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双语·股票大作手回忆录 第十五章

所属教程:译林版·股票大作手回忆录

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2022年05月04日

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AMONG the hazards of speculation the happening of the unexpected— I might even say of the unexpectable—ranks high.There are certain chances that the most prudent man is justified in taking—chances that he must take if he wishes to be more than a mercantile mollusk.Normal business hazards are no worse than the risks a man runs when he goes out of his house into the street or sets out on a railroad journey.When I lose money by reason of some development which nobody could foresee I think no more vindictively of it than I do of an inconveniently timed storm.Life itself from the cradle to the grave is a gamble and what happens to me because I do not possess the gift of second sight I can bear undisturbed.But there have been times in my career as a speculator when I have both been right and played square and nevertheless I have been cheated out of my earnings by the sordid unfairness of unsportsmanlike opponents.

Against misdeeds by crooks,cowards and crowds a quick-thinking or far-sighted business man can protect himself.I have never gone up against downright dishonesty except in a bucket shop or two because even there honesty was the best policy;the big money was in being square and not in welshing.I have never thought it good business to play any game in any place where it was necessary to keep an eye on the dealer because he was likely to cheat if unwatched.But against the whining welsher the decent man is powerless.Fair play is fair play.I could tell you a dozen instances where I have been the victim of my own belief in the sacredness of the pledged word or of the inviolability of a gentlemen's agreement.I shall not do so because no useful purpose can be served thereby.

Fiction writers,clergymen and women are fond of alluding to the floor of the Stock Exchange as a boodlers' battlefield and to Wall Street's daily business as a fight.It is quite dramatic but utterly misleading.I do not think that my business is strife and contest.I never fight either individuals or speculative cliques.I merely differ in opinion—that is,in my reading of basic conditions.What playwrights call battles of business are not fights between human beings.They are merely tests of business vision.I try to stick to facts and facts only,and govern my actions accordingly.That is Bernard M.Baruch's recipe for success in wealth-winning.Sometimes I do not see the facts—all the facts—clearly enough or early enough;or else I do not reason logically.Whenever any of these things happen I lose.I am wrong.And it always costs me money to be wrong.

No reasonable man objects to paying for his mistakes.There are no preferred creditors in mistake-making and no exceptions or exemptions.But I object to losing money when I am right.I do not mean,either,those deals that have cost me money because of sudden changes in the rules of some particular exchange.I have in mind certain hazards of speculation that from time to time remind a man that no profit should be counted safe until it is deposited in your bank to your credit.

After the Great War broke out in Europe there began the rise in the prices of commodities that was to be expected.It was as easy to foresee that as to foresee war inflation.Of course the general advance continued as the war prolonged itself.As you may remember,I was busy“coming back”in 1915.The boom in stocks was there and it was my duty to utilise it.My safest,easiest and quickest big play was in the stock market,and I was lucky,as you know.

By July,1917,I not only had been able to pay off all my debts but was quite a little to the good besides.This meant that I now had the time,the money and the inclination to consider trading in commodities as well as in stocks.For many years I have made it my practice to study all the markets.The advance in commodity prices over the pre-war level ranged from 100 to 400 per cent.There was only one exception,and that was coffee.Of course there was a reason for this.The breaking out of the war meant the closing up of European markets and huge cargoes were sent to this country,which was the one big market.That led in time to an enormous surplus of raw coffee here,and that,in turn,kept the price low.Why,when I first began to consider its speculative possibilities coffee was actually selling below pre-war prices.If the reasons for this anomaly were plain,no less plain was it that the active and increasingly efficient operation by the German and Austrian submarines must mean an appalling reduction in the number of ships available for commercial purposes.This eventually in turn must lead to dwindling imports of coffee.With reduced receipts and an unchanged consumption the surplus stocks must be absorbed,and when that happened the price of coffee must do what the prices of all other commodities had done,which was,go way up.

It didn't require a Sherlock Holmes to size up the situation.Why everybody did not buy coffee I cannot tell you.When I decided to buy it I did not consider it a speculation.It was much more of an investment.I knew it would take time to cash in,but I knew also that it was bound to yield a good profit.That made it a conservative investment operation—a banker's act rather than a gambler's play.

