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双语·股票大作手回忆录 第三章

所属教程:译林版·股票大作手回忆录

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2022年04月22日

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It takes a man a long time to learn all the lessons of all his mistakes.They say there are two sides to everything.But there is only one side to the stock market;and it is not the bull side or the bear side,but the right side.It took me longer to get that general principle fixed firmly in my mind than it did most of the more technical phases of the game of stock speculation.

I have heard of people who amuse themselves conducting imaginary operations in the stock market to prove with imaginary dollars how right they are.Sometimes these ghost gamblers make millions.It is very easy to be a plunger that way.It is like the old story of the man who was going to fight a duel the next day.

His second asked him,“Are you a good shot?”

“Well,”said the duelist,“I can snap the stem of a wineglass at twenty paces,”and he looked modest.

“That's all very well,”said the unimpressed second.“But can you snap the stem of the wineglass while the wineglass is pointing a loaded pistol straight at your heart?”

With me I must back my opinions with my money.My losses have taught me that I must not begin to advance until I am sure I shall not have to retreat.But if I cannot advance I do not move at all.I do not mean by this that a man should not limit his losses when he is wrong.He should.But that should not breed indecision.All my life I have made mistakes,but in losing money I have gained experience and accumulated a lot of valuable don'ts.I have been flat broke several times,but my loss has never been a total loss.Otherwise,I wouldn't be here now.I always knew I would have another chance and that I would not make the same mistake a second time.I believed in myself.

A man must believe in himself and his judgment if he expects to make a living at this game.That is why I don't believe in tips.If I buy stocks on Smith's tip I must sell those same stocks on Smith's tip.I am depending on him.Suppose Smith is away on a holiday when the selling time comes around?No,sir,nobody can make big money on what someone else tells him to do.I know from experience that nobody can give me a tip or a series of tips that will make more money for me than my own judgment.It took me five years to learn to play the game intelligently enough to make big money when I was right.

I didn't have as many interesting experiences as you might imagine.I mean,the process of learning how to speculate does not seem very dramatic at this distance.I went broke several times,and that is never pleasant,but the way I lost money is the way everybody loses money who loses money in Wall Street.Speculation is a hard and trying business,and a speculator must be on the job all the time or he'll soon have no job to be on.

My task,as I should have known after my early reverses at Fullerton's,was very simple:To look at speculation from another angle.But I didn't know that there was much more to the game than I could possibly learn in the bucket shops.There I thought I was beating the game when in reality I was only beating the shop.At the same time the tape-reading ability that trading in bucket shops developed in me and the training of my memory have been extremely valuable.Both of these things came easy to me.I owe my early success as a trader to them and not to brains or knowledge,because my mind was untrained and my ignorance was colossal.The game taught me the game.And it didn't spare the rod while teaching.

I remember my very first day in New York.I told you how the bucket shops,by refusing to take my business,drove me to seek a reputable commission house.One of the boys in the office where I got my first job was working for Harding Brothers,members of the New York Stock Exchange.I arrived in this city in the morning,and before one o'clock that same day I had opened an account with the firm and was ready to trade.

I didn't explain to you how natural it was for me to trade there exactly as I had done in the bucket shops,where all I did was to bet on fluctuations and catch small but sure changes in prices.Nobody offered to point out the essential differences or set me right.If somebody had told me my method would not work I nevertheless would have tried it out to make sure for myself,for when I am wrong only one thing convinces me of it,and that is,to lose money.And I am only right when I make money.That is speculating.

They were having some pretty lively times those days and the market was very active.That always cheers up a fellow.I felt at home right away.There was the old familiar quotation board in front of me,talking a language that I had learned before I was fifteen years old.There was a boy doing exactly the same thing I used to do in the first office I ever worked in.There were the customers—same old bunch—looking at the board or standing by the ticket calling out the prices and talking about the market.The machinery was to all appearances the same machinery that I was used to.The atmosphere was the atmosphere I had breathed since I had made my first stock-market money—$3.12 in Burlington.The same kind of ticker and the same kind of traders,therefore the same kind of game.And remember,I was only twenty-two.I suppose I thought I knew the game from A to Z.Why shouldn't I?

