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美国政要第15课

所属教程:美国政要

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The RMA Force
--Interview with Dr. James R. Blaker, Senior Advisor to Former Vice Chairman of Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. (Re.) William A. Owens 访美国参联会原副主席欧文斯上将的高级顾问詹姆斯•布莱克博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: In your paper “Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century defense”, you suggest building up the RMA force. Is the RMA force a part of RMA or a result of it?
DR. BLAKER: Well, it’s both. You have to understand that that paper was part of this debate. It was an exaggerated1 view. It was written at a time when nobody had tried to be specific about what were the real changes that the American RMA implied.
The paper argued the United States should move toward smaller forces because, by making them smaller they become more agile2, and you can substitute3 knowledge for mass. That's the hypothesis4. It's not proven, but that' s the hypothesis. The paper was an effort to try to portray what those sorts of organizations might look like.
So, if we got to that point, it would be a result of the RMA. But there was also an argument that said that, we don' t really know how to do this. In order to make the kinds of changes that might be necessary, it would really be necessary to do a great deal of experimentation. And the way to do that experimentation was to take some part of the active military5, free it from the current readiness requirements, make the organizational changes, and then ask them to test whether or not those organizations were the right ones.
To do that meant that in the U.S. you would have to use the reserve forces6 differently than we had used them before. The reserve forces in this scheme7 would be used to provide force presence8, peacekeeping operations9, many of the things that the acting force is now charged with.
So it was a means of accelerating the changes that we think might be involved in this revolution. And as such, it was considered too radical10.
MR. CHEN: Could you describe the technological templates11 for the RMA force?
DR. BLAKER: Well, I'm not sure what you mean by the templates. But the templates do not depend on the traditional way in which the military's looked at technology. In the American case, military technology in aircraft was always associated with advanced forms of the platform itself: aircraft that would fly faster, farther, carry more, things like that.
In the Navy it was always associated12 with platforms. Ships that would go faster, carry more armament, those things. And in the Army, particularly the armored forces, it was always associated with tanks which were more heavily armored13, could shoot faster and more accurately, could go longer, things like that.
The real technology template for the RMA has much less to do with14 advanced platforms than with the things that they carry. It is, again, information technology-based, which deals less with the amount of armor that the tank carries, and more with its ability to communicate, its ability to receive information, and/or trade that information to the tank crew, etc.
So the template was counter-intuitive15 because it did not say that you should spend your research and development money on new tanks or new aircraft, you should spend it on the ability to integrate those platforms better.
MR. CHEN: What are the necessities and goals of building up the RMA force? According to your estimate, how long will it take to shift to the RMA force from the current situation?
DR. BLAKER: The necessities are the will to try it and the courage to change. It sounds like a cliche, but that's the real necessity.
Because the changes are likely to be significant, many of the people inside the military are reluctant16 to try to change, because they don't know where it will lead. And because we have not lost a war since Vietnam, there's a reluctance, a smugness17, an arrogance18, that works against the willingness to try to experiment to change.
If we had the courage to do this, I think it would take 10 years, but the changes would be dramatic in those 10 years.
MR. CHEN: What changes in the armed forces will take place during the building up of the RMA force?
DR. BLAKER: Well, I think that the changes will be in the form of appliques19. What I mean by that is that the technology is arriving. It's almost a done deal20. It’s in place. For the most part, it's been applied to existing organizations and doctrines.
What the Army is doing is a good example. They are taking information technology, and applying it to existing tanks within the existing organizations, and operating as they develop these devices. As such, the real capabilities of this technology will be reached only slowly as people come to the realization that, for instance, if you really do have a dominant knowledge of what is occurring, then perhaps you don't need things like tactical reserves21. Tactical reserves have always been meaningful in the context of22 not having knowledge. They were an insurance policy against the sudden breakthrough, or an enemy capability which you did not expect.
But if you really have a much better understanding of what is occurring on the battlefield, then perhaps you don't need a reserve force. And those kinds of implications go throughout the use of military forces.
The Americans have developed a concept of close air support23, primarily in which the Air Force, provides close air support to the Army. But close air support has always been something seen by the Army and the Air Force, and the United States, as something like the reserves; something that you use when you come up against an unexpected event. But if there are fewer unexpected events, then maybe you don't have to have that concept of close air support.
So, the implications of this are massive. They involve challenges to existing doctrine. Yet the current approach in using the technology is to apply it to existing doctrine, existing organization. And as such, the changes and the power of the concepts will be slow in coming. That's why Owens and others, myself included, have argued that we should experiment much more rapidly and much more radically. We want to condense24 the time at which the revolution will occur, from 20 years to 10 years.
MR. CHEN: What are the main obstacles25 to be overcome in building up the RMA forces? How will the military capabilities be maintained during the building up of the RMA force?
DR. BLAKER: The biggest obstacles again are lack of courage, traditional commitments, and the parochialism26 of the separate services. The way to overcome them is to move toward joint operations, joint command control structures. And speaking as an American, I believe the Americans should do this now—do this sooner rather than later. We should do the experimentation now, when the threat is relatively low.

