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双语·股票大作手回忆录 第十九章

所属教程:译林版·股票大作手回忆录

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2022年05月08日

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I DO not know when or by whom the word“manipulation”was first used in connection with what really are no more than common merchandising processes applied to the sale in bulk of securities on the Stock Exchange.Rigging the market to facilitate cheap purchases of a stock which it is desired to accumulate is also manipulation.But it is different.It may not be necessary to stoop to illegal practices,but it would be difficult to avoid doing what some would think illegitimate.How are you going to buy a big block of a stock in a bull market without putting up the price on yourself?That would be the problem.How can it be solved?It depends upon so many things that you can't give a general solution unless you say:possibly by means of very adroit manipulation.For instance?Well,it would depend upon conditions.You can't give any closer answer than that.

I am profoundly interested in all phases of my business,and of course I learn from the experience of others as well as from my own.But it is very difficult to learn how to manipulate stocks today from such yarns as are told of an afternoon in the brokers' offices after the close.Most of the tricks,devices and expedients of bygone days are obsolete and futile;or illegal and impracticable.Stock Exchange rules and conditions have changed,and the story—even the accurately detailed story—of what Daniel Drew or Jacob Little or Jay Gould could do fifty or seventy-five years ago is scarcely worth listening to.The manipulator today has no more need to consider what they did and how they did it than a cadet at West Point need study archery as practiced by the ancients in order to increase his working knowledge of ballistics.

On the other hand there is profit in studying the human factors—the ease with which human beings believe what it pleases them to believe;and how they allow themselves—indeed,urge themselves—to be influenced by their cupidity or by the dollar-cost of the average man's carelessness.Fear and hope remain the same;therefore the study of the psychology of speculators is as valuable as it ever was.Weapons change,but strategy remains strategy,on the New York Stock Exchange as on the battlefield.I think the clearest summing up of the whole thing was expressed by Thomas F.Woodlock when he declared:“The principles of successful stock speculation are based on the supposition that people will continue in the future to make the mistakes that they have made in the past.”

In booms,which is when the public is in the market in the greatest numbers,there is never any need of subtlety,so there is no sense of wasting time discussing either manipulation or speculation during such times;it would be like trying to find the difference in raindrops that are falling synchronously on the same roof across the street.The sucker has always tried to get something for nothing,and the appeal in all booms is always frankly to the gambling instinct aroused by cupidity and spurred by a pervasive prosperity.People who look for easy money invariably pay for the privilege of proving conclusively that it cannot be found on this sordid earth.At first,when I listened to the accounts of old-time deals and devices I used to think that people were more gullible in the 1860's and '70's than in the 1900's.But I was sure to read in the newspapers that very day or the next something about the latest Ponzi or the bust-up of some bucketing broker and about the millions of sucker money gone to join the silent majority of vanished savings.

When I first came to New York there was a great fuss made about wash sales and matched orders,for all that such practices were forbidden by the Stock Exchange.At times the washing was too crude to deceive anyone.The brokers had no hesitation in saying that“the laundry was active”whenever anybody tried to wash up some stock or other,and,as I have said before,more than once they had what were frankly referred to as“bucket-shop drives,”when a stock was offered down two or three points in a jiffy just to establish the decline on the tape and wipe up the myriad shoe-string traders who were long of the stock in the bucket shops.As for matched orders,they were always used with some misgivings by reason of the difficulty of co?rdinating and synchronising operations by brokers,all such business being against Stock Exchange rules.A few years ago a famous operator canceled the selling but not the buying part of his matched orders,and the result was that an innocent broker ran up the price twenty-five points or so in a few minutes,only to see it break with equal celerity as soon as his buying ceased.The original intention was to create an appearance of activity.Bad business,playing with such unreliable weapons.You see,you can't take your best brokers into your confidence—not if you want them to remain members of the New York Stock Exchange.Then also,the taxes have made all practices involving fictitious transactions much more expensive than they used to be in the old times.

The dictionary definition of manipulation includes corners.Now,a corner might be the result of manipulation or it might be the result of competitive buying,as,for instance,the Northern Pacific corner on May 9,1901,which certainly was not manipulation.The Stutz corner was expensive to everybody concerned,both in money and in prestige.And it was not a deliberately engineered corner,at that.