I started my buying operations in the winter of 1917.I took quite a lot of coffee.The market,however,did nothing to speak of.It continued inactive and as for the price,it did not go up as I had expected.The outcome of it all was that I simply carried my line to no purpose for nine long months.My contracts expired then and I sold out all my options.I took a whopping big loss on that deal and yet I was sure my views were sound.I had been clearly wrong in the matter of time,but I was confident that coffee must advance as all commodities had done,so that no sooner had I sold out my line than I started in to buy again.I bought three times as much coffee as I had so unprofitably carried during those nine disappointing months.Of course I bought deferred options—for as long a time as I could get.

I was not so wrong now.As soon as I had taken on my trebled line the market began to go up.People everywhere seemed to realise all of a sudden what was bound to happen in the coffee market.It began to look as if my investment was going to return me a mighty good rate of interest.

The sellers of the contracts I held were roasters,mostly of German names and affiliations,who had bought the coffee in Brazil confidently expecting to bring it to this country.But there were no ships to bring it,and presently they found themselves in the uncomfortable position of having no end of coffee down there and being heavily short of it to me up here.

Please bear in mind that I first became bullish on coffee while the price was practically at a pre-war level,and don't forget that after I bought it I carried it the greater part of a year and then took a big loss on it.The punishment for being wrong is to lose money.The reward for being right is to make money.Being clearly right and carrying a big line,I was justified in expecting to make a killing.It would not take much of an advance to make my profit satisfactory to me,for I was carrying several hundred thousand bags.I don't like to talk about my operations in figures because sometimes they sound rather formidable and people might think I was boasting.As a matter of fact I trade in accordance to my means and always leave myself an ample margin of safety.In this instance I was conservative enough.The reason I bought options so freely was because I couldn't see how I could lose.Conditions were in my favour.I had been made to wait a year,but now I was going to be paid both for my waiting and for being right.I could see the profit coming—fast.There wasn't any cleverness about it.It was simply that I wasn't blind.

Coming sure and fast,that profit of millions!But it never reached me.No;it wasn't side-tracked by a sudden change in conditions.The market did not experience an abrupt reversal of form.Coffee did not pour into the country.What happened?The unexpectable!What had never happened in anybody's experience;what I therefore had no reason to guard against.I added a new one to the long list of hazards of speculation that I must always keep before me.It was simply that the fellows who had sold me the coffee,the shorts,knew what was in store for them,and in their efforts to squirm out of the position into which they had sold themselves,devised a new way of welshing.They rushed to Washington for help,and got it.

Perhaps you remember that the Government had evolved various plans for preventing further profiteering in necessities.You know how most of them worked.Well,the philanthropic coffee shorts appeared before the Price Fixing Committee of the War Industries Board—I think that was the official designation—and made a patriotic appeal to that body to protect the American breakfaster.They asserted that a professional speculator,one Lawrence Livingston,had cornered,or was about to corner,coffee.If his speculative plans were not brought to naught he would take advantage of the conditions created by the war and the American people would be forced to pay exorbitant prices for their daily coffee.It was unthinkable to the patriots who had sold me cargoes of coffee they couldn't find ships for,that one hundred millions of Americans,more or less,should pay tribute to conscienceless speculators.They represented the coffee trade,not the coffee gamblers,and they were willing to help the Government curb profiteering actual or prospective.

Now I have a horror of whiners and I do not mean to intimate that the Price Fixing Committee was not doing its honest best to curb profiteering and wastefulness.But that need not stop me from expressing the opinion that the committee could not have gone very deeply into the particular problem of the coffee market.They fixed on a maximum price for raw coffee and also fixed a time limit for closing out all existing contracts.This decision meant,of course,that the Coffee Exchange would have to go out of business.There was only one thing for me to do and I did it,and that was to sell out all my contracts.Those profits of millions that I had deemed as certain to come my way as any I ever made failed completely to materialise.I was and am as keen as anybody against the profiteer in the necessaries of life,but at the time the Price Fixing Committee made their ruling on coffee,all other commodities were selling at from 250 to 400 per cent above pre-war prices while raw coffee was actually below the average prevailing for some years before the war.I can't see that it made any real difference who held the coffee.The price was bound to advance;and the reason for that was not the operations of conscienceless speculators,but the dwindling surplus for which the diminishing importations were responsible,and they in turn were affected exclusively by the appalling destruction of the world's ships by the German submarines.The committee did not wait for coffee to start;they clamped on the brakes.

