美国政要第19课
Challenges to U.S. Military in the Next Century
--Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dr. James N. Miller, Jr. 访美国国防部助理国防部长帮办小詹姆斯•米勒博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: How do you view challenges to US military in the next century? What will be the toughest1 challenges? What will be the most likely future challenge that is different from that faced today?
DR. MILLER: That is a very good question. Many aspects of the early part of the next century are not hard to project, because many of the challenges that we face today will still be with us not just the next couple of years but for the next decade or more. One of those that the QDR2 emphasized and that I believe the RMA is very important in dealing with is the problem of so-called “asymmetric warfare3.” And that would include the threat of chemical and biological or potentially nuclear, but particularly chemical and biological weapons against U.S. forces, allies and possibly the United States territory.
Terrorism4 is another element of asymmetric warfare, as is information operations. The possibility of attacks on U.S. theater communications or on the U.S. infrastructure5, whether military, more broadly governmental or including private as well. And we've seen some hacker6 activity lately that I think is a reminder that this could be a very serious problem, indeed .
Those are very serious challenges. Others that I would add would be some¬thing the Marine Corps7 is very much em¬phasizing with Army participation, military operations in urban terrain8. This could come in the context of anything from peacekeeping in a somewhat hostile9 envi¬ronment-even small numbers of hostile people can make that quite difficult, as you know-to large-scale military operations in which an adversary10 might decide to go to the cities in order to gain sanctuary11. This is a very difficult problem and a very different type of conflict from what it looked like in Desert Storm.
The U.S. is, I expect, and the de¬fense strategy would say that the U.S. is going to retain its power projection capabil¬ities12, and projecting power has a number of difficulties. The possibility of access denial13 by chemical or biological weapons, or even sufficient numbers of conventional missiles is certainly an area of concern.
And I can imagine a number of new challenges. Some project extended prolif¬eration14 of cruise missile15 to countries that today don' t have them, which married with chemical and biological agents would pose a very, very difficult threat. Contin¬ued work in bioengineering could produce new types of viruses16-as difficult as it is to imagine why people would do this, but to the extent17 that a terrorist group or a nation puts sufficient resources to such an effort that is a challenge that, again, could be very daunting18. The bio threat is one we see today, but with fundamentally new pieces or agents in the mix the challenge would increase.
To some extent the challenges of the future depend on the success of the Shap¬ing portion of our strategy, and I hope very much that the focus that's been put on that will help. Getting beyond the op¬erational level, and thinking for a moment about global politics-you have to look, for example, at whether we are improving re¬lationships with Russia, since the Cold War end. It's been a great power histori¬cally and our success with that relationship is critical. The same is true of China. If we face a resurgent19 China that doesn't like the United States, then that will be a challenge that none of us should even want to consider. The point is that the nature of U.S. relations today with China, Russia, and also other countries, will affect the challenge faced by the U.S. military in the future. So the “shape” part of our strate¬gy is very, very important.
MR. CHEN: Secretary Cohen raised the “Shape-Respond-Prepare Strategy” in his report of the Quadrennial Defense Re¬view last May. What is the essence and main points of this new strategy?
DR. MILLER: As we have already talked about, it' s extremely straightfor¬ward20. First, the department should sup¬port national efforts to shape the interna¬tional environment in ways favorable to United States interests. Second, the mili¬tary must have the capacity to respond to crises when they occur. And third, we must prepare now for an uncertain future--in other words, we must ensure that we have the capacity to shape and respond in the future as well as in the present. Within the Shape portion, and I know you've read the QDR so know the main pieces, the leadership of the department has been very active with military to mili¬tary contacts at many levels as well. And one of the recent things that happened since the QDR is that each of the commanders-in-chief, each of the regional CINCs21, has been asked to create a theater engage¬ment22 plan that specifies the CINC' s ob¬jectives23 in the region and how that CINC will work with regional partners, including joint combined exercises and other activi¬ties with all of the players in the region. Systematically planning engagement is an important part of implementing24 the Shap¬ing Strategy.
