英语演讲 学英语,练听力,上听力课堂! 注册 登录
> 英语演讲 > 英语演讲mp3 > 美国政要 >  列表

美国政要第17课

所属教程:美国政要

浏览:

随身学
扫描二维码方便学习和分享
http://online2.tingclass.net/lesson/shi0529/0001/1093/2_5.mp3
http://image.tingclass.net/statics/js/2012

Modern Joint Operations
--Interview with the Professor of National Defense University,Col.Thomas E.Smith 访美国国防大学教授托马斯•史密斯上校
MR.CHEN BOJIANG: What is the defining concept or the exact meaning of Joint Operation1? What is the difference between Joint Operation and Multi Services and Arms Cooperation2?
COL. SMITH: To me the big difference is that in true joint operations we're talking about an integration of capabilities and it's not simply several services participating. The participation must be more than that. It must involve integration of the capabilities to take advantage of3 the synergistic4 effect that you achieve by combining capabilities. By the same token5, those who urge some caution about jointness-- that jointness is not always the answer to every circumstance, that perhaps you can try to achieve too much jointness at the expense of your capabilities as individual services. This certainly needs a lot more exploration6 .The basic functions of services are relatively traditional functions. We have had some discussions in our classes about whether these functions should be consistent or whether they need to change. It seems to most people that those are fairly consistent functions. And so the question is whether with new technology application, those functions can be done in a way that is different enough to make them distinctly different from what we are used to or have been used to in the past.
MR. CHEN: How will the legacy7 systems be dealt with during the process of achieving Joint capabilities? Is it possible to improve them and employ them in new and different ways?
COL. SMITH: Well, yes. I think it is. I think that legacy systems will first of all remain important although in some cases become less important, but it is always a mix of old and new systems. And it is very difficult, if not impossible, to change a military completely without dealing with legacy systems. Nor would you want to do that, I would argue. Some people have used the analogy8 of the tip of the spear as being the high-tech9, most capable force,but many other forces remain as part of the spear,still useful in many other operations. There are probably two thoughts here--one that there are types of operations for which legacy systems are still very useful--whether they be operations other than war, smaller conflicts, or fighting against a less capable enemy. And then the other piece is that many of those systems can still play a very useful role even with your higher-tech forces. For example, to some, the army's efforts to digitize the current force can be seen as essentially applying new technologies to old systems. But perhaps it is a way to transition some of those legacy systems with new ideas into newer systems in the future. But obviously they still can remain extremely useful in the interim.
MR. CHEN: In future Joint Operations,how will former operational arts such as Centers of Gravity10 and Decisive Points11, Simultaneity and Depth12, Timing and Tempo13, and so forth, change?
COL.SMITH:I think that most of those concepts first of all will still be extremely valid14, but in fact there may be some changes in centers of gravity--perhaps some of the centers of gravity may be different. And there might be, back to the information operations, different ways of attacking those centers of gravity, Timing and tempo are terms that we use frequently and we think are very important in the sense of 15 relative advantage of one side over the other. As for tempo of operations, normally the faster you can conduct simultaneous and coherent operations, the better, although there are those who caution that faster is not always better. There may be times when operation tempo is too fast. One example is whether it is too fast for political decision makers to ensure that the military instrument is being used effectively to achieve political objectives, and not simply to destroy things or to conduct warfare for warfare's sake16. And at the same time, from a military standpoint17, there may be reasonable limitations on how fast operations could be done and how comprehensive those operations can be in a theater of warfare18.The point I'm making is there still may have to be some sequential19 aspects of an operation,that you can't do everything at once everywhere. So I think there's much to be explored in those areas. And I'm an advocate of experimentation and war-gaming and exercises to try to understand how the operational art might be changing based on new concepts and new technology.
MR. CHEN: How do you view the complexity of command and control in joint operation? Along with the development of information technology,it is likely that command and control will become both centralized20 and decentralized21.How can centralized and decentralized command and control be effectively combined in practice?
COL. SMITH: We imply that there will be a significant increase in centralization necessary to conduct long-range strikes with a system of systems. By the same token,we are saying that potentially the smaller,fast moving forces will have to be decentralized to a significant degree in order for them to accomplish their missions very quickly and perhaps get out of an area if they need to do that. So there might be, as the question seems to indicate, some almost contradictory22 aspects. I think that is really one of the central issues for command and control,and I think we're going to have to somehow strike a balance between the two in the sense that there are practical limitations to the effectiveness of centralization, for example, in terms of having a system that controls where fighters are going to go and which platform fires and at what time. There will need to be a certain amount of that in order to get fire on target quick enough and to hit the target, and there's no way to really totally automate that--to take the man out of the loop, as some people say, and still provide the kind of effectiveness that the people on the ground will need. Again, an area that I would say needs some experimentation and practice to really see what the technology will permit23. And I think it goes back to the man in the loop, in terms of how people can then deal with what the technology potentially has the capability of doing.