As a matter of fact very few of the great corners were profitable to the engineers of them.Both Commodore Vanderbilt's Harlem corners paid big,but the old chap deserved the millions he made out of a lot of short sports,crooked legislators and aldermen who tried to double-cross him.On the other hand,Jay Gould lost in his Northwestern corner.Deacon S.V.White made a million in his Lackawanna corner,but Jim Keene dropped a million in the Hannibal & St.Joe deal.The financial success of a corner of course depends upon the marketing of the accumulated holdings at higher than cost,and the short interest has to be of some magnitude for that to happen easily.

I used to wonder why corners were so popular among the big operators of a half-century ago.They were men of ability and experience,wide-awake and not prone to childlike trust in the philanthropy of their fellow traders.Yet they used to get stung with an astonishing frequency.A wise old broker told me that all the big operators of the '60's and‘70's had one ambition,and that was to work a corner.In many cases this was the offspring of vanity;in others,of the desire for revenge.At all events,to be pointed out as the man who had successfully cornered this or the other stock was in reality recognition of brains,boldness and boodle.It gave the cornerer the right to be haughty.He accepted the plaudits of his fellows as fully earned.It was more than the prospective money profit that prompted the engineers of corners to do their damnedest.It was the vanity complex asserting itself among cold-blooded operators.

Dog certainly ate dog in those days with relish and ease.I think I told you before that I have managed to escape being squeezed more than once,not because of the possession of a mysterious ticker-sense but because I can generally tell the moment the character of the buying in the stock makes it imprudent for me to be short of it.This I do by common-sense tests,which must have been tried in the old times also.Old Daniel Drew used to squeeze the boys with some frequency and make them pay high prices for the Erie“sheers”they had sold short to him.He was himself squeezed by Commodore Vanderbilt in Erie,and when old Drew begged for mercy the Commodore grimly quoted the Great Bear's own deathless distich:

He that sells what isn't hisn

Must buy it back or go to prim.

Wall Street remembers very little of an operator who for more than a generation was one of its Titans.His chief claim to immortality seems to be the phrase“watering stock.”

Addison G.Jerome was the acknowledged king of the Public Board in the spring of 1863.His market tips,they tell me,were considered as good as cash in bank.From all accounts he was a great trader and made millions.He was liberal to the point of extravagance and had a great following in the Street—until Henry Keep,known as William the Silent,squeezed him out of all his millions in the Old Southern corner.Keep,by the way,was the brother-in-law of Gov.Roswell P.Flower.

In most of the old corners the manipulation consisted chiefly of not letting the other man know that you were cornering the stock which he was variously invited to sell short.It therefore was aimed chiefly at fellow professionals,for the general public does not take kindly to the short side of the account.The reasons that prompted these wise professionals to put out short lines in such stocks were pretty much the same as prompts them to do the same thing today.Apart from the selling by faith-breaking politicians in the Harlem corner of the Commodore,I gather from the stories I have read that the professional traders sold the stock because it was too high.And the reason they thought it was too high was that it never before had sold so high;and that made it too high to buy;and if it was too high to buy it was just right to sell.That sounds pretty modern,doesn't it?They were thinking of the price,and the Commodore was thinking of the value!And so,for years afterwards,old-timers tell me that people used to say,“He went short of Harlem!”whenever they wished to describe abject poverty.

Many years ago I happened to be speaking to one of Jay Gould's old brokers.He assured me earnestly that Mr.Gould not only was a most unusual man—it was of him that old Daniel Drew shiveringly remarked,“His touch is Death !”—but that he was head and shoulders above all other manipulators past and present.He must have been a financial wizard indeed to have done what he did;there can be no question of that.Even at this distance I can see that he had an amazing knack for adapting himself to new conditions,and that is valuable in a trader.He varied his methods of attack and defense without a pang because he was more concerned with the manipulation of properties than with stock speculation.He manipulated for investment rather than for a market turn.He early saw that the big money was in owning the railroads instead of rigging their securities on the floor of the Stock Exchange.He utilised the stock market of course.But I suspect it was because that was the quickest and easiest way to quick and easy money and he needed many millions,just as old Collis P.Huntington was always hard up because he always needed twenty or thirty millions more than the bankers were willing to lend him.Vision without money means heartaches;with money,it means achievement;and that means power;and that means money;and that means achievement;and so on,over and over and over.

