TED演讲:我们对慈善的理解大错特错 - 听力课堂
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  I want to talk about social innovation and social entrepreneurship. I happen to have triplets. They're little. They're five years old. Sometimes I tell people I have triplets. They say, "Really? How many?" Here's a picture of the kids. That's Sage and Annalisa and Rider. Now, I also happen to be gay. Being gay and fathering triplets is by far the most socially innovative, socially entrepreneurial thing I have ever done.

  我想跟大家聊聊“社会公益创新”(social innovation) 和“社会公益事业”(social entrepreneurship)。 我有三个孩子,他们是三胞胎。 他们现在5岁,还很小。 当我告诉人们我有三胞胎的时候 他们说,“真的,多少个?” 这是这些小家伙的照片 分别叫Sage、Annalisa和Rider 现在,我也是一个同性恋。 身为一个同性恋父亲养育三胞胎孩子 是我目前做过的最具有社会创新、最具有 社会事业精神的事情。

  (Laughter) (Applause)


  The real social innovation I want to talk about involves charity. I want to talk about how the things we've been taught to think about giving and about charity and about the nonprofit sector are actually undermining the causes we love and our profound yearning to change the world.

  我真正想要说的社会创新 是关于慈善事业的。 我要说的是我们一直以来被灌输的有关慈善、 奉献和非营利部门的概念 正在破坏我们热爱的 慈善事业的根基,而我们强烈的 呼吁各位改变这样的现状。

  But before I do that, I want to ask if we even believe that the nonprofit sector has any serious role to play in changing the world. A lot of people say now that business will lift up the developing economies, and social business will take care of the rest. And I do believe that business will move the great mass of humanity forward. But it always leaves behind that 10 percent or more that is most disadvantaged or unlucky. And social business needs markets, and there are some issues for which you just can't develop the kind of money measures that you need for a market.

  但是在我开始之前,我想要问问大家, 是否真的相信非营利组织是改变世界的 重要力量。 很多人都说营利性部门负责促进经济发展, 而社会公益将会搞定剩下的事情。 我相信商业活动能够极大的 促进人类的进步。 但是总是会有百分之十或更多的人 无法从中获益。 社会事业也需要一个市场, 当你需要的东西无法用金钱来衡量的时候, 创建这样的市场有一些问题需要处理。

  I sit on the board of a center for the developmentally disabled, and these people want laughter and compassion and they want love. How do you monetize that? And that's where the nonprofit sector and philanthropy come in. Philanthropy is the market for love. It is the market for all those people for whom there is no other market coming. And so if we really want, like Buckminster Fuller said, a world that works for everyone, with no one and nothing left out, then the nonprofit sector has to be a serious part of the conversation.

  我曾经在一个发展障碍关怀中心呆过 那里的人想要获得的是 快乐、热情和爱。 这些如何货币化? 这就是非营利组织和慈善机构的 作用所在。 慈善为关爱提供了市场。 这个市场是为那些不被其它任何市场 接受的人准备的。 如果我们真的想要做到巴克明斯特·富勒说的那样, 不抛弃不放弃任何一个人, 那么非营利组织 就必须在社会中承担起 一个举足轻重的角色。

  But it doesn't seem to be working. Why have our breast cancer charities not come close to finding a cure for breast cancer, or our homeless charities not come close to ending homelessness in any major city? Why has poverty remained stuck at 12 percent of the U.S. population for 40 years?

  但是好像不是这样子的。 为什么我们的乳腺癌慈善组织 无法找到治疗乳腺癌的医疗方法? 为什么关心无家可归者的慈善机构 至今没有在任何一个大城市做到居者有其屋? 为什么在过去四十年中美国贫困率 始终不低于总人口的12%?

  And the answer is, these social problems are massive in scale, our organizations are tiny up against them, and we have a belief system that keeps them tiny. We have two rulebooks. We have one for the nonprofit sector and one for the rest of the economic world. It's an apartheid, and it discriminates against the [nonprofit] sector in five different areas, the first being compensation.

