 1980.
C.By the late 1970’s. D.By the late 1980’s.
4. When did the American military theorists claim that they had a means of defeating the echelon attack?
A.By the mid 1980’s. B.By the mid 1970’s.
C.Andy Marshall. D.By the late 1970’s.
5. Who was the first people to use the term “RMA”?
A.Bill Perry. B.Donn Starry.
C.In early 1990’s D.William Owens.
6. When did the term “RMA” replace the term “MTR”?
A.In 1995. B.In mid 1980’s.
C.In early 1990’s D.By the late 1980’s.
7. What did it turn out to be quite a shock to American military thinking?
A.The Gulf War broke out in 1991.
B.The Cold War ended in the late 1980’s.
C.The Cold War started after World War Ⅱ.
D. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
8. What kind of things did they look at which seemed to have b3en similar changes of the past in the early 1990’s?
A.They looked at things like the blitzkrieg.
B.They looked at things like Peoples’ War concepts.
C.They looked at things like guerrilla warfare.
D.They looked at things like the blitzkrieg and Peoples’ War concepts.
9. What was Andy Marshall’s view on the RMA?
A.It would take a long time to occur.
B.It would not take a very long time to occur.
C.It would occur in few years.
D.It would occur within the technological area.
10. What was Owens’ view on the RMA?
A.It would take a long time to occur.
B.It would not take a very long time to occur.
C.It would occur in few years.
D.It would occur within the technological area.

【参考译文】
“军事革命”一词的来历
陈伯江:很高兴有机会请您谈谈您对军事革命、未来战争和美国国防发展的看法.我注意到在开始进行军事革命讨论时,使用的是军事技术革命一词,后来变为军事革命.请您首先介绍一下军事革命讨论的背景和发展过程。
布莱克:我认为术语的变化有两个原因。第一个原因不怎么重要,就是为了使美国的说法与苏联人的有所区别。“军事技术革命”一词最初是由苏联的军事学者提出来的,我想它最早出现时,便引起了一些跟踪研究苏联军事情况的美国人的注意。因为它开始出现在许多不同作者的文章中,大多数作者是弗隆恩扎军事学院的级别较低的军官。美国的分析家们对这个词突然热门的原因很感兴趣。
我们最初认为“军事技术革命”一词与某种技术上的变革有关。而苏联人认为这种变革将会影响各种力量之间的相互关系。
因此,在70年代的一段时间里,我们美国人花费了大量时间试图弄清什么是苏联人所说的军事技术革命。我们最初的结论是,苏联将要宣布他们已经取得某种技术上的优势。当时有许许多多有关这种优势可能是什么推测。主要的推测集中在认为苏联可能发明了把空间卫星侦察系统与导弹发射系统结合起来的办法,这将会对美国的弹道导弹潜艇带来严重危害。当然,这也将对那时的战略军事平衡带来重大影响。于是,我们以大量精力进行研究,以求发现情况是否真的如此,苏联是否已经找到能非常精确而又及时地跟踪弹道导弹潜艇的方法。则他们就可能使用陆基核导弹攻击美国已部署的弹道潜艇力量。
特别值得注意的是,某些概念和技术与后来美提出的“空地一体战”思想密切相关。后来成为美国国防部长的威谦•佩里,曾在前70年代未卡特政府时期担任防务研究与工程计划主任,他当时就谈到过那种可使精确武器远距离攻击苏联地面部队成为可能的实时跟踪能力。其他人,如美国陆军训练与纪律中心的唐•斯塔里上将当时也曾推测,这将使美国能够攻击苏军第二梯队。这说明美国已经解决了欧洲常规军事力量对比中苏联人掌握了主动权所引起的问题。当时的华沙条约组织国家毕竟拥有非常强大的现役部队以及选择发起攻击时间和地点的能力。在那之前,西方的战略一直以消耗战为基础,基本的思想是以“钢铁之墙”挡住东方的进攻。但这一战略始终令人怀疑,因为进攻一方完全有可能获得局部优势,从而突破西文的防线。对东方拥有进攻地点的选择权,并能随后从一连串的梯队发起进攻的能力,西文分析家始终忧心忡忡。但到70年代中期,美国的军事理论家宣称他们有了击败梯队式进攻的方法,因为他们发展了能够攻击敌方领土纵深并阻挡敌第二及其后续梯队前进的能力。
所以到80年代初期,确切地说是到80年代中,美国对“军事技术革命”这一术语有了基本一致的看法,即苏联人所谈论的有关“军事技术革命”的那些东西,实际上正是美国人所在做的。
但是,美国所正在做的却远远超出了技术上的发展,因为他们已开始意识到技术的发展将有可能导致极不相同的战略。他们提出了在地面作战中由消耗战向机动战转变的设想。
换句话说,它强调了技术将引起一场由消耗战向新的作战方式的转变。这场变革远远超出了技术的范围,它是技术与军事理论变革的紧密结合。
我认为安德鲁•马歇尔是最早使用军事革命术语的人。他用“军事革命”一词代替“军事技术革命”的目的,是要摒弃技术本身就能带来重大变化的思想,强调重大的变革所要求的,是技术与新作战理论以及为了实践这一理论而产生的新军事编制的结合。
因此,到90年代初,“军事技术革命”一词变成了“军事革命”。美国人用“军事革命”这个词来表明军事革命是一个比仅仅发展技术要复杂得多的概念。
80年代未冷战的结束,给美国的军事思想界带来了相当大的震动。尽管人们说遏制政策最终会使苏联发生变化,但五角大楼没有人相信情况真会如此,相反,人们认为冷战是一场长期冲突,在每个人的有生之年都将持续进行下去。
所以在苏联垮台之时,五角大楼的人们感到相当震惊。多少年来,我们都认为冷战绝无尽头。
在震惊之余,思想界的一些人急忙开始寻求现在怎么办的答案。因为我们40年来一直计划对付的威胁不复存在了。我们已经发展完善起来的军队编成和军事理论所要对付的威胁不复存在了。这些军队是否适合于新的时代当时还不清楚。因此,安德鲁•马歇尔和其它一些人率先提出,我们可能必须进行变革,并且我们可能真的被推进到一场快速的变革之中,一场军事领域里的革命性变化。所以,他们在90年代初花了大量的时间,从历史上考察过去是否发生过类似的变化。
他们考察了30年代德国人发明的闪击战;他们还考察了中国人在30至40年代发展的人民战争思想,以求了解他们如何进行这类变革。最后提出的结论是,与技术上的发展所不同的是,军事革命是规模宏大的深刻变化;非常困难而又极不寻常,因为它们将导致体制上的变化。它们之所以称得上是革命,在于它们的影响是无法限制在技术领域之内的。有鉴于此,安德鲁•马歇尔认为,军事革命的发生通常需要经历较长的时间。
参联会副主席欧文斯上将一开始相信进行变革是必要的,但后来成了普遍看法的对立派。他尤其反对这样的普遍看法;“军事革命是需要很长时间才能完成的大事,不要急于求成,我们应当小心谨慎地前进。”
欧文斯的贡献在于他提出了相反看法。他指出:“不,军事革命并不需要你们所说的那么长时间。那种认为军事革命需要很长时间才能完成的说法,只不过是想要坚持老一套的做法而已。而老一套做法已不再与我们能够拥有的新型军队相适应。我们应当大步向前跃进,因为美国拥有允许向前跃进的先进技术。”

KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 参考答案:
1.b 2.a 3.c 4.b 5.c 6.c 7.b 8.d 9.a 10.b

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