Having American forces prepared, about 100,000 in Europe and 100,000 in Asia, is an important part of forward pres¬ence25. The capacity to deter26 conflict by that presence, if necessary, and by the continuing military capabilities that we have at home that could be brought to bear is also a part of Shaping, so is the capaci¬ty to deter as well as to interact with peo¬ple in a region.
Now to the Response capacity. The U.S. military must have response capabili¬ties across the full spectrum27 of possible operations, from very small scale humani¬tarian28 and peace operations, to a major theater war. And again, the deterrence aspect of the Shaping portion of the strat¬egy requires the capacity to respond along the full spectrum, up to and including the nuclear deterrence provided by our nuclear weapons.
The Prepare now for the future por¬tion of the strategy. We've talked about a core element of it in talking about the RMA. In addition, one of the things that the department is working hard to do is to operate more efficiently internally29, to conduct a “revolution in business affairs.” For example, take the Defense Reform Ini¬tiative30 that reduced the Office of the Sec¬retary of Defense and other parts of the de¬partment, and the ongoing effort to streamline31 the department at all levels. Also consider the desire to reduce military infrastructure, the bases in the United States and overseas, as appropriate. These steps are part of being sure that the de¬partment can live within the resource con¬straints it has and is efficient enough to be prepared for the future.
And as I said before, the RMA ef¬forts, including not only experimentation but also science and technology development is a very important part of the Prepare Now. Finally, continuous intelligence projections and assessments32, though very difficult, provide necessary pieces in considering what possible future capabilities we may need. All of these are important pieces of the Prepare portion of the strategy.
Practise Listening to Words 词汇听力练习:
1.tough [] adj. 艰难的
2.QDR:Quadrennial Defense Review《四年防务审查报告》
3.asymmetric warfare非对称战争
4.terrorism[]n.恐怖主义
5.infrastructure [] n. 基础设施
6.hacker [] n.电脑黑客
7.Marine Corps（美国）海军陆战队
8.urban terrain城区地形
9.hostile [] adj. 敌对的
10.adversary [] n. 敌人，对手
11.sanctuary [] n. 避难所
12.power projection capability力量投送能力
13.denial [] n. 否定，否认
14.proliferation [] n. 扩散
15.cruise missile 巡航导弹
16.virus [] n. 病毒
17.to the extent 到……程度
18.daunt [] vt. 威吓
19.resurgent [] adj. 重新崛起的
20.straightforward [] adj. 直截了当的
21.CINC:commanders-in -chief 总司令
22.engagement [] vt. 接触
23.objective [] n. 目标
24.implement [] vt. 执行
25.forward presence 前沿存在
26.deter [] vt. 阻止
27.spectrum [] n. 频谱
28.humanitarian [] n. 人道主义
29.internally [] adv. 在内部
30.Defense Reform Initiative《国防改革倡议》
31.streamline [] vt. 精简
32.assessment [] n. 评估
【参考译文】
美国下个世纪的军事挑战
陈伯江：你对下个世纪美国面临的军事挑战有何看法?在美国今后面临的挑战中，什么挑战可能与今天所面临的最为不同?