  答案是,这些社会问题 都太大了, 公益组织相比起来太渺小了, 而我们的某些信念压制了这些组织的壮大。 我们有两套不同的游戏规则, 一套是限定非营利组织的, 另一套是限定营利性组织的。 这是“种族隔离”, 在五个方面歧视非营利组织, 首当其冲的就是人员薪酬。

  So in the for-profit sector, the more value you produce, the more money you can make. But we don't like nonprofits to use money to incentivize people to produce more in social service. We have a visceral reaction to the idea that anyone would make very much money helping other people. Interesting that we don't have a visceral reaction to the notion that people would make a lot of money not helping other people. You know, you want to make 50 million dollars selling violent video games to kids, go for it. We'll put you on the cover of Wired magazine. But you want to make half a million dollars trying to cure kids of malaria, and you're considered a parasite yourself. (Applause)

  在营利性部门,你的产出越多, 你的收入就越多。 但是在非营利部门,我们不喜欢 用高报酬来激励社会服务人员提高产出。 我们对于那些在帮助他人的过程中 为自己赚钱的行为有种本能的厌恶。 有意思的是我们对那些在赚钱的过程中 没有帮助他人的人却没有这样的厌恶。 比如,你想通过向孩子们兜售暴力游戏 来赚5千万美元,没问题, 我们会让你上《连线》杂志封面。 但是如果你想通过为得了疟疾的孩子们 提供医疗服务,并只想赚50万美元时, 你会被人看成是贪婪的吸血鬼。(掌声

  And we think of this as our system of ethics, but what we don't realize is that this system has a powerful side effect, which is, it gives a really stark, mutually exclusive choice between doing very well for yourself and your family or doing good for the world to the brightest minds coming out of our best universities, and sends tens of thousands of people who could make a huge difference in the nonprofit sector marching every year directly into the for-profit sector because they're not willing to make that kind of lifelong economic sacrifice.

  但是在我开始之前,我想要问问大家, 是否真的相信非营利组织是改变世界的 重要力量。 很多人都说营利性部门负责促进经济发展, 而社会公益将会搞定剩下的事情。 我相信商业活动能够极大的 促进人类的进步。 但是总是会有百分之十或更多的人 无法从中获益。 社会事业也需要一个市场, 当你需要的东西无法用金钱来衡量的时候, 创建这样的市场有一些问题需要处理。

  Businessweek did a survey, looked at the compensation packages for MBAs 10 years of business school, and the median compensation for a Stanford MBA, with bonus, at the age of 38, was 400,000 dollars. Meanwhile, for the same year, the average salary for the CEO of a $5 million-plus medical charity in the U.S. was 232,000 dollars, and for a hunger charity, 84,000 dollars. Now, there's no way you're going to get a lot of people with $400,000 talent to make a $316,000 sacrifice every year to become the CEO of a hunger charity.

  《商业周刊》做过一个调查,他们调查了 商学院MBA毕业生十年来的收入水平。 其中斯坦福大学MBA的毕业生,在38岁时, 各种福利薪资加起来,平均能拿到40万美元。 与此同时,美国规模在5百万美元以上的 医疗慈善团体的CEO平均薪酬只有23.2万美元, 食品援助团体的CEO更少,只有8.4万美元。 你看,你根本没有办法让那些能够拿到 40万美金的人才,放弃31.6万美金的收入, 去一个食品援助团体做CEO。

  Some people say, "Well, that's just because those MBA types are greedy." Not necessarily. They might be smart. It's cheaper for that person to donate 100,000 dollars every year to the hunger charity, save 50,000 dollars on their taxes, so still be roughly 270,000 dollars a year ahead of the game, now be called a philanthropist because they donated 100,000 dollars to charity, probably sit on the board of the hunger charity, indeed, probably supervise the poor SOB who decided to become the CEO of the hunger charity, and have a lifetime of this kind of power and influence and popular praise still ahead of them.