I watched the board and saw something that looked good to me.It was behaving right.I bought a hundred at 84.I got out at 85 in less than a half hour.Then I saw something else I liked,and I did the same thing;took three-quarters of a point net within a very short time.I began well,didn't I?

Now mark this:On that,my first day as a customer of a reputable Stock Exchange house,and only two hours of it at that,I traded in eleven hundred shares of stock,jumping in and out.And the net result of the day's operations was that I lost exactly eleven hundred dollars.That is to say,on my first attempt,nearly one-half of my stake went up the flue.And remember,some of the trades showed me a profit.But I quit eleven hundred dollars minus for the day.

It didn't worry me,because I couldn't see where there was anything wrong with me.My moves,also,were right enough,and if I had been trading in the old Cosmopolitan shop I'd have broken better than even.That the machine wasn't as it ought to be,my eleven hundred vanished dollars plainly told me.But as long as the machinist was all right there was no need to stew.Ignorance at twenty-two isn't a structural defect.

After a few days I said to myself,“I can't trade this way here.The ticker doesn't help as it should!”But I let it go at that without getting down to bed rock.I kept it up,having good days and bad days,until I was cleaned out.I went to old Fullerton and got him to stake me to five hundred dollars.And I came back from St.Louis,as I told you,with money I took out of the bucket shops there—a game I could always beat.

I played more carefully and did better for a while.As soon as I was in easy circumstances I began to live pretty well.I made friends and had a good time.I was not quite twenty-three,remember;all alone in New York with easy money in my pockets and the belief in my heart that I was beginning to understand the new machine.

I was making allowances for the actual execution of my orders on the floor of the Exchange,and moving more cautiously.But I was still sticking to the tape—that is,I was still ignoring general principles;and as long as I did that I could not spot the exact trouble with my game.

We ran into the big boom of 1901 and I made a great deal of money—that is,for a boy.You remember those times?The prosperity of the country was unprecedented.We not only ran into an era of industrial consolidations and combinations of capital that beat anything we had had up to that time,but the public went stock mad.In previous flush times,I have heard,Wall Street used to brag of two-hundred-and-fifty-thousand-share days,when securities of a par value of twenty-five million dollars changed hands.But in 1901 we had a three-million-share day.Everybody was making money.The steel crowd came to town,a horde of millionaires with no more regard for money than drunken sailors.The only game that satisfied them was the stock market.We had some of the biggest high rollers the Street ever saw:John W.Gates,of‘Bet-you-a-million' fame,and his friends,like John A.Drake,Loyal Smith,and the rest;the Reid-Leeds-Moore crowd,who sold part of their Steel holdings and with the proceeds bought in the open market the actual majority of the stock of the great Rock Island system;and Schwab and Frick and Phipps and the Pittsburgh coterie;to say nothing of scores of men who were lost in the shuffle but would have been called great plungers at any other time.A fellow could buy and sell all the stock there was.Keene made a market for the U.S.Steel shares.A broker sold one hundred thousand shares in a few minutes.A wonderful time!And there were some wonderful winnings.And no taxes to pay on stock sales!And no day of reckoning in sight.

Of course,after a while,I heard a lot of calamity howling and the old stagers said everybody—except themselves—had gone crazy,But everybody except themselves was making money.I knew,of course,there must be a limit to the advances and an end to the crazy buying of A.O.T.—Any Old Thing—and I got bearish.But every time I sold I lost money,and if it hadn't been that I ran darn quick I'd have lost a heap more.I looked for a break,but I was playing safe—making money when I bought and chipping it out when I sold short—so that I wasn't profiting by the boom as much as you'd think when you consider how heavily I used to trade,even as a boy.

