美国政要第3课
Strategy in the Global Era
--Interview with the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University), Dr. Hans Binnendijk (March 10, 1998) 访美国国防大学战略研究所所长汉斯•宾内迪雅克博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: I was really impressed by your lecture on “Strategy in the Global Era” given at Georgetown University last week. Your lecture covered a lot of ground1 on current views on strategy. Strategy, especially national security strategy and military strategy are always closely connected to national defense development. Today, I would like to ask you to expand on your views on strategy from the perspective of national defense development.
Strategic thinking cannot be thought of independently of history. Even though U.S. history goes back only over 200 years, it has witnessed the significant changes in the international situation. In thinking about current and future U.S. strategy, what lessons do you think should be especially observed from history?
DR. BINNENDIJK: One of the things that is very important for the U.S. to think about is how to use the fact that technologically, economically, and in terms of political philosophy we are in a dominant position and history shows that is very dangerous if the position is abused2. It is very important for us not to act too unilaterally. If we believe that we have both the right and the might, and we act unilaterally too often, that would be a mistake.
I think in most cases we have to make sure we use international mechanisms to bring coalitions around to get as much legitimacy as we can, before we take major national security actions. A lesson from history is that other countries that had been in a position of relatively greater power, if they had abused that position, other nations tend to join alliances against them, and we don’t want to be in that position.
MR, CHEN: You mentioned the key question from the lessons from history is whether the U.S. can break out of the flexibility-rigidity-conflict cycle3. Could you please describe this cycle in detail?
DR. BINNENDIJK: This cycle tends to repeat itself. Napoleon used a fluid international system to his advantage, creating alliances to isolate his target. Eventually others saw his pattern, aligned themselves against him and created a more rigid bipolar system. And as a result you have the grand alliance against him, and he was defeated twice. In 1814-1816, the Congress of Vienna system4, the Holy Alliance5 was established and the whole purpose was to allow other nations, and particularly the U.K., to balance power that went out of alignment. That actually brought a great deal of stability from 1815-1855, until the Crimean War. It was that balance of power system that was created with the British. That was a very flexible system. You have the U.K. ready to shift alliances very rapidly and act boldly in order to keep the system down. It was by design a flexible system. The first system was not by design. The third system (1860-1914) was also a very flexible system early on. Bismark used it and pushed against Denmark, Austria, and then against France. But after he left the scene and Kaiser Wilhelm took full control, flexibility became more rigid, and you have two alliance systems that led to World War Ⅱ.The league of Nations6 system started out to be very flexible. The whole League was supposed to act against any nation that behaved badly. The system failed, and very quickly became rigid around the Axis powers and the Allied-powers. In the Cold War international system, the flexibility of the system soon turned rigid and bipolar. We were able to avoid conflict there because of nuclear deterrence. The question here is: can we break out of that cycle? We are in a very flexible period right now in the international system. Alliances exist but they’ve been modified. The whole idea is not to have them become too rigid. What we don’t want is a system in which we become bipolar again. An example of that would be if China and Russia’s relationship became much firmer and became an anti-American alliance. That would lead, again, to a bipolar system, which would, I think, be very unfortunate. You do not want the international system to become rigid. You don’t want a situation in which you come to a more bipolar situation.
MR. CHEN: In analyzing the current international situation, you pointed out that there were three revolutions in a complex new system. How are they likely to affect the development of the international situation in the future?
DR. BINNENDIJK: Well, as I said, the three revolutions-the geostrategic7, the information, and the revolution in government by and large have a positive effect on the United States. One of the points I made was that I hope that the attractiveness of globalization8-global markets, the wealth that can come with globalization would be attractive enough for China and Russia and others to want to become part of that system. There is a lot of reward in this globalization process. The hope is that would be powerful enough so that we can break out of the flexibility-rigidity-conflict space.
MR. CHEN: In your opinion, what are the topmost current U.S. interests? How are these interests related to U.S. strategic needs?
DR. BINNENDIJK: I think we have a broad array of interests. We obviously want to secure our homeland and want to make sure that there is no threat to the United States directly, whether it is from Russian missiles or terrorist weapons or whatever-that is the primary concern-since we also have as a major interest-protecting areas that are of vital importance to us, such as the Persian Gulf. We want to retain and adapt our alliances. That’s very important. Extremely important to the United States is the transition under way in Russia and China.
MR. CHEN: When the U.S. is shaping a future national security strategy, what are the main elements that should be considered? What do you think a future national security strategy for the U.S. would look like?
DR. BINNENDIJK: I think the current national security strategy is pretty much on the track. I think the enlargement strategy has thus far applied primarily to Europe. The idea here is to welcome new democratic states into the core of market democracies. And that’s been a pretty successful effort. The most visible would pertain to9 NATO enlargement. But it goes on elsewhere. That seems to be a very positive trend in the world. Engagement also has been quite misunderstood, especially in China, because it has been misinterpreted as containment. Engagement is much more what we’re doing right here.