  有人会说,“那是因为MBA毕业生都很贪婪。” 这不一定,可能是因为他们更聪明 对他们来说每年捐出去10万美元 给食品援助团体, 能省下来5万美元的个人税, 他们的收入还多出来将近27万美元, 而且由于他们向慈善团体捐赠了10万美元的善款, 他们成了慈善家, 而且有可能坐进食品援助团体的董事会, 有可能监管着当初决定成为 食品援助团体CEO的可怜的倒霉蛋, 并且在余生中他们的权力、影响力和社会赞许程度 都始终高于慈善团体的CEO。

  The second area of discrimination is advertising and marketing. So we tell the for-profit sector, "Spend, spend, spend on advertising until the last dollar no longer produces a penny of value." But we don't like to see our donations spent on advertising in charity. Our attitude is, "Well, look, if you can get the advertising donated, you know, at four o'clock in the morning, I'm okay with that. But I don't want my donations spent on advertising. I want it go to the needy." As if the money invested in advertising could not bring in dramatically greater sums of money to serve the needy.

  第二个歧视的地方是广告和营销手段。 我们认为营利性部门砸钱营销是必然的,“砸钱,砸钱, 直到广告投入无法让你转到更多的钱为止。” 但是我们不希望看到我们捐赠给慈善团体的钱被用在广告上。 我们的态度是,“如果你们能够拿到电视台捐赠的广告时间, 比如,凌晨四点没人看的时间段,我没意见。 但是我不希望我的钱拿去买广告时间。 我希望我的钱用在需要的人身上。” 他们觉得投入在广告中的钱 不能够带来更多的善款去帮助 需要它们的人。

  In the 1990s, my company created the long distance AIDSRide bicycle journeys and the 60-mile-long breast cancer three-day walks, and over the course of nine years, we had 182,000 ordinary heroes participate, and they raised a total of 581 million dollars. They raised more money more quickly for these causes than any events in history, all based on the idea that people are weary of being asked to do the least they can possibly do.

  在1990年代,我的企业发起了 长距离“AIDS骑行”自行车骑行活动 和为乳腺癌筹款的60公里三日行走活动, 经过这九年的努力, 有18.2万平民英雄参与进来, 共募集到了5.81亿美元善款。 这是历史上为艾滋病和乳腺癌筹款的 最快记录。 这一切基于的观点就是 人们已经厌倦被动的去做力所能及的慈善。

  People are yearning to measure the full distance of their potential on behalf of the causes that they care about deeply. But they have to be asked. We got that many people to participate by buying full-page ads in The New York Times, in The Boston Globe, in primetime radio and TV advertising. Do you know how many people we would have gotten if we put up flyers in the laundromat?

  在自己深深关心的问题上, 人们总是会投入 自己所有力所能及的所有资源。 但是你要提出要求。 我们通过在《纽约时报》、《波士顿全球》上打广告, 通过在电台和电视台的黄金时段打广告 吸引到了如此多的朋友。 如果我们只是在洗衣店附近发发传单, 你觉得还会有这么多人参与么?

  Charitable giving has remained stuck, in the U.S., at two percent of GDP ever since we started measuring it in the 1970s. That's an important fact, because it tells us that in 40 years, the nonprofit sector has not been able to wrestle any market share away from the for-profit sector. And if you think about it, how could one sector possibly take market share away from another sector if it isn't really allowed to market?

  美国的慈善捐赠数额一直固定在GDP的2%附近, 从我们开始统计的1970年代开始便是如此。 这是一个很重要的事实, 这告诉我们在过去40年中, 非营利部门没能从营利性部门那里 抢到任何市场份额。 但是你反过来想想 一个不允许进行市场营销的非营利部门怎么可能 从营利性部门抢夺到市场?

  And if we tell the consumer brands, "You may advertise all the benefits of your product," but we tell charities, "You cannot advertise all the good that you do," where do we think the consumer dollars are going to flow?

  如果我们对消费品牌的态度是, “你可以把产品的所有优点都广告出来”, 但是我们告诉慈善组织,“你不能为你所做的任何好事打广告,” 你觉得消费者的钱会流向哪里?

  The third area of discrimination is the taking of risk in pursuit of new ideas for generating revenue. So Disney can make a new $200 million movie that flops, and nobody calls the attorney general. But you do a little $1 million community fundraiser for the poor, and it doesn't produce a 75 percent profit to the cause in the first 12 months, and your character is called into question.