As a matter of policy and of expediency it was a mistake to force the Coffee Exchange to close just then.If the committee had let coffee alone the price undoubtedly would have risen for the reasons I have already stated,which had nothing to do with any alleged corner.But the high price—which need not have been exorbitant—would have been an incentive to attract supplies to this market.I have heard Mr.Bernard M.Baruch say that the War Industries Board took into consideration this factor—the insuring of a supply—in fixing prices,and for that reason some of the complaints about the high limit on certain commodities were unjust.When the Coffee Exchange resumed business,later on,coffee sold at twenty-three cents.The American people paid that price because of the small supply,and the supply was small because the price had been fixed too low,at the suggestion of philanthropic shorts,to make it possible to pay the high ocean freights and thus insure continued importations.

I have always thought that my coffee deal was the most legitimate of all my trades in commodities.I considered it more of an investment than a speculation.I was in it over a year.If there was any gambling it was done by the patriotic roasters with German names and ancestry.They had coffee in Brazil and they sold it to me in New York.The Price Fixing Committee fixed the price of the only commodity that had not advanced.They protected the public against profiteering before it started,but not against the inevitable higher prices that followed.Not only that,but even when green coffee hung around nine cents a pound,roasted coffee went up with everything else.It was only the roasters who benefited.If the price of green coffee had gone up two or three cents a pound it would have meant several millions for me.And it wouldn't have cost the public as much as the later advance did.

Post-mortems in speculation are a waste of time.They get you nowhere.But this particular deal has a certain educational value.It was as pretty as any I ever went into.The rise was so sure,so logical,that I figured that I simply couldn't help making several millions of dollars.But I didn't.

On two other occasions I have suffered from the action of exchange committees making rulings that changed trading rules without warning.But in those cases my own position,while technically right,was not quite so sound commercially as in my coffee trade.You cannot be dead sure of anything in a speculative operation.It was the experience I have just told you that made me add the unexpectable to the unexpected in my list of hazards.

After the coffee episode I was so successful in other commodities and on the short side of the stock market,that I began to suffer from silly gossip.The professionals in Wall Street and the newspaper writers got the habit of blaming me and my alleged raids for the inevitable breaks in prices.At times my selling was called unpatriotic—whether I was really selling or not.The reason for exaggerating the magnitude and the effect of my operations,I suppose,was the need to satisfy the public's insatiable demand for reasons for each and every price movement.

As I have said a thousand times,no manipulation can put stocks down and keep them down.There is nothing mysterious about this.The reason is plain to everybody who will take the trouble to think about it half a minute.Suppose an operator raided a stock—that is,put the price down to a level below its real value—what would inevitably happen?Why,the raider would at once be up against the best kind of inside buying.The people who know what a stock is worth will always buy it when it is selling at bargain prices.If the insiders are not able to buy,it will be because general conditions are against their free command of their own resources,and such conditions are not bull conditions.When people speak about raids the inference is that the raids are unjustified;almost criminal.But selling a stock down to a price much below what it is worth is mighty dangerous business.It is well to bear in mind that a raided stock that fails to rally is not getting much inside buying and where there is a raid— that is,unjustified short selling—there is usually apt to be inside buying;and when there is that,the price does not stay down.I should say that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred,so-called raids are really legitimate declines,accelerated at times but not primarily caused by the operations of a professional trader,however big a line he may be able to swing.

The theory that most of the sudden declines or particular sharp breaks are the results of some plunger's operations probably was invented as an easy way of supplying reasons to those speculators who,being nothing but blind gamblers,will believe anything that is told them rather than do a little thinking.The raid excuse for losses that unfortunate speculators so often receive from brokers and financial gossipers is really an inverted tip.The difference lies in this:A bear tip is distinct,positive advice to sell short.But the inverted tip—that is,the explanation that does not explain—serves merely to keep you from wisely selling short.The natural tendency when a stock breaks badly is to sell it.There is a reason—an unknown reason but a good reason;therefore get out.But it is not wise to get out when the break is the result of a raid by an operator,because the moment he stops the price must rebound.Inverted tips!