Of course manipulation was not confined to the great figures of those days.There were scores of minor manipulators.I remember a story an old broker told me about the manners and morals of the early '60's.He said:

“The earliest recollection I have of Wall Street is of my first visit to the financial district.My father had some business to attend to there and for some reason or other took me with him.We came down Broadway and I remember turning off at Wall Street.We walked down Wall and just as we came to Broad or,rather,Nassau Street,to the corner where the Bankers' Trust Company's building now stands,I saw a crowd following two men.The first was walking eastward,trying to look unconcerned.He was followed by the other,a red-faced man who was wildly waving his hat with one hand and shaking the other fist in the air.He was yelling to beat the band:‘Shylock!Shylock!What's the price of money?Shylock!Shylock!’I could see heads sticking out of windows.They didn't have skyscrapers in those days,but I was sure the second and third-story rubbernecks would tumble out.My father asked what was the matter,and somebody answered something I didn't hear.I was too busy keeping a death clutch on my father's hand so that the jostling wouldn't separate us.The crowd was growing,as street crowds do,and I wasn't comfortable.Wild-eyed men came running down from Nassau Street and up from Broad as well as east and west on Wall Street.After we finally got out of the jam my father explained to me that the man who was shouting‘Shylock!’was So-and-So.I have forgotten the name,but he was the biggest operator in clique stocks in the city and was understood to have made—and lost—more money than any other man in Wall Street with the exception of Jacob Little.I remember Jacob Little's name because I thought it was a funny name for a man to have.The other man,the Shylock,was a notorious locker-up of money.His name has also gone from me.But I remember he was tall and thin and pale.In those days the cliques used to lock up money by borrowing it or,rather,by reducing the amount available to Stock Exchange borrowers.They would borrow it and get a certified check.They wouldn't actually take the money out and use it.Of course that was rigging.It was a form of manipulation,I think.”

I agree with the old chap.It was a phase of manipulation that we don't have nowadays.

我不知道是谁何时首次把“炒作”一词跟其实只是普通市场交易的商业过程联系到了一起,来描述在交易所交易大量股票的行为。通过操纵市场低价买进想要的股票也是炒作,但这个不一样,这个不需要你降低标准,用非法的手段去做,不过你也不容易避开去做那些别人认为不正当的事。在多头市场,你如何买到很大数量的同一只股票,而不会对股价造成抬升?这是个问题。而要解决这个问题的话,决定性因素比较多,没办法找到一个通用的办法,除非你笼统地说,要靠聪明的操作。有没有实例?这要根据具体情况来定。此外你再也给不出更加精确的回答。

对于我所从事的事业,每一个阶段我都兴致盎然,我从自己和他人的经验中学到了很多。但是今天下午收盘以后,从那些交易厅里传播的段子中,我很难学到炒股经验。原先大多数巧妙的方式方法都已经跟不上时代,或者成了非法手段。证券交易的法律法规和市场情况都发生了变化。50到70年前,丹尼尔·德鲁、小雅各和古德能做的很多事情,即便很详细、很真实,都已经失去了学习的价值。今天的股民们不用去想以前的股市大咖们做过的那些事情,不用考虑他们为什么那样做,这就等同于西点军校的学生们不用向古代人学习射箭技术,来增加弹道学方面的知识。

此外,对涉及人性的因素展开研究,总是比较好的,比如人为什么容易轻信自己希望的事情?人为什么会允许甚至鼓励自己受到欲望的影响,或者受到他人粗心大意、斤斤计较的影响?恐惧始终与希望对等,所以对投机的人们的心理进行研究,一直都有很大的用处。武器会发生变化,可是战略不会变。不管在纽交所,还是在战场,都是一样的。我觉得最能简单表述这种情形的话就是汤姆斯·伍德罗克说的那句:“假设人们未来继续犯以前出现过的错误是股市投机的基石。”

在市场特别景气时,炒股人员的数量会达到一个峰值。聪明与巧妙是徒劳的,所以在那种时候,花时间去研究如何炒作和投机,没多少道理,就像你想知道同时落在街对面屋檐上的两滴雨的不同点在哪里一样。笨蛋们总是想着不劳而获,所以在牛市的时候,总会吸引一大堆人参与到股市赌博当中,是市场的普遍繁荣刺激了人贪婪的天性。把赚钱的希望寄托在天上掉馅饼上面,迟早都要付出代价的。在我们生活的渺小的地球上,是不存在不劳而获这种东西的。早先,每当我听到人们谈论以前的市场交易和手段时,总认为19世纪60年代和70年代的人,比20世纪初的人更容易受欺骗。可是,我敢确定在当天或者第二天,就会在报纸上看到一种新式骗局,或者交易场所关张的报道,以及笨蛋们的几百万存款在不知不觉中悄然消失的事情。