There was one stock that I wasn't short of,and that was Northern Pacific.My tape reading came in handy.I thought most stocks had been bought to a standstill,but Little Nipper behaved as if it were going still higher.We know now that both the common and the preferred were being steadily absorbed by the Kuhn-Loeb-Harriman combination.Well,I was long a thousand shares of Northern Pacific common,and held it against the advice of everybody in the office.When it got to about 110 I had thirty points profit,and I grabbed it.It made my balance at my brokers' nearly fifty thousand dollars,the greatest amount of money I had been able to accumulate up to that time.It wasn't so bad for a chap who had lost every cent trading in that selfsame office a few months before.

If you remember,the Harriman crowd notified Morgan and Hill of their intention to be represented in the Burlington-Great Northern-Northern Pacific combination,and then the Morgan people at first instructed Keene to buy fifty thousand shares of N.P.to keep the control in their possession.I have heard that Keene told Robert Bacon to make the order one hundred and fifty thousand shares and the bankers did.At all events,Keene sent one of his brokers,Eddie Norton,into the N.P,crowd and he bought one hundred thousand shares of the stock.This was followed by another order,I think,of fifty thousand shares additional,and the famous corner followed.After the market closed on May 8,1901,the whole world knew that a battle of financial giants was on.No two such combinations of capital had ever opposed each other in this country.Harriman against Morgan;an irresistible force meeting an immovable object.

There I was on the morning of May ninth with nearly fifty thousand dollars in cash and no stocks.As I told you,I had been very bearish for some days,and here was my chance at last.I knew what would happen—an awful break and then some wonderful bargains.There would be a quick recovery and big profits—for those who had picked up the bargains.It didn't take a Sherlock Holmes to figure this out.We were going to have an opportunity to catch them coming and going,not only for big money but for sure money.

Everything happened as I had foreseen.I was dead right and—I lost every cent I had!I was wiped out by something that was unusual.If the unusual never happened there would be no difference in people and then there wouldn't be any fun in life.The game would become merely a matter of addition and subtraction.It would make of us a race of bookkeepers with plodding minds.It's the guessing that develops a man's brain power.Just consider what you have to do to guess right.

The market fairly boiled,as I had expected.The transactions were enormous and the fluctuations unprecedented in extent.I put in a lot of selling orders at the market.When I saw the opening prices I had a fit,the breaks were so awful.My brokers were on the job.They were as competent and conscientious as any;but by the time they executed my orders the stocks had broken twenty points more.The tape was way behind the market and reports were slow in coming in by reason of the awful rush of business.When I found out that the stocks I had ordered sold when the tape said the price was,say,100 and they got mine off at 80,making a total decline of thirty or forty points from the previous night's close,it seemed to me that I was putting out shorts at a level that made the stocks I sold the very bargains I had planned to buy.The market was not going to drop right through to China.So I decided instantly to cover my shorts and go long.

My brokers bought;not at the level that had made me turn,but at the prices prevailing in the Stock Exchange when their floor man got my orders.They paid an average of fifteen points more than I had figured on.A loss of thirty-five points in one day was more than anybody could stand.

The ticker beat me by lagging so far behind the market.I was accustomed to regarding the tape as the best little friend I had because I bet according to what it told me.But this time the tape double-crossed me.The divergence between the printed and the actual prices undid me.It was the sublimation of my previous unsuccess,the selfsame thing that had beaten me before.It seems so obvious now that tape reading is not enough,irrespective of the brokers' execution,that I wonder why I didn't then see both my trouble and the remedy for it.

I did worse than not see it;I kept on trading,in and out,regardless of the execution.You see,I never could trade with a limit.I must take my chances with the market.That is what I am trying to beat—the market,not the particular price.When I think I should sell,I sell.When I think stocks will go up,I buy.My adherence to that general principle of speculation saved me.To have traded at limited prices simply would have been my old bucket-shop method inefficiently adapted for use in a reputable commission broker's office.I would never have learned to know what stock speculation is,but would have kept on betting on what a limited experience told me was a sure thing.