在市场投机过程中,出现无法预估的事情的可能性很大,风险非常高。有些风险,很多非常谨慎的人都该承受,他如果想在市场上不那么畏畏缩缩,就要承担风险。正常的商业风险,没有出门逛街或者坐火车旅行那么危险。我对受到无法预测的事情而赔本的情势的怨恨不会比对来得不是时候的暴风雨更多。从摇篮到坟墓,这个生命的过程本身就是一场赌博。我没法预知未来,所以对遇到的所有事情都可以承受,不觉得受到困扰。不过,在我从事投机事业的生涯里,有几次我判断正确,操作也没错,却被一些宵小之徒卑鄙地骗走了获利。

一个反应迅捷和眼光深远的人会通过对骗子、懦夫和乌合之众进行反击而保护自己。除了在以前的一些对赌行里以外,我从来没有遇到十分卑鄙、恶劣的不诚实做法,就算在对赌行那样的地方,诚实也是最可取的准则。赚大钱需要公平公正地赚,而不是通过欺诈与蒙骗。我不觉得随时随地都必须放亮眼睛以免上当是好的市场交易行为。不过,一个正直的人遇到那种卑劣的人是丝毫没办法的。公平竞争就是公平竞争。我还可以说出十几个例子来,在这些活生生的实例中,我都是因为一言九鼎或者相信别人能够一言九鼎而受到损害。不过这些事情我不会讲出来的,已经没什么意义了。

有很多人,比如小说家、宗教人士或者妇女们,都觉得股票交易所是贿赂公行的战场,或是把华尔街人的日常业务说成是一场战争。这种说法相当耸动,却彻底误导了大家。我不觉得我的副业是引发冲突或者发动战争。我从来没有对哪个人或群体发过战书,只是各自有不同的看法,不同的观点,仅此而已。戏剧家们所谓的那种商战,不是人与人之间的战争,而是商业观念上的较量。我努力去相信事实,并且据此行动,这就是贝纳德·巴鲁奇能够成功的秘诀。有时候,我没有完全看清客观事实,或者没有及时了解全部的事实,或者没有做出合理的推论。一旦出现这种情况,我就会亏钱。只要一出错,代价就是付出金钱。

凡是理智的人,都不会反对为自己所犯的错付出代价。谁犯了错都要有代价,这是普遍规律。可我在对的时候,就很反对亏钱。我说的不是那种因为交易所规则突然改变让我付出了金钱的某些交易。我想到的是交易中的一些偶发事件,它们会经常提醒我:只有将钱存到自己的银行账户上后,才算是实打实的利润。

世界大战在欧洲爆发后,急需品价格上涨,人们对这样的情况非常容易估计到,正如人们觉得战争会导致通货膨胀一样。战争一直在持续,物价也在跟着上涨。你可能记得我之前说的,我在1915年的时候,忙的都是怎么样翻身的事情。股市热潮出现,抓住这个机会是我必须要做的。我做过的最稳当、最容易实现、最迅速的大事都是在股市中进行的,而且我很幸运,这件事你已经知道。

到了1917年7月,我不光能够还清债务,还有一定的结余,这说明我已经有了同时去做股票和期货交易的时间、资本和意愿。这么多年,研究交易市场,已经成了我的习惯。期货市场的商品,除了咖啡,价格都比战争之前上涨了1到4倍。这是有原因的,战争导致了欧洲商品市场被迫关闭,大量的咖啡被运到了市场广阔的美国,所以美国国内咖啡原料积压过多,导致咖啡价格下跌。我开始考虑咖啡投资的可能性时,它的价格已经低于战争之前的价格。造成这个反常现象的原因很明显,而更明显的是,德国和奥地利不断地对同盟国船只展开攻击,致使能用在商业方面的船数量减少,这也造成了咖啡进口生意不景气。随着时间的推移,咖啡进口减少,人们的消费速度却没有变化,积压的咖啡终会被消费掉,所以当这样的局面出现时,咖啡价格一定跟其他商品一样猛涨。

不需要有福尔摩斯的智慧就足以分析出这个情况。可为什么人们都不买咖啡,我却不知道原因。当我决定要买的时候,不觉得这是一种投机行为,而更像是商业投资。我知道想赚钱得需要时间,可我知道这个投资会产生很大的利润。这就使得买进咖啡成了保守的投资行为,是银行家而不是投机者的操作。

1917年冬天,我开始着手收购咖啡,买进了大量的咖啡。可是,市场却没有什么反响,还是那样的萧条,价格也并非我预想的那样会上涨,所以我手里握着没有前途的合约长达九个月之久。

九个月后,合同到期,我只好卖掉平仓,这让我又赔了一大笔钱。不过,我觉得我的分析并非没有道理,显然我是拿捏错了时机,我确定咖啡一定会跟其他东西一样涨价。所以,我刚一卖掉,就又立刻买入,而且是上一次买入的3倍。当然了,我买的是尽可能长久握在手里的期权合约。

这一次我可没有出错。我买进三倍的数量后不久,咖啡价格就开始上涨,每个人都好像一下子明白过来了,知道咖啡市场要出现什么情形。从市场行情来看,我的投资好像快要收到巨额回报了。