Practice Listening to words词汇听力练习:
1.Joint Operation 联合作战
2.Multi-Services and Arms Cooperation 多军兵种协同作战
3.take advantage of 利用
4.synergistic [] adj协同的,协同作用
5.by the same token 同样的
6.exploration[]n. 探索
7.legacy[]n. 遗产
legacy systems 现有(或陈旧)系统
8.analogy[] 类推
9.high-tech 高技术
10.Centers of Gravity (作战艺术中的)重心
11.Decisive Points (作战艺术中的)决定点
12.Simultaneity and Depth (作战艺术中的)同时和纵深
13.Timing and Tempo (作战艺术中的)时机和节奏
14.valid [] adj. 有效的
15.in the sense of 在……意义上
16.sake [] n. 缘故
17.standpoint [] n. 立场,观点
18.theater of warfare 战区作战
19.sequential [] adj.连续的,顺序的
20.centralize [] vi. 集中
21.decentralize [] n. 分散
22.contradictory [] adj. 矛盾的
23.permit [] vt. 允许

【参考译文】
现代联合作战
陈伯江:什么是联合作战的定义或确切含义?联合作战与多军兵种协同作战的区别是什么?
史密斯:在我看来,二者最大的不同,在于我们所说的真正意义上的联合作战,指的是各种作战能力的一体化,而不仅仅是几个军种的简单参与。联合作战中各军种参与的程度要比协同作战大得多。它必须实现多种作战能力的一体化,以便充分利用各种能力相结合产生的增效。基于同样的理由,有些人对联合作战问题提出了强烈的质疑,认为这种联合并非总是解决一切问题的灵丹妙药;认为只有以牺牲单个军种的作战能力为代价,才能取得充分的联合作战能力。对这些问题确实需要进行更多地探索。各军种的基本功能相对来说都是传统的功能。我们已在教学时对这些功能究竟是应继续下去还是需作改变进行了讨论。多数人认为各军种的基本功能应当继续保持。于是上述问题就变为:由于新技术的运用,能否以不同的方式实现这些功能,新的方式与我们现用的或过去已用的方式有明显的不同。
陈:在实现联合作战能力的过程中,如何对待现有的武器系统?是否有可能改进它们和以新的、不同的方式运用它们?
史密斯:是的,我想是这样。首先我认为现有的武器系统仍将是重要的,尽管在某些情况下重要程度有所下降。但通常总是新、老武器系统混合使用。完全更新军队的武器系统而淘汰旧系统,如果不是不可能的话,也是非常困难的。我敢说人们也不想那样做。有些人把高技术和战斗力强的部队比作“刀尖”,但其它许多部队仍然是“刀”的组成部分,在许多作战中仍然有用。这大概可从两个方面来加以认识,一是,现有武器系统在许多类型的作战中——无论是非战争行动,还是更小的冲突,或者是与战斗力较差的敌人作战——仍然是有用的;二是,既使在装备了更高技术的部队中,许多现有武器系统仍能发挥重要作用。例如,有人认为,陆军使现有部队数字化的一些尝试,基本上属于把新技术运用于老系统。也许将来将陈旧系统转变为更新的系统会有新的办法。很明显,在过渡期间陈旧武器系统仍是非常有用的。
陈:在未来的联合作战中,以往的作战艺术如“重心”和“决定点”、“同时”和“纵深”、“时机”和“节奏”等等,将如何变化?
史密斯:首先,我认为以往的作战概念大多数仍将适用。“重心”的概念可能会有一些变化,即有些“重心”可能与过去不同。仍以信息作战来说,打击“重心”的方式可能会有不同。“时机”和“节奏”是我们经常使用的术语,在形成一方对于另一方的优势时非常重要。就作战的节奏而论,你能同时和紧凑地进行作战,越快越好。尽管有人认为并非总是越快越好。有时作战速度可能会太快。一个例子是作战速度太快以致政治决策者无法确定军事手段是否已有效地用来达成政治目标,而不只是简单地用来进行毁灭或为打仗而打仗。与此同时,从军事的角度来说,可在战区作战的速度能有多快,范围能有多广泛,也可能有一些适当的限制。我的意思是作战仍可能顺序展开,你不可能立刻在所有地方做所有事情。因此,我认为在这些领域有许多问题需要探索。我积极主张通过试验、作战模拟和演习,努力弄清以往的战役法在新作战概念和新技术基础上会发生什么变化。
陈:你怎样看待联合作战中指挥与控制问题的复杂性?随着信息技术的发展,指挥与控制好像将要向集中和分散两个方面发展,在实践中怎样使指挥控制的集中与分散有效地结合起来?
史密斯:我们的意思是,对于实施“系统集成”的远距离打击来说,更需要增加指挥与控制的集中程度。此外,我们也认为更小型、更快速的机动部队的指挥与控制要大大分散,使他们能够很快地完成任务,也许是很快地离开一个区域,如果他们需要那样做的话。因此,正如这一问题所表明的,这里可能存在着一些相互矛盾的方面。我认为这确实是指挥与控制的一个核心问题。而且我认为我们必须设法在集中指挥与控制的有效性存在着实际限制的情况下(例如,要有一个系统来控制战斗机向哪里飞和哪一个作战平台发射以及何时发射),求得集中与分散两者之间的平衡。为了足够快地向目标开火并击毁目标,将需要一定数量的系统。但真正全部实现自动化(像某些人说的人离开指挥链)是不可能的。仍将需要地面上的人来提供那种集中指挥与控制的有效性。我想重申的一点是,我们需要一些试验和实践来确实弄清哪些技术适用于这一领域。并且我认为,就人们怎样才能找到那些潜在的技术具有做这些的能力而言,它又重新回到指挥与控制链中的人上来。

内容来自 听力课堂网:http://www.tingclass.net/show-6093-27890-1.html
用手机学英语,请加听力课堂微信公众号:tingclass123
用户搜索

疯狂英语 英语语法 新概念英语 走遍美国 四级听力 英语音标 英语入门 发音 美语 四级 新东方 七年级 赖世雄 zero是什么意思

订阅每日学英语:

  • 频道推荐
  • |
  • 全站推荐
  • 广播听力
  • |
  • 推荐下载
  • 网站推荐
0.093750