  第三个歧视的地方是通过新方式 募集资金的风险问题。 迪斯尼能够砸2亿美元拍电影,打了水漂的话 也不会有人打电话给司法部长。 但是如果你是一个救济组织的筹款人, 筹集了不到一百万美元,而你在头12个月中 没有将善款的75%发到救济人手中, 你的人品就会受到质疑。

  So nonprofits are really reluctant to attempt any brave, daring, giant-scale new fundraising endeavors for fear that if the thing fails, their reputations will be dragged through the mud. Well, you and I know when you prohibit failure, you kill innovation. If you kill innovation in fundraising, you can't raise more revenue. If you can't raise more revenue, you can't grow. And if you can't grow, you can't possibly solve large social problems.

  所以非营利组织非常不情愿尝试任何冒险的、 大规模的筹款行动, 他们担心一旦失败了, 他们的声誉也会随之一败涂地。 我们都知道,不允许失败 等于扼杀创新。 如果你扼杀了筹款创新,你就没有办法获得更多的收入。 如果你不能获得更多收入,你的组织就无法壮大。 如果你的组织无法壮大,你就无法解决社会面临的那些大问题。

  The fourth area is time. So Amazon went for six years without returning any profit to investors, and people had patience. They knew that there was a long-term objective down the line of building market dominance. But if a nonprofit organization ever had a dream of building magnificent scale that required that for six years, no money was going to go to the needy, it was all going to be invested in building this scale, we would expect a crucifixion.

  第四个歧视的地方就是时间。 亚马逊可以在六年时间中不给股东分红, 而股东们都有这个耐心。 他们知道亚马逊目标很大, 它要花时间占领市场。 但是如果一个非营利组织 想要筹划一个时间长达六年的筹款活动, 在此期间募集的钱没有分给受捐赠人, 而是用来扩大筹款规模, 他们肯定会被钉死在十字架上。

  And the last area is profit itself. So the for-profit sector can pay people profits in order to attract their capital for their new ideas, but you can't pay profits in a nonprofit sector, so the for-profit sector has a lock on the multi-trillion-dollar capital markets, and the nonprofit sector is starved for growth and risk and idea capital.

  最后一个领域就是利润本身。 营利性部门可以通过向股东分红来吸引投资者, 支持实现自己的新想法, 但是在非营利部门你不能分红, 所以营利性部门独占了规模庞大的资本市场, 而非营利部门就只能艰难中求生存, 渴望资本的投入。

  Well, you put those five things together -- you can't use money to lure talent away from the for-profit sector, you can't advertise on anywhere near the scale the for-profit sector does for new customers, you can't take the kinds of risks in pursuit of those customers that the for-profit sector takes, you don't have the same amount of time to find them as the for-profit sector, and you don't have a stock market with which to fund any of this, even if you could do it in the first place, and you've just put the nonprofit sector at an extreme disadvantage to the for-profit sector on every level.

  第三个歧视的地方是通过新方式 募集资金的风险问题。 迪斯尼能够砸2亿美元拍电影,打了水漂的话 也不会有人打电话给司法部长。 但是如果你是一个救济组织的筹款人, 筹集了不到一百万美元,而你在头12个月中 没有将善款的75%发到救济人手中, 你的人品就会受到质疑。

  If we have any doubts about the effects of this separate rule book, this statistic is sobering: From 1970 to 2009, the number of nonprofits that really grew, that crossed the $50 million annual revenue barrier, is 144. In the same time, the number of for-profits that crossed it is 46,136. So we're dealing with social problems that are massive in scale, and our organizations can't generate any scale. All of the scale goes to Coca-Cola and Burger King.

  如果我们对这两套游戏规则带来的问题持怀疑态度, 下面的统计数字会让你震惊: 从1970年到2009年, 规模壮大的非营利组织数量, 超过5千万美元门槛的, 只有144家。 与此同时,营利性机构的数量 是46136家。 现状是我们需要处理的社会问题规模非常庞大, 而我们的组织却没有办法壮大到那样的规模。 只有像可口可乐公司或汉堡王连锁可以达到那样的规模。

  So why do we think this way? Well, like most fanatical dogma in America, these ideas come from old Puritan beliefs. The Puritans came here for religious reasons, or so they said, but they also came here because they wanted to make a lot of money. They were pious people but they were also really aggressive capitalists, and they were accused of extreme forms of profit-making tendencies compared to the other colonists.