卖咖啡的人是咖啡烘烤业者,大多数是德国人或者是和德国有关系的商家,他们信心十足地从巴西买到咖啡后非常想运送到美国,可是没有货船。不久之后,他们发现自己处于非常紧迫的状态,一方面在遥远的南美洲那里,有无穷无尽的咖啡供应,另一方面又在美国大量放空给我。

请记住,咖啡价格处于世界大战之前的水平时,我开始看好它;也别忘了,我买了以后,被套牢了大半年,承受了庞大的亏损。亏本是对错误的惩罚,而赚钱就是对正确的奖励。因为这次做得非常正确,也属于长线投资,我绝对有理由可以赚一大笔。要赚到让自己满意的利润,并不需要市场价格涨多高,我手里可是有几十万袋咖啡。我不喜欢说能操作多少多少,这些数字听起来似乎有些不可能一样,人们会认为我是在说大话。其实我只是根据自己的财力操作,也为自己留足了投资安全的余地,在这个例子中我够谨慎了。我买了这么多咖啡期权,是因为感觉不会赔本,情况对我有利。我已经等待了一年时间,现在耐心等待和操作正确无误会让我得到报酬。我知道利润会源源不断地涌来,非常猛烈。这当中没有什么巧妙,而仅仅是因为我不盲目而已。

几百万的赚头确实很快就来了,可是钞票根本没到我手中。不是形势突然发生了变化,美国国内的市场没有转变,咖啡也没有涌进美国。到底出了什么事情呢?真是难以预料,是任何人都没遇到过的,我也没办法提前防范的事情。在投资过程中,那一连串的突发事件里,必须得加上这一件令我永远记住的事情了。这就是,那些卖给我咖啡的空头们,非常明白自己面临的现实情况,所以尽力摆脱现状,他们要把手里的咖啡抛售出去,想出了新的欺骗方式。他们匆忙来到华盛顿寻求帮助,而且确实得到了协助。

你可能记得,政府以前制定过很多条例,防止民生必需品遭到囤积居奇。你知道的,大多数都发挥了作用。呃,那些大慈大悲的咖啡商们跑到了战时的价格管制委员会,打着爱国的幌子,为美国人的早餐申请权利。这个委员会说,一个叫劳伦斯·利文斯顿的职业投机商可能垄断了咖啡,他想利用世界大战创造的条件,赚取巨额利润,而美国人不得不用很昂贵的价格来买每天的必需品——咖啡。那些卖给我几船咖啡却没有船只运送的爱国者,根本无法想象,1亿美国人或多或少要向没有良心的投机分子致意。他们代表的是咖啡这一行,而不是炒作咖啡的赌客,他们情愿帮政府打压市场上的或者可能出现在市场中的暴利投机行为。

现在有一大堆人抱怨我,我并不是暗示价格管制委员会没尽到职责去管控囤积居奇和浪费行为,我更想表达出我的看法,他们可能没有很深入地研究咖啡市场。他们制定了咖啡原料的限价,也定了个终止现有咖啡合同的期限。这就说明咖啡市场的交易马上要停了,我只有一件事可以做,就是卖掉所有的咖啡合约。正如之前曾赚几百万时一样,这次我认定能赚的几百万打了水漂。我从来都是强烈反对在生活必需品行业牟利,可当价格管制委员会制定咖啡条例前,所有的其他商品价格都已经比大战之前高了2.5到4倍,可咖啡价格实际上比战前那几年的均价还低呢。我觉得咖啡在谁手中都一个样,价格肯定要上涨,不是因为那些无情的投机分子操控了,而是咖啡数量越来越少。这是进口的数量越来越少导致的,而进口数量的减少又是由德国潜艇对船只的轰炸造成的。价格管制委员会还没等咖啡涨价,就采取了限价行动。

作为一种政策和没办法的办法,强迫市场停止咖啡交易简直是个错误。如果这个价格管制委员会允许咖啡交易正常进行,咖啡价格就会因为之前说过的其实与垄断没有丝毫关系的原因上涨。而且这样的上涨,不需要太高,就会起到刺激作用,让咖啡供给回到市场中来。我曾经听贝纳德·巴鲁奇提到过,战时工业委员会规定价格的时候,考虑过为市场做担保这个因素,所以一些针对某些商品的高价限制所发的怨言就很不公平了。后来,咖啡市场交易重新回归后,咖啡的价格达到了每磅23美分。供应量太少,美国人还是得掏腰包。同时因为那些慈悲为怀的空头的建议导致定价过低,使得连高价运费都没办法支付,进口量就变得很少,因此咖啡在美国的供应也就很少。