Whenever I did try to limit the prices in order to minimize the disadvantages of trading at the market when the ticker lagged,I simply found that the market got away from me.This happened so often that I stopped trying.I can't tell you how it came to take me so many years to learn that instead of placing piking bets on what the next few quotations were going to be,my game was to anticipate what was going to happen in a big way.

After my May ninth mishap I plugged along,using a modified but still defective method.If I hadn't made money some of the time I might have acquired market wisdom quicker.But I was making enough to enable me to live well.I liked friends and a good time.I was living down the Jersey Coast that summer,like hundreds of prosperous Wall Street men.My winnings were not quite enough to offset both my losses and my living expenses.

I didn't keep on trading the way I did through stubbornness.I simply wasn't able to state my own problem to myself,and,of course,it was utterly hopeless to try to solve it.I harp on this topic so much to show what I had to go through before I got to where I could really make money.My old shotgun and BB shot could not do the work of a high-power repeating rifle against big game.

Early that fall I not only was cleaned out again but I was so sick of the game I could no longer beat that I decided to leave New York and try something else some other place.I had been trading since my fourteenth year.I had made my first thousand dollars when I was a kid of fifteen,and my first ten thousand before I was twenty-one.I had made and lost a ten-thousand-dollar stake more than once.In New York I had made thousands and lost them.I got up to fifty thousand dollars and two days later that went.I had no other business and knew no other game.After several years I was back where I began.No—worse,for I had acquired habits and a style of living that required money;though that part didn't bother me as much as being wrong so consistently.

于人而言,吃一堑长一智需要花费大量时间。谁都知道事物具有两面性,可股市却始终只有一面。不是多头的一面,也不是空头的一面,而是正确的一面。真正记住这条通则所花费的时间,远远超过股票投机游戏中很多技术层次的东西。

据说有人能模拟操作股市,证明自己有多厉害。这些玄幻的赌徒有时的确能赚很多钱,这样很容易让人成为大赌特赌的赌徒,就像老故事里说的那样,某人第二天要与人决斗。

助手问他:“你能行吗?”

决斗的人说:“当然,我能在二十步之外射中酒杯脚。”他还一副很谦虚的样子。

“厉害啊。”助手没任何反应,“可酒杯上若有个手枪对着你的心脏,而且已经上膛了,你还能行吗?”

我觉得,必须要拥有实际赚到的钱才能证明自己的观点正确。我过去栽的跟头让我明白:只有百分百坚信不会后退,才可以开始前进。如果不能前进,那就蛰伏待动。我的意思并非说人犯错了不要去止损。他就该那样做,不过最好不要把自己培养成优柔寡断的人。我这辈子总在犯错,不过我会吸取教训,也总结了一些很实用的经验。有那么几次,我的亏损很大,但是我的亏损从来都不是彻底的亏损。不然的话,我现在也就不是我了。我总是相信自己还有机会,我不会在同一条道上摔两次。我相信自己。

如果谁要靠这种游戏过活的话,就必须要自信,只有自信才不至于盲目相信各种乱七八糟的内幕消息。如果按照史密斯的内幕消息去买进卖出,那他就成了我的心理依靠,他一旦外出度假,又恰逢交易的好机会来了,那该怎么办?不能这样啊,先生,可不能靠别人教我们怎么去赚钱。以我的经验来看,只有靠自己的判断才能赚更多钱,不管谁提供的消息都比不上这个,我用五年时间才学会了怎么聪明地玩这个游戏,足以让我在自己正确时赚大钱。

我身上没有多少你认为的那种有趣经历。我的意思是,学习怎么样去投机股票,这个历程没有什么趣味性。我有好多令人不爽的失败经历,跟华尔街上的那些人一模一样。投机是一件非常耗人的艰难事情,玩的人一定要紧盯着不能松懈,不然的话随时都可能会失业。