  那么我们的这些观念是怎么来的? 跟美国的许多狂热信条一样, 这些观念都来自于以前的清教徒。 清教徒由于宗教原因来到美洲,他们这么说的, 但是他们来这里也是为了赚钱。 他们是虔诚的人,但是也赚起钱来 也非常的不择手段, 而相比其他的殖民者他们的赚钱方式更加激进, 也因此受到了很多谴责。

  But at the same time, the Puritans were Calvinists, so they were taught literally to hate themselves. They were taught that self-interest was a raging sea that was a sure path to eternal damnation. Well, this created a real problem for these people, right? Here they've come all the way across the Atlantic to make all this money. Making all this money will get you sent directly to Hell. What were they to do about this?

  但是与此同时,这些清教徒也信奉加尔文教派, 这个教派的观念让他们也厌恶自己。 他们被告知自私自利只会让自己 堕入地域,永不得救。 这给这些人出了一个大难题,对吧? 他们漂过大西洋来到这里就是为了赚钱, 赚钱让你坐上下地狱的直通车。 他们该怎么办?

  Well, charity became their answer. It became this economic sanctuary where they could do penance for their profit-making tendencies at five cents on the dollar. So of course, how could you make money in charity if charity was your penance for making money? Financial incentive was exiled from the realm of helping others so that it could thrive in the area of making money for yourself, and in 400 years, nothing has intervened to say, "That's counterproductive and that's unfair."

  慈善事业成了答案。 他们每追逐到1美元的利润, 就捐出5美分作为救赎的手段,慈善成了一个 经济实惠的避难所。 理所当然的,用来化解赚钱带来的罪恶的组织, 怎么能又自己跑去赚钱呢? 经济刺激被排除在慈善助人事业之外, 这样他们就可以放心大胆的去赚钱了。 400年来,没有人质疑这一点, 站出来说,“这不公平,也不科学。

  Now this ideology gets policed by this one very dangerous question, which is, "What percentage of my donation goes to the cause versus overhead?" There are a lot of problems with this question. I'm going to just focus on two. First, it makes us think that overhead is a negative, that it is somehow not part of the cause. But it absolutely is, especially if it's being used for growth. Now, this idea that overhead is somehow an enemy of the cause creates this second, much larger problem, which is, it forces organizations to go without the overhead things they really need to grow in the interest of keeping overhead low.

  这种观念引出来一个很危险的问题, 就是:“我的善款有多大比例给了受捐赠人,多大比例成了管理费?” 这带来了很多问题。 我就挑其中两个说。 第一,这让我们觉得管理费是很不好的东西, 对受捐赠人没有任何好处。 恰恰相反,尤其是这些费用被用来扩大筹款规模时。 而“管理费是慈善事业的敌人” 这种观念 引发了第二个,也是更大的问题, 就是这种观念迫使非营利组织放弃自己 真正应该处理的大问题, 而把精力放在控制管理费上。

  So we've all been taught that charities should spend as little as possible on overhead things like fundraising under the theory that, well, the less money you spend on fundraising, the more money there is available for the cause. Well, that's true if it's a depressing world in which this pie cannot be made any bigger. But if it's a logical world in which investment in fundraising actually raises more funds and makes the pie bigger, then we have it precisely backwards, and we should be investing more money, not less, in fundraising, because fundraising is the one thing that has the potential to multiply the amount of money available for the cause that we care about so deeply.

  我们都被灌输了这样的观念, 慈善团体的筹款等管理费用应该尽可能的低, 因为管理费比例越少, 受捐赠人能够拿到的钱就越多。 这种结论的前提是无论你怎么筹款, 这个冷漠的世界也不会给你更多的钱。 但是如果在现实世界中筹款活动 能够增加善款收入并且将规模扩大, 那么控制管理费这个观念就不合时宜, 而我们应该更多, 而不是更少的投钱到筹款活动中, 因为更大规模的筹款活动有可能筹到很多倍的善款, 可以帮助更多我们想要帮助的人。

  I'll give you two examples. We launched the AIDSRides with an initial investment of 50,000 dollars in risk capital. Within nine years, we had multiplied that 1,982 times into 108 million dollars after all expenses for AIDS services. We launched the breast cancer three-days with an initial investment of 350,000 dollars in risk capital.