我刚到纽约的时候,人们喜欢探讨洗盘和对冲单,不过证券交易所已经禁止了这样的做法。有时候洗盘太粗糙,骗不过任何人。谁要是想洗哪只股票,营业员就会立马说,洗得太厉害了。正如我之前所说,市场不止一次出现营业员毫不隐讳地指出交易公司洗盘,也就是一只股票在瞬间就下跌了两三点,目的是在报价牌上落实价格下跌,以便把交易公司里靠一点儿保证金做多的人洗掉。而对冲单的话,用起来总会出错,因为各个经纪商很难操作得非常协调齐整,这都是违反法令的做法。几年前,一个很知名的交易人取消订单后却没取消对冲单中的买单,结果导致一个不知情的营业员在短时间内就将股价炒高了大约25个点,他停下买盘后,就看到这只股票用同样快的速度下跌。这样做是为了制造活跃交易的市场假象,实在是个不好的做法,是种很不正规的手段。对了,就算是遇到最优秀的经纪商,也不要随便透露你的秘密,如果你想让他继续做纽交所的会员,就不能信任他。但是,那些与买空卖空相关联的一切做法,都因为税收而变得比以前昂贵多了。

在字典里,炒作还包含了轧空的意义。嗯,轧空或许本就是炒作出来的,也或许是人们争着买进造成的。比如1901年5月9日,北太平洋铁路公司股票的轧空很明显就不是炒作的结果。斯图兹轧空后,每个相关人都付出了很大的代价,他们的金钱和名誉都受损严重。这一次其实并非特意安排的轧空。

其实,在那些著名的轧空操作中,很少有能够让主导者获利的。范德比准将曾经两次轧空了哈林公司股票,赚了几百万,可是老家伙赚到的钱是来自那些想诈骗他的空头赌手和谎话连篇的议员,那些钱是他应该赚到的。另外,古德在做西北铁路公司的轧空交易时却亏了大钱,怀特在他的拉克万纳轧空时赚到了100万,可詹姆斯·凯恩在汉尼拔—圣乔股票上赔了100万。想要实现轧空赚钱,靠的是用高于成本的价格,卖掉一开始买来的股票,而且要很大规模地操作才能相对容易地实现。

我曾想,为什么在半个世纪之前的那些大作手中间,轧空这么流行。他们的能力都很强,经验也很丰富,而且智慧过人,不会像小孩一样轻信其他作手。但是,他们在轧空中受困的次数却非常多。一个精明的老营业员对我说过,六七十年代的所有大作手都梦想着主动制造一次轧空交易。虚荣心导致了很多次垄断出现,还有些是要报复别人而制造的轧空。总之,有人如果被别人指责说非常成功地实现了一次轧空,其实是说他是个聪明、勇敢并且取得了成就的人。轧空让那些操作者有了高于别人的优势,有同行对他佩服得五体投地也是理所当然的。促使这些人全力去轧空的不是能得到多少财务上的利益,而是虚荣心。

一条狗在咬其他狗的时候,是非常轻松愉悦的。我觉得以前可能说过,我不止一次地想办法从被轧空的危险中逃脱,并非我有多神秘的看盘灵感,而是我大致可以看出,什么时候买盘的性质不能轻率地放空。我靠普通的试探才做到了这点,当年的那些人也必定有这样做的。德鲁曾经好多次都轧空了同时期的其他作手,使得他们因为多次放空伊利股票而连连赔本。而他则在伊利股票上,又吃了范德比准将轧空的亏,他求范德比准将放过他一次,可是范德比准将却毫不心软,他引用德鲁自己曾说过的两句话:“谁把自己本没有的东西卖掉的话,就要重新买回来,或者去蹲监狱。”

华尔街人很少有记得有关一个作手的事情,这位作手在股市上叱咤风云了一代多人,能够让人们牢牢记住,主要是因为他创造了一个名词——灌水股票。

艾迪生·杰罗姆被公认为1863年春公共交易所霸主。有人对我说,他提供的市场内幕消息,简直与银行的现金一样有价值。总之,他确实是个很厉害的作手,赚到过好几百万。他放任不羁,非常奢华,在华尔街上粉丝很多。一直到后来在老南方股票交易时,被号称“沉默的威廉”的亨利·吉普轧空,杰罗姆损失了自己的几百万美元。顺便说一下,吉普是当时州长罗斯维尔·弗劳恩的小舅子。