本来,我要做的事情也不难,在受到富勒顿公司的打击后我就应该知道了:换个角度去看待投机。但我没有很快认识到,其实很多东西在对赌行都没办法学到。我觉得在投机过程中已经能手到擒来了,其实只不过是在对赌行有点小小战绩而已。而在对赌行的那些日子的确让我的分析判断能力有所提升,尤其是训练了记忆力。这两点我学得很好。身为交易人士,我起先的那些成功经历都源于这两点,而并不是我有多么聪明或者多么博学,我没受过头脑训练,是很无知的。在玩这个游戏的过程中我学会了操作,而且这个游戏也在教导我的同时很冷血地鞭打我。

直到现在我都记得初到纽约那天的情形。我提到过对赌行不跟我做生意,所以我只能去找名号响亮的经纪人。我原来有个同事在纽交所会员企业哈丁兄弟公司工作,我早上到纽约后,中午一点前就在那家公司开好了股票账户,准备交易。

我没有跟你解释过。我是多么自然而然地就玩起对赌行那一套,瞅准股价走势,伺机捕捉一小段一定会出现的价格变化。没人对我说这与原来有何不同,要是有人告诉我这样是不行的,那我也一定会去验证一番。只有赔钱才让我相信我错了,只要能赚钱就是正确之道。这就是投机的实质。

那段时日,股市活跃,股民们轻松快活,很让人兴奋,我一下子就如鱼得水。熟悉的股市行情公告就在我的眼前,大家谈的话我15岁以前就学会了。有个男孩干着我刚开始做事时干的那些活,股民们一动不动地看着股市行情公告牌,大喊着股价数字,讨论着行情。机器跟我熟悉的机器显然完全一样。空气和我在伯灵顿赚到第一笔钱(就是那3.12美元)以来所呼吸的空气一样。行情还是那样的行情,股民还是那种股民,游戏也还是那个游戏。不要忘记,这时候我才22岁,我觉得自己已经完全掌握了这个游戏规则,难道不是这样吗?

我专心观察着股市行情公告牌,看准了想买的股票,它的形势不错,84美元,我买了100股,没到半个小时,我就以85美元抛掉。紧接着,我又瞅准了另一只股票,然后用相同手法行事,在很短的时间里净赚3/4个点。初试身手就旗开得胜,不是吗?

请注意,在这家名气很响的地方,光在头一天只花了两个小时,我就买卖了1100股,抢进抢出。但是那天的结果是,我赔掉了1100美元,意思是我在纽交所第一次出手就损失了一半资金。请记住,有赚钱的时候,但最后赔掉了1100美元。

我没有在意,因为我根本不知道哪里出错了。我的每一步都稳稳当当,如果在之前的对赌行,肯定是稳赚不赔的。失去的那1100美元很清楚地告诉我,机器没有以正常的方式对待我,可只要机器操作人员没有问题,就没什么可担心的。22岁年轻人的懵懂不是什么大弱点。

过了几天,我告诉自己:“在这里这样交易可不行,这里出来的信息没有多大的参考价值。”不过这也就是一闪念的事,我没深想,继续按照老路子玩,有赚有赔,一直赔到一文不剩,我就去跟老富勒顿借了500美元。后来我带着从对赌行赚到的那些钱,再次由圣路易斯跑到纽约。

我学得更加谨慎,有一阵子还玩得比较顺手。手头一宽裕,我就尽力让生活惬意点。我认识了一些新朋友,日子过得还不错。不要忘记,我才不到23岁,一个人能闯荡纽约,口袋里也有挣来的钱,我心中坚信我已经开始了解新的股价机器了。

我开始考虑我的单子下到证券交易所大厅后实际的执行情况,行动变得特别谨慎,不过我还是相信来自纸上的那些信息,没有在意普遍性的规则。我一直不转变方式,就看不出自己操作上的真正问题。