我一直觉得,在我所有的商品交易中,这笔咖啡的交易才是最合情合理合法的。我认为这是商业投资,而不是投机行为。我投资了咖啡一年多时间,要是真说其中有赌博因素的话,那也是那些有德国姓氏和血统的爱国者在赌博。他们在巴西买了咖啡,运回到纽约卖给我。价格管制委员会又管制了唯一没有上涨的商品价格,在暴利交易出现之前,对大众的利益起到了保护作用。可是,却没有抵挡得了随后无可避免的价格上涨。不光是这样,而且当生咖啡豆在每磅9美分盘旋时,烘干咖啡跟其他商品一样,价格在上涨,其实只有那些烘烤商人赚了钱。如果生咖啡豆每磅能涨价两三美分的话,我就会赚几百万美元,同时大众也不会在后来咖啡暴涨时付出那么高的代价了。

事后为投机验尸是浪费时间,不过像这样的特殊交易,却很有总结的价值。它跟我之前所做的所有交易一样顺利。价格上涨是显而易见的趋势,什么都符合规律,让我觉得不赚到那几百万都不可能,可是结果却真的没有赚到。

另外有两次,我是被那个委员会的规定所害,他们提前没有任何警示,就直接改变了交易规则。但是这两次,从方法的角度来看,我的所作所为是没问题的,只是没有我在咖啡投资交易时那么符合商业标准。在投机交易上,没有什么事情能够绝对确定。我刚说的那段经历,又为我那些意外事故增添了更多不可预估的因素。

这次咖啡投资事情过后,我在其他股票和期货买卖的交易上都做得很好,所以又听到了很多关于我的谈资。在华尔街,那些职业玩家和新闻记者看到市价出现无法避免的崩跌时,总习惯指责我,明里暗里地说是我在背后搞鬼。有时,说我所做的交易是不爱国的行为,却不管真正卖出的人是不是我。我觉得他们无端放大我在投资交易上的规模与影响,就是为了替人们找一个市价变动的理由,满足他们贪婪的需求。

我都说过一千次了,不论哪种操作手段,都不可能让股票价格下跌或者一直处在低价水平。这一点儿都不算神秘。任何一个人,只要不嫌麻烦的话,想上一会儿,就能清楚地得到答案。假设有个作手掼压一只股票,也就是让价格降到比实际价值更低的程度,一定会发生什么事情?嗯,聪明的内线人士就会迅速利用时机买进。能确定股票真正价值的人,总是会趁着股价低廉时买进股票。如果内线们不买进了,原因就是他们不看好股市行情,没办法自由支配足够的钱,这就不是多头的行情。人们在议论空头掼压时,总是认为掼压没有道理,甚至是犯罪。但是,把一只股票打压到远低于真正价值的水准,是非常危险的事情。要深深记住,那些被人操控着的,没有价格回升希望的股票,是不能够买的;只要有不正当卖空行为,使股价下跌猛烈,就容易引发买进行为,不管什么时候出现这样的事情,价格都不可能维持在低档。我应该说百分之九十九所谓的惯压,其实是合法合理的股价下跌,而且常常会加速下跌。不过,这种下跌并非主要是由哪个职业投机者造成的,无论他玩的是多大规模的投资。

那些认为股价突然下跌,或者出现比较异常的暴涨现象,都是由疯狂的幕后投机分子的投机行为造成的说法,都可能是编造的,只是为了提供给那些不用脑子思考,只知道盲目偏信的赌徒听,让他们得到个股价变动的解释。运气不好的投机者动不动就会在经纪人或者喜欢以讹传讹的人们口中听闻,说自己的亏损与股价变动都是幕后炒作的结果。这其实是一种反面的内幕消息。其中的区别是,空头的内幕消息是很清晰的,明确建议卖空,而反面的内幕消息就是一种没有给出说法的说法,它的作用其实是阻止了你卖空的明智决定。股票在下跌时,卖掉是自然而然的事,这一定是有理由的,是一个不知道原因但必定非常好的理由。所以,就应该脱手。可是,如果股价下跌是由幕后操控导致的,那脱手就不是聪明的做法。操纵者只要停止打压股市,价格就会马上反弹。这就是反面的内幕消息。

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