  我讲两个例子。我们从风投那里 拿到了5万美元作为“AIDS骑行”的启动资金。 9年之后我们将这笔钱翻了1982倍,达到了1.08亿美元, 这是扣除了所有AIDS服务之后的盈余。 我们从风投那里拿到了35万美元 作为“关爱乳腺癌三日行走”活动的启动资金。

  Within just five years, we had multiplied that 554 times into 194 million dollars after all expenses for breast cancer research. Now, if you were a philanthropist really interested in breast cancer, what would make more sense: go out and find the most innovative researcher in the world and give her 350,000 dollars for research, or give her fundraising department the 350,000 dollars to multiply it into 194 million dollars for breast cancer research?

  不到5年时间我们就将善款翻了554倍, 扣除了乳腺癌研究费用之后 还剩下1.94亿美元。 如果你是一个慈善家,想要资助乳腺癌研究, 你觉得哪个更有意义: 找到一个世界上最有创造力的研究人员, 给她35万美元用于研究, 还是给筹款部门35万美元 让他们把乳腺癌研究的资金规模扩大到1.94亿?

  2002 was our most successful year ever. We netted for breast cancer alone, that year alone, 71 million dollars after all expenses. And then we went out of business, suddenly and traumatically.

  2002年是我们最成功的一年, 仅在乳腺癌项目一项上,扣除所有开支, 我们得到了7100万美元的盈余。 然后我们就被解散了, 以非常突然和不愉快的方式。

  Why? Well, the short story is, our sponsor split on us. They wanted to distance themselves from us because we were being crucified in the media for investing 40 percent of the gross in recruitment and customer service and the magic of the experience and there is no accounting terminology to describe that kind of investment in growth and in the future, other than this demonic label of overhead. So on one day, all 350 of our great employees lost their jobs because they were labeled overhead. Our sponsor went and tried the events on their own. The overhead went up. Net income for breast cancer research went down by 84 percent, or 60 million dollars in one year.

  为什么?简单的说,我们的赞助人背叛了我们。 他们希望和我们保持距离, 因为我们被媒体报道妖魔化了, 因为我们将总收入的40%投入到 人员培训、客户服务、提高用户体验上, 而这些为了组织自身发展和筹款规模扩大的投资 并没有办法在我们的财报中体现, 只能用被妖魔化的词“管理费”笼统概括。 于是有一天,所有350名雇员, 都被裁掉了, 因为他们都被打上了“额外开支”的标签。 我们的赞助人用自己的方式管理。 他们的管理费用更高, 乳腺癌研究基金的收入缩减了84%, 年收入只剩下了600万美元。

  This is what happens when we confuse morality with frugality. We've all been taught that the bake sale with five percent overhead is morally superior to the professional fundraising enterprise with 40 percent overhead, but we're missing the most important piece of information, which is, what is the actual size of these pies? Who cares if the bake sale only has five percent overhead if it's tiny? What if the bake sale only netted 71 dollars for charity because it made no investment in its scale and the professional fundraising enterprise netted 71 million dollars because it did? Now which pie would we prefer, and which pie do we think people who are hungry would prefer?

  发生这样的事情,是因为我们搞混了 “道德”和“节俭”这两个概念。 我们都被灌输了这样的观念,管理费只有5%的爱心面包义卖 要比专业的筹款企业更加高尚,因为后者的管理费高达40%, 但是我们忽略了最重要的信息,就是, 这张大饼(善款的规模)到底有多大? 如果这张大饼很小,谁会在意它的管理费只有5%? 如果爱心面包义卖只能够筹集71美元, 而专业筹款企业筹集了7100万美元, 差别就在于前者没有任何投资用于扩大规模 而后者做到了? 让你选你会选哪张大饼, 饥饿的受捐赠人去选他们会选择哪张?