Practice Listening to words词汇听力练习:
1.exaggerated []夸大的
2.agile []灵活的
3.substitute [] v. 替换
4.hypothesis [] n. 假设
5.active military现役部队
6.reserve forces预备役部队
7.scheme [] n. 安排,配置
8.force presence兵力存在
9.peacekeeping operations维和作战
10.radical [] adj. 激进的
11.template [] n. 模板,模式
12.associated [] adj. 关联的
13.armored [] adj. 装甲的
14.have…to do with 与…有关
15.intuitive [] adj. 直觉的
16.reluctant [] adj. 勉强的
17.smugness [] n. 沾沾自喜
18.arrogance [] n. 傲慢,自大
19.applique [] n. 镶嵌
20.a done deal(技术)已成型、完善
21.tactical reserves战术预备队
22.in the context of 在……情况下
23.close air support近距空中支援
24.condense [] v.(使)浓缩
25.obstacle [] n.障碍
26.parochialism [] n.本位主义

【参考译文】
军事革命部队
陈伯江:在你的一篇题为“理解军事革命----美国21世纪防务指南”的文章中,你提出要建立军事革命部队。军事革命部队是军事革命的组成部分,还是军事革命的结果?
布莱克:噢,军事革命部队既是军事革命的组成部分,又是军事革命的结果。你应当了解那篇文章是为了阐述这种观点而写的,它用的是矫枉过正的办法,这篇文章是在还没有人试图对美国军事革命真正意味着什么样的变化进行专门研究的时候写成的。
我在那篇文章中提出,美国军队应当建立规模更小的部队。因为通过使军队更小型化,它们会变得更加灵活,并且你可能用知识来取代集中。这只是一种假设,尚未被证明。该文章旨在勾画新军队编成可能是什么样的。
因此,如果我们实现了文中所勾画的蓝图,这就将是军事革命的一个结果。但也还有另一种观点,认为我们的确不知道该怎样做。为了进行这种可能是必要的变革,有必要进行大量的试验。进行实验的方式是拿出一部分现役部队,不让他们担负战备任务,然后改革它们的编制,并要求他们试验新编制是否可行。
那样做意味着美国必须以与过去不同的方式运用预备役部队。在这种构成中,预备役部队将被用来提供兵力存在、维和行动、以及目前由现役部队担负的许多任务。
因此,建立军事革命部队是加快我们认为与这场革命有关的变革的——种办法。但是有人认为这样做过于激进。
陈:你能说明一下军事革命部队的技术模式吗?
布莱克:我不太清楚你所说的技术模式的意思。但这种模式将不再以传统的那种军队寻求技术的方式为依据。就美国的情况来说,传统军用飞机的技术总是与平台本身的先进型号相联系,即要求飞得更快、更远、载重更大及其它更好性能的飞机。
海军也总是与平台相联系。要求船的速度更快、载乘部队更多等等。陆军特别是装甲兵,也总是与坦克相联系,要求坦克具有更厚的装甲、能更快更准地发射武器、能去更远的地方等等。
军事革命的技术模式与先进的平台关系不大,而与平台所携带的东西密切相关。它同样也是以信息技术为基础。它对坦克装甲板的厚度要求不高,而对坦克的通讯能力、接收信息的能力、以及与坦克乘员交换信息的能力等等要求很高。
因此,这种技术模式是与直觉背道而驰的,因为它不主张将研究和发展的投资放在新坦克或飞机上;它主张将钱花在进一步提高那些作战平台的一体化能力上。
陈:建立军事革命部队的必要条件和目标是什么?根据你的预测,由目前的状况向军事革命部队转变需要多长时间?
布莱克:敢于尝试的意愿和进行变革的勇气是改革的必要条件。这听起来像一句老生常谈,但它却是真正的必要条件。
变革可能是巨大的,因此军队中的许多人不愿尝试变革,他们不知道这场变革将导向何处。美国自越战以后还没有在—场战争中失败过,所以存在着—种抵触情绪、—种沾沾自喜、一种骄傲自大,它们是阻碍为变革进行试验的力量。
如果我们有勇气进行这场变革,我认为它将需要10年时间,但在这10年,种种变化将会非常之大。
陈:在建立军事革命部队过程中,美国武装力量将会发生哪些变化?
布莱克:我认为这些变化将以镶嵌的形式出现。我这样说的意思是技术正在出现,它几乎是现成的,已经在那里。其中的大部分已经用于现在的编制和条令之中。
陆军目前的所作所为就是一个很好的例子。他们正在发展信息技术,并将其运用于现有编制内的坦克中,并在发展新装备的同时执行作战任务。这样,这一技术的实际能力只能随着人们逐步认识的程度而慢慢发挥出来。例如,如果你确实对战场所发生的一切有了主导性知识,那么也许你不再需要诸如战术预备队这类东西。战术预备队通常总是在对战场情况不甚了解的情况下才有意义。它是预防突然变故或敌方能力出乎意料时的保险措施。然而,如果确实能对战场情况了如指掌,那么也许你就不需要—支预备队。诸如此类的影响在军事力量的运用中比比皆是。
美国人曾经发展了近距空中支援的概念。主要是空军向陆军提供近距空中支援。然而,这种支援总是被陆军、空军和美国人看作是—种预备队;当遇到未曾预料的情况时,就使用这种近距空中支援。但是,如果未曾预料的情况寥寥无几,近距空中支援的概念也就可有可无了。
因此,技术影响是大量的。它们包括对现有条令的挑战,而日前对待技术的做法是将其运用于现有的条令、现有的编制。这样做,各种变革以及新作战概念的威力将只能缓慢地显示出来。这就是为什么欧文斯和其他——些人(包括我本人),一再强调我们应当更快、更积极主动地进行试验。我们希望把这场军事革命的时间从20年压缩到10年。
陈:建立军事革命部队需要克服的主要障碍是什么?在建立军事革命部队的过程中,如何保持军事能力?
布莱克:最大的障碍是缺少勇气、传统的束缚,以及各军种的本位主义。克服这些障碍的途径是向作战、联合指挥控制结构发展。作为一个美国人来说,我认为美国人应当从现在做起----赶早不赶晚! 在当前威胁相对较少之时,我们应当抓紧进行实验。

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