金融时报:当心“金砖”失色

当心“金砖”失色

“金砖国家正在重蹈欧洲的覆辙”，美国外交关系委员会高级研究员，FT特约编辑塞巴斯蒂安·马拉贝(Sebastian Mallaby)说。

测试中可能遇到的词汇和知识：

debt denominated in domestic currency 内债

quiescent [kwɪ'es(ə)nt] 静止的

sclerotic labour market 僵化的劳动力市场：劳动力难自由流动、择业和雇佣限制过多、社会保障成本过高。比如曾有一英国人在法国开雪橇出租店被拘捕，因为他没有法国雪橇教师资格证——只有英国的资格证。

resilience [rɪ'zɪlɪəns] n.恢复力；弹力

blizzard ['blɪzəd] n.暴风雪

epitomize [ɪ'pɪtəmaɪz; e-] 摘要；概括；成为…的缩影

525 basis points 一个基点为万分之一，525个基点也就是5.25%

pervasive [pə'veɪsɪv] adj.普遍的，到处渗透的

macroeconomic and microeconomic n./adj.宏观经济与微观经济，前者关注的是GDP、物价水平、就业、进出口与政府债务等，后者研究的是单个生产者或消费者的生产和消费行为等。

Beware membership of this elite club (823 words)

A year ago, Brazil, Russia, India and China were the darlings of the world economy. Today, Brazil is barely growing, Russia is struggling and India and China are on course for their lowest growth in a decade. Although they are as different as they are similar, all four of the original Bric countries have contrived to stumble simultaneously. The lessons are that microeconomics can matter as much as macroeconomics – and that belonging to a prestigious economic club is hazardous.

The Brics, and emerging economies generally, deserve enormous credit for their macroeconomic management. In the 1970s and 1980s, one in two emerging and developing economies had double-digit inflation. Today, fewer than one in five do. As recently as the 1990s, the median emerging economy had public debt to gross domestic product of more than 65 per cent. In the past two years, the median has been below 40 per cent. Add in bulging foreign exchange reserves, debt denominated in domestic currency rather than dollars and (with China the big exception) flexible exchange rates, and the hype surrounding emerging economies seems almost reasonable.

Since the emerging market crises of 1997-2002, these strong macro foundations have delivered extraordinary performance.

When the global financial crisis hit, emerging economies’ budget deficits were small so the fiscal counterattack could be forceful. Inflation was quiescent so credit could be eased safely. In the 1990s, emerging economies that cut interest rates were punished with capital flight and currency collapse, triggering the bankruptcy of businesses with debts in dollars. This time, ample foreign exchange reserves offset capital flight and the shift away from dollar borrowing insured companies against depreciation.

That is the good news. But, as the rich world discovered in the wake of its own “Great Moderation”, resilient growth encourages complacency. In the US, households borrowed too much and regulators grew indulgent. In Europe, this pattern was amplified by the “club effect” of euro membership. Countries that had tightened their belts to meet the criteria for accession went soft once they were admitted. With cheap foreign capital buoying living standards, there was no will to fix microeconomic problems such as sclerotic labour markets.

The Brics are following a version of this playbook. Macroeconomic management remains credible. China, in particular, has dramatically cut export dependence without suffering a hard landing. But macro success has bred micro complacency. Governments have permitted themselves to meddle destructively in markets. State companies have been allowed to stifle innovative competitors. The upshot is that the resilience of the Brics in the face of the 2008 financial shock has not been matched by resilience to an extended period of weak global demand.

Consider Brazil. It boasts moderate inflation, sober public finances and a partially flexible exchange rate. Its central bank has tried to revive growth by reducing its lending rate by 525 basis points over the past 16 months. But growth this year will come in at barely more than 1 per cent because a blizzard of micro meddling has damaged business confidence. Petrobras, the state oil company that accounts for a 10th of the economy, epitomises this malady. Despite the discovery in 2007 of lucrative offshore oil, it is losing money because of local content rules and irrational fixed prices.