  Here's how all of this impacts the big picture. I said that charitable giving is two percent of GDP in the United States. That's about 300 billion dollars a year. But only about 20 percent of that, or 60 billion dollars, goes to health and human services causes. The rest goes to religion and higher education and hospitals and that 60 billion dollars is not nearly enough to tackle these problems.

  这些加起来对总体的影响就是这样的。 我说过慈善捐赠只占美国GDP的2%。 也就是3000亿美元一年。 但是其中只有20%,也就是600亿美元, 被用于医疗和人道救助服务。 别的钱被用在宗教、高等教育、医院等地方。 而600亿美元根本不足以 处理这些问题。

  But if we could move charitable giving from two percent of GDP up just one step to three percent of GDP, by investing in that growth, that would be an extra 150 billion dollars a year in contributions, and if that money could go disproportionately to health and human services charities, because those were the ones we encouraged to invest in their growth, that would represent a tripling of contributions to that sector.

  但是如果我们能够通过筹款投资, 将我们的慈善捐赠比例从GDP的2%, 就提高一点,从2%提高到3%, 那就多出来1500亿美元用于慈善。 而如果这些钱更多的流向 医疗和人道援助服务项目, 这些都是我们鼓励进行筹款投资的组织, 这将使这些部门的收入翻3倍。

  Now we're talking scale. Now we're talking the potential for real change. But it's never going to happen by forcing these organizations to lower their horizons to the demoralizing objective of keeping their overhead low.

  这是我们想要的规模, 这是我们想要的真正的变革。 但是如果我们继续要求非营利组织 控制他们的管理费比例, 限制他们的视野,这一切都不可能发生。

  Our generation does not want its epitaph to read, "We kept charity overhead low." (Laughter) (Applause) We want it to read that we changed the world, and that part of the way we did that was by changing the way we think about these things. So the next time you're looking at a charity, don't ask about the rate of their overhead. Ask about the scale of their dreams, their Apple-, Google-, Amazon-scale dreams, how they measure their progress toward those dreams, and what resources they need to make them come true regardless of what the overhead is.

  我们这一代人没有人希望自己的墓碑上刻着 “我们把慈善管理费控制的很低。” (笑声)(掌声) 我们希望上面写着我们改变了世界, 而改变世界的途径之一就是 我们改变了我们对这些事情的思考方式。 所以下一次你遇到一个慈善组织, 不要问他们的管理费比例。 问他们有多大的梦想, 像苹果、谷歌、亚马逊那么大的梦想, 他们如何衡量他们与梦想的接近程度, 为了这个梦想他们需要什么帮助, 不要问管理费比例。

  Who cares what the overhead is if these problems are actually getting solved? If we can have that kind of generosity, a generosity of thought, then the non-profit sector can play a massive role in changing the world for all those citizens most desperately in need of it to change. And if that can be our generation's enduring legacy, that we took responsibility for the thinking that had been handed down to us, that we revisited it, we revised it, and we reinvented the whole way humanity thinks about changing things, forever, for everyone, well, I thought I would let the kids sum up what that would be. Annalisa Smith-Pallotta: That would be -- Sage Smith-Pallotta: -- a real social -- Rider Smith-Pallotta: -- innovation.

  如果真能够解决问题,谁还会去关心管理费比例? 如果我们能够有这样的一种宽容, 一种思想上的慷慨,那么我们的非营利部门就有可能 在扮演很重要的角色来改变世界, 帮助所有那些最需要帮助的人去改变。 而这种改变可能是我们这一代最宝贵的遗产之一, 我们有义务 去思考已经传递给我们的这一切, 我们重新审视它,修订完善它, 最终重新定义人类思考慈善事业的方式, 永远的,并且不漏掉任何人。 最后我想让我的孩子们做个总结。 Annalisa Smith-Pallotta: 那将是—— Sage Smith-Pallotta: 真正的 Rider Smith-Pallotta: 社会创新。

  Dan Pallotta: Thank you very much. Thank you.

  Dan Pallotta: 非常感谢,谢谢大家。

  (Applause) Thank you. (Applause)

  (掌声) 谢谢。(掌声)

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