米勒：这是一个很好的问题。下个世纪头几年的许多方面不难预测，因为我们今天面临的许多挑战不仅在今后几年仍然存在，而且将在今后10年或更长的时间继续伴随着我们。《四年防务审查报告》所强调的挑战之一，并且我认为也是需要军事革命特别关注的挑战，就是所谓的“非对称作战”问题。它将包括化学和生物武器的威胁，或潜在的核威胁，特别是对美军、盟国、甚至美国本土使用化学和生物武器的威胁。
恐怖主义是非对称作战争的另一个内容，各种信息作战也是。信息战包括对美国战区通讯系统或美国的基础设施(无论是军用的还是更广泛的政府或者私人拥有的)进行攻击。近来我们已看到某些计算机“黑客”的活动，我觉得这种信息战确实有可能成为严重问题。
这些都是非常严重的挑战。其它方面我想补充的是，在美国陆军的参与下，海军陆战队非常重视城市地形条件下的军事行动。这种挑战可出现在各种情况中，如在敌对环境中执行任务，只要有少数的敌对分子，就可能造成相当大的困难；再如大规模军事行动中，为了寻求庇护，也叫飞皂决定到城市去。这是一个非常棘手的问题，也是一个与“沙漠风暴”截然不同的冲突类型。
我认为，美国的国防战略应当明确它将继续保持力量投送能力。但投送力量有许多困难。用各种化学或生物武器、或者甚至足够数量的常规导弹，就有可能阻止美国的进入，这确实是-种令人担心的情况。
我还能想出其它一些挑战。有些国家打算将巡航导弹大量扩散到目前尚未拥有这种武器的国家中去，巡航导弹与化学和生物武器结合起来，将会是非常、非常难以对付的威胁。生物工程的持续发展可能产生新的病毒类型。和这些病毒一样难以想象的是，人们为什么要研究它们。但是，只要某个恐怖主义集团或国家投入足够的资源研究新的病毒，这就会成为令人不寒而栗的挑战。生物威胁现在已经存在，但是若出现新的生物战剂，挑战会更加难对付。
在-定程度上，能否迎接未来的挑战取决于我们战略中“塑造”部分能否成功，我非常希望把重点放在“塑造”上将会带来好处。让我们超越作战的范围，想-想全球的政治，例如，你应当看-看冷战结束以来，我们是否在改善与俄罗斯的关系。俄罗斯历史上是个大国，能否改善与它的关系是很重要的。中国也是这样。如果我们面对一个重新崛起而又不喜欢美国的中国，那么这将是一个挑战，我们没有人愿意面对这样的挑战。我要说的是，口前美国与中国、俄罗斯、还有其它国家关系的状况，将会影响到未来美军所面临的挑战。因此，我们战略中的“塑造”部分是非常、非常重要的。
陈：说到《四年防务审查报告》中提出的“塑造一反应一准备”战略，这种新战略的实质和主要内容是什么?
米勒：正如我们已经谈到的，这个战略的意思是非常直截了当的。第-，国防部应当支持国家以对美国利益有利的方式“塑造”国际环境。第二，当危机发生时，军队必须具有对危机做出反应的能力。第三，我们现在必须为一个不确定的未来进行准备。换句活说，我们必须确保在今后和在当前有能力进行“塑造和反应”。
就“塑造”部分来说，我知道你已看过《四年防务审查报告》，因此知道其主要内容。美国国防部领导一直非常积极地进行军队之间多层次的接触。《四年防务审查报告》之后出现的一个情况，就是要求每个地区性总部司令制订战区接触计划，详细说明总部司令在本地区的目标和将如何与该地区的伙伴国家进行合作，包括与该地区各方共同举行联合演习和其它活动。为接触制定全面系统的计划是执行“塑造”战略的重要组成部分。
使驻在欧洲的10万美军和驻在亚洲的10万美军作好准备，是前沿存在的重要部分。通过这种军事存在(如果必要的话通过继续运用美国本土的军事力量施加影响)制止冲突的能力也是“塑造”战略的组成部分。所以“塑造”包括威慑能力和在本地区与其它方打交道的能力。
现在来谈谈“反应”能力。美军必须具有对整个冲突频谱可能发生的冲突做出反应的能力，从规模很小的人道主义援助和维和行动，一直到大规模战区战争。同样，“塑造”战略所具有的威慑内容也要求具有对整个冲突频谱做出反应的能力，而且包括由我们的核武器提供的核威慑能力。
下面谈谈战略中为未来而进行“准备”的部分。我们在谈论有关军事革命问题时，已经谈到厂“准备”的一个核心因素。另外，国防部现在努力做的另一件事是使自己更有效地运作，进行一场“商业革命”。例如，《国防改革倡议》已提出了削减国防部长办公厅和国防部其他部门的人员，目前正在努力对国防部各级进行精简。还有，我们希望对美国及其海外的军事基础设施和基地进行适当的削减。这些举措都是要确保国防部能在资源有限的条件下生存，并能足以有效地为未来作好准备。
正如我在前面已讲到的，目前军事革命的种种努力(不仅包括试验，而且包括科学和技术发展)也是“准备”战略非常重要的组成部分。最后，做出各种情报预测与评估尽管很困难，但却有助于我们考虑未来可能需要什么能力。所有这一切都是“准备”战略的重要组成部分。