在过去出现过的大部分轧空中,主要是靠着不让别人知晓你正在轧空这只股票来实现炒作目的,而其他人却不断地受到诱惑放空这只股票。所以,轧空的主要对象集中在那些同时期的专业作手群中,因为普通大众不喜欢做空的人。能够让那些明智的老作手放空的原因与现在让他们放空的原因差不多。我从自己的所见所闻里知道,范德比准将在轧空哈林股票的时候,除了不讲信用的议员们外,其他职业交易者放空,是因为股价太高了。他们觉得股价很高,是因为这只股票价格从来没这么高过。所以,股价高到了令人没办法买进的程度,那卖出就是自然而然的事情了。这是不是听起来很现代化呢?他们想的是价格,而范德比准将想的是价值。鉴于此,很多年后,老前辈们向我提到,当他们想形容贫穷状态的时候,总会说:“他放空了哈林股。”

多年前,我与古德先生的一个老营业员聊天时,他一本正经地向我保证说,古德不但是个异于常人的人,而且绝对比以前和现在的作手们都厉害。老德鲁曾心有余悸地说:“与他交手就意味着死亡。”他指的就是古德。古德必定是个正儿八经的金融牛人,所以才取得了那么大的成就,这是不用怀疑的。即使相隔年代很长,我仍然可以看出他身上有着适应新情况的惊人能力,这在市场交易中是非常难能可贵的。他可以游刃有余地改变攻防方式,他注重的是操纵股票性质,而不是投机本身。他炒作的目的,就是为了投资,而不是改变市场。他在很久之前就明白,要想大赚就要拥有铁路,而不是仅仅在股市中炒作铁路股票。他当然也玩铁路股票,可我猜之所以如此,是因为股市上赚钱最快最轻松,而且他需要大量的钱,正如克里斯·亨廷顿总是嫌钱不够一样。银行能够借给他的资金,总比他所需的钱要少那么两三千万美元。如果光有长远的眼光而缺钱,就只能忧心忡忡;如果有钱了,那么长远的眼光代表的可就是成就、权力和财富,等等等等。

当然,并不是只有当年的这些大咖在炒作,另外一些不太重要的作手也炒作。曾有一位老营业员对我讲过一件与19世纪60年代初的社会情形和道德现象有关的事情。他说:“首次踏进金融区时,我就对华尔街产生了最初的印象。我父亲去那里办事,不知为什么却带着我,我们沿百老汇大街向前走,在华尔街转了弯,然后继续向前,走到宽街还是拿骚街的时候,就到了如今信孚银行大楼这个街口上,我看见有一大堆人跟在两个男人身后。走在前面的男人假装很无所谓的样子朝东走了,后面一个男人满脸通红,一只手用力挥着帽子,另一只手也在空中乱挥,嘴里大嚷着:‘夏洛克,夏洛克(指的是放高利贷的狠心角色)’,金钱的价值到底是什么?夏洛克,夏洛克。我看见人们都从窗户里探头来看。那时候还没有高楼大厦,可我能确定二三楼的人都在张望。我父亲问发生什么事情了,有人说了一通话,我没有听见。我紧紧抓着父亲的手,免得被人群挤开。就像平时常见的那样,街上的人越来越多,我深感不舒服。人们惊愕地从街上走过来,最后我们终于挤出人群。父亲告诉我说,那个大声嚷着‘夏洛克’的人是谁谁谁。我忘了他叫什么,但我记得他是纽约主力股的最大作手。听说除了小雅各以外,他赚过和亏过的钱比谁都多。我之所以知道小雅各,是因为他一个大人叫这么个名字很有意思。被喊作‘夏洛克’的人因为控制着资金而名声很臭,他叫什么我也忘了,只记得他长得又高又瘦,肤色很白。当年,公司内部总是用借钱的方式把资金控制住,或者说让交易所里那些需要钱的人没多少钱可借。他们去借钱,只拿了保付支票,其实并没拿到真正的钱而去其他地方使用。这当然属于操控。我觉得这也是一种炒作方式。”

我非常同意这个老人的观点,这是如今我们并没有的炒作方式。

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