1901年,经济开始进入大增长时期,我挣了很多钱——对一个年轻人来说——是很多钱。你还记得那些日子吗?国家经济繁荣,工业兼并和资本重组来势汹汹,股市被疯狂地托举起来。我听说以前日子红火时,华尔街号称日成交量达到了25万股,一天能倒腾2500万美元的股票。到1901年,股民们制造了日成交量300万股的创世纪录,每个人都在赚钱。那些挥金如土的钢铁巨头也进来了,都是些百万富翁,能让他们感到满意的游戏就是闯荡股市。我们曾遇到过这样的大人物:约翰·盖茨和他的一群朋友,他们常挂在嘴边的一句话就是“赌个100万”,比如约翰·德里克、罗伊尔·史密斯这些里德-利兹-摩尔集团的人,他们把钢铁公司的股份卖掉,然后在股市把罗德岛系统的一大半股份买进手里。还有施瓦布、弗里克、菲甫斯和匹斯堡集团,更别提很多很多在这场金钱易主的游戏中亏了本,但在其他行当里都被奉为大作手的人了。你可以买卖所有的股票。凯恩炒热了美国钢铁公司的股票。一个经纪人几分钟就能卖掉10万股,多美好的时代啊,多令人艳羡的巨头啊,而且人们不用为卖掉股票纳税,简直就是一派没有终点的祥和气氛。

没多久,我听到了熊市要来的流言。老手们都说,除了他们,其他人都是疯子。可事实却是除了他们外,其他人都赚到了钱。我自然知道,牛市总有到头的时候,见股票就收入囊中的疯劲儿也有终止的一天——我做好了面对熊市的心理准备。可我每次卖出后都在亏,如果不是我出手快,可能会赔更多。我梦想着股市暴跌,但我也小心翼翼地操作。我买进的股票赚了钱,抛掉的又赔本了,一直没赚什么大钱,虽然你们会因为我出手豪爽而觉得我赚了不少。

有一只股票我一直没放空,就是北太平洋铁路的股票。我以往具有的那些能力有了用武之地,通过分析后我觉得大多数股票都已经被人买到久盘不动了,而北太平洋的走势却很好,可能还会上涨。我们现在都清楚,当时不管是普通股还是优先股,都被库恩-罗布-哈里曼集团收入囊中。我手里握着北太平洋1000普通股,没有被其他人的意见左右,一直牢牢抓住不放。当它涨到110美元的时候,已经上涨了30个点,我立马伺机卖掉,赚了将近5万美元,这是那时候我赚得最多的一笔钱。对于几个月前在同一个地方还赔得吐血的人来说,这种成绩就算非常难得了。

你可能记得,哈里曼集团那时候通知摩根集团和希尔集团说,他们要取代摩根在北太平洋铁路公司的地位,然后摩根集团事先让操盘的凯恩买进5万股北太平洋,设法保住他们对公司的控股权。据说,凯恩让银行家罗伯特·培根做好了买15万股的准备,罗伯特照办了。总之,凯恩派了他的经纪人艾迪·诺顿去买北太平洋的10万股。我觉得,他们接下来又买了5万股,然后演变成一场著名的收购大战。1901年5月8日闭市后,谁都知道有两家金融巨鳄的战争正在持续。这个国家从未出现过规模如此庞大的巨头资本之战,哈里曼对战摩根,真正的棋逢对手啊。

5月9日早上,我拿着5万美元现金,没有一只股票。我说过,我做好了迎接熊市的准备,现在机会来了。我知道接下来要发生的事情:从暴跌开始,接着很多价格低廉的股票充斥股市,用不了多久又马上反弹,然后那些低价买进的股民们就会大赚。这都不用他福尔摩斯来推理我也能判断出这一点。我们即将有机会在股价一涨一跌之间稳稳当当地获取巨大利润。