The story is similar in Russia. The current account is in surplus, inflation is modest and the budget is in balance. But microeconomic policy is lousy. Corruption deters investors. State companies elbow out private ones. Plans to diversify the economy have been a failure. Instead of building manufacturing exports, Russia is exporting skilled workers.

In some ways India is the odd one out: it runs a chronic budget deficit but shares the microeconomic weaknesses of its brethren. Corruption is pervasive and dysfunctional regulation inflicted blackouts on 600m consumers in the summer. Supply side rigidities handicap India’s economy so thoroughly that stimulus quickly causes inflation, which is close to 10 per cent. Last year the IMF projected India could sustain growth of 8.1 per cent per year. This year that has been revised to 6.9 percent.

The IMF’s estimate of trend growth in China has come down from 9.5 per cent to 8.5 per cent. As elsewhere, corruption and distorted prices are the key challenges. State-owned companies account for more than half the capitalisation of the stock market. They hog subsidised credit, hire the best graduates and lobby fiercely against deregulation. Li Keqiang, the incoming premier, recently said that China had used up its “demographic dividend” of plentiful labour and would now have to rely on a “reform dividend”. But China has yet to act accordingly.

For all their macroeconomic resilience, the business climate in the Brics is unreliable. In the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings, China comes in a shameful 91st, Russia 112th, Brazil 130th and India 132nd. By contrast, Rwanda, Oman, Colombia and Kazakhstan are all in the top 60. The Rocks could teach the Brics how to regain momentum.

请根据你所读到的文章内容，完成以下自测题目：

1."The Brics···deserve enormous credit for their macroeconomic management".This can be supported by?

A. Inflation went down.

B. Public debt to GDP ratio went down.

C. Foreign exchange reserves grew.

D. All of above.

答案(1)

2.For some european countries, the "club effect" is harmful in what way?

A. Fosters economic growth and standard of living.

B. Encourages foreign capital inflows.

C. They are less willing to reform their labour market.

D. Their once prudent fiscal policies became extravagant.

答案(2)

3.What are the similarities of the four BRIC countries?

A. Government's meddling destructively in markets.

B. Corruption deters investors.

C. Skilled workers fleeing out of the country.

D. Having used up “demographic dividend”.

答案(3)

4.What is true about the state companies in BRIC?

A. Brazil's state oil company accounts for 1/10 of the economy.

B. Russian state companies elbow out private ones.

C. Chinese state companies enjoy privileges of all kinds and lobby for maintaining them.

D. All of above.

答案(4)

* * *

(1) 答案：D.All of above.

解释： ABC三项都是正确的。文章第二段介绍了最近二三十年来以金砖国家为代表的新兴市场国家在宏观经济上取得了 不小的成就。除此三项之外，还有公共债务不再以外债为主，而是主要是内债；以及浮动利率制度——这一点中国除外。

(2) 答案：C.They are less willing to reform their labour market.

解释：C项是正确的。这四项在事实上都是正确的：加入欧盟后，利用一体化的市场和资本，“欧猪”等国家经济得到发展。 但是，加入欧盟前它们整顿财政，以达到入盟标准，但是加入后就不是这样了。 Countries that had tightened their belts to meet the criteria for accession went soft once they were admitted. 因此，“俱乐部效应”的一个坏处就是让这些国家不再积极fix microeconomic problems such as sclerotic labour markets.

(3) 答案：A.Government's meddling destructively in markets.

解释：严重的腐败阻碍了外国投资这事儿主要发生在俄罗斯和印度，至少目前中国和巴西还在吸引外资最多的国家之列。 技术人才流失主要发生在俄罗斯。人口红利被用完是李克强发出的警告，这个威胁出现在中国。 作者说金砖四国正重复那些欧洲国家的错误，也就是resilient growth encourages complacency. 要害就在政府干预太多，而国企势力太强大。

(4) 答案：D.All of above.、

解释：把欧元交易拉回欧陆的想法显然在欧陆国家得到了支持，而英国则奋力反击，向欧洲法院控告这不合法，侵犯了统一市场原则。 The policy has yet to come into effect only because the UK Treasury has challenged its validity at the European Court of Justice…