所有事情都在我的预料之中,可是我却赔尽了钱。我没有料到会有一些意外出现。如果人们不遇到突发事件,大家就不会有什么差别,生活该是多么无趣,炒股也就只是乏味的增减,而股民也只是思维僵化的记账员而已。恰恰就是预测让人脑洞大开。你只要想想要猜得正确你必须做什么,就知道这一点。

就像我预测的那样,股市又变得疯狂了,巨额的成交量,变幻无常的股价。我下了一大堆卖单。我看到想做的股票开盘价不是太好,心里一阵兴奋。经纪人为我忙着,他们与其他经纪人一样兢兢业业,可等到他们执行我的单子时,价格已经跌了20多个点。成交量太大了,报价纸带上的数字远远落在市况之后。当我按报价纸带显示的股价,比如100美元,下单卖出股票时,经纪人却以80美元替我卖掉,比前一天的收盘价还低三四十美元,这好像是我花钱让股价跌落到我想买的低价了。不过股价不会一直这样下跌,所以我马上决定平了空头,掉转方向做多头。

经纪人按照交易所接到单子时候的那个股价买进股票,并不能按照能让我有利可图的那个股价买,而是他们的场内人员拿到我的委托单时,证券交易所的市价。他们付出的价格比我预估的高出15点,谁能受得了一天之内就损失35点呢。

我被滞后的信息完全损伤了,根据报价机信息判断行情的习惯耍了我,纸上显示的股价和真实的股价不符让我遭受了大损失。我被曾经让我失败过的东西再次打倒。如此看来,光靠那些滞后的信息,而不顾经纪人是怎么操作的会吃大亏。我特别吃惊,为什么早没有搞明白这点而找到应对措施呢。

我的行为比看不出来还糟糕,我继续交易,继续抢进抢出,也没考虑经纪人的操作规律。你知道,我没做过限价交易,我要抓住机会,打败股市而不是股价。我一旦觉得可以卖就赶紧卖掉,觉得股价会涨就赶紧买进,坚守投机的这一条通则挽救了我。在对赌行里的那一套——简单地玩限价交易——在股票交易所里也可以使用。倘若不是吃了亏,我就学不到实打实的投机玩法,只能按照粗浅的经验一直冒险。

为了减少纸带机滞后于股市的不利影响,我每次都尝试玩限价买卖,但股市一直飞速变化,我只好放弃这样的做法。我都不知道为什么会有这样的改变,耗了那么多年,我才知道不能赌随后几档的小小起伏,而应该赌预期即将出现的大波动。

5月9日赔了以后,我就改变了做法,不过还是有漏洞。要不是偶尔会赚点钱,我可能会更快地学到市场中的智慧。但我赚到的钱也够我舒服地生活,开心地享受生活。那年夏天,我跟其他富裕发达的华尔街人一样,到新泽西海滨去避暑,只是赚的钱不足以支撑我的亏损和生活开销。

我继续那样交易,不是因为我顽固不化,而是我不知道问题出在哪里,更别说如何解决了。我不厌其烦地说这些,只是想让你知道,天将降大任于我,必会先让我吃些苦。在对付大型动物时,我的那杆老猎枪与高超的来复枪相比,劣势太明显了。

这年秋天,我一方面输掉了全部的资金,另一方面对屡败屡战的炒股游戏也产生了厌倦,我做出了离开纽约的决定,想换个地方换个方向玩。我从14岁开始玩股票,15岁赚到第一个1000美元,21岁赚到第一个1万美元。我很多次赚了上万美元又亏掉了。我在纽约赚过几千、几万美元,又把这些钱亏掉了。我最多赚过5万美元,两天后,又赔得血本无归。我没有其他的生意,也不知道别的游戏。几年以后,我被打回原点。更不幸的是,我变得花钱如流水一般,虽然这没有赔钱那样令我不舒服。

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