Now, where should this go in the future? I think that as you look out three or four or five years, trying to make sure that the policy is as inclusive as possible. It means making China a full partner in the international system. And part of the deal with China is that it needs to live up to international norms. China is more and more looking at these international norms. China is more and more looking at these international norms and saying yeah we can live up10 to that. And once China agrees to do that, it can move more and more into the international community.
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 词汇提示
1.ground [] n. 范围
2.abuse [] v. 滥用
3.the flexibility-rigidity-conflict cycle “灵活-僵化-冲突”怪圈
4.the Congress of Vienna system 维也纳会议体系
5.the Holy Alliance 神圣同盟
6.the League of Nations 国际联盟
7.geostrategic [] a.地缘战略的
8.globalization [] n. 全球化
9.pertain to 关于
10.live up 快乐地过日子（在这里是好好地行事的意思）
QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 听后答题:
1. What is the lesson from the history in Dr. Binnendijk’s view?
A.It is that a country should act with its allies.
B.It is that the U.S. should abuse its dominant position.
C.It is that a country should act unilaterally.
D.It is that a country should act bilaterally.
2. What cycle did Dr. Binnendijk mention?
A.Flexibility-rigidity-conflict cycle.
B.Flexibility-rigidity-respond cycle.
C.Respond-shape-preparation cycle.
D.Engagement-containment-expansion cycle.
3. When was the Congress of Vienna system and the Holy Alliance established?
A.1914~1916. B.1914~1917.
C.1814~1816. D.1815~1855.
4. How many international systems emerged from Napoleon era to 1914?
A.Two. B.Three. C.Four. D.Six.
5. What kind of international system was it in the Cold War?
A.Bipolar. B.Multipolar.
C.Unipolar. D.Tripolar.
6. What period is it now in the international system according to Dr. Binnendijk?
A.a conflicting period.
B.a rigid period.
C.a stable period.
D.a very flexible period.
7. Which three revolutions are there in a complex new system?
A.The geostrategic revolution, education revolution and information revolution.
B.The information revolution, educational revolution and technical revolution.
C.The geostrategic revolution, the information revolution and the revolution in government.
D.The educational revolution, cultural revolution and technical revolution.
8. What are the topmost U.S. interests in Dr. Binnendijks’ view?
A.To maintain the sea lane safe.
B.To promote the human right in the developing countries.
C.To protect areas that are of vital importance to the U.S..
D.To secure the homeland and make sure that there is no threat to the U.S. directly.
9, What is the main idea about the enlargement strategy according to Dr. Binnendijk?
A.To welcome new independent countries into UN.
B.To welcome new democratic states into the core of market democracies.
C.To welcome the developing countries into NATO.
D.To welcome the ASEAN countries into ATEC.
10.What is one of the main purpose of the engagement policy in Dr. Binnendijk’s words?
A.To make China a full Partner in the international system.
B.To make North Korea a full partner in the international system.
C.To make Russia a full partner in the international system.
D.To make Cuba a full partner in the international system.
【参考译文】
全球时代的战略
陈伯江：上个星期您在乔治城大学外交学院“全球时代的战略”为题所作的报告，给我留下了较深的印象。您的报告涉及到当前战略问题的许多方面。战略，特别是国家安全战略和军事战略，总是与国防发展密切相关。今天，我想请您从国防发展的角度，谈谈对战略问题的一些看法。
战略思维离不开历史的考察。尽管美国的历史只有２００多年，但它也已经历了国际形势的一系列重大变化。在考虑当前和未来美国战略的时候，您认为应当特别汲取的历史经验教训是什么？
宾内迪雅克：对于美国来说，非常重要的一点，是考虑如何利用我们在技术、经济、以及政治哲学方面的主导地位。历史表明，如果滥用这种主导地位将是非常危险的。对于我们来说，不要过多采取单方面的行动是很重要的。如果我们相信自己既有公理又有强权，从而过多采取单方面行动，就将导致错误。在采取重大的国家安全行动之前，我认为在大多数情况下我们必须尽是运用国际机制组成联盟，以获得大限度的合法性。一个历史的教训是，力量相对强大的国家，如果它们自恃强大而欺压别国，其它国家就会加入反对它们的联盟。我们不想处于这种受人反对的位置上。
陈：您谈到汲取历史教训的关键问题是美国能否打破“灵活－僵化－冲突”的怪圈。请您解释一下这个怪圈好吗？
宾内迪雅克：这一怪圈趋于不断重复。拿破仑曾利用流动状态的国际体系，建立起一个个联盟以孤立其对手。结果其他国家识破了拿破仑的模式，组成了自己的联盟去反对他，而出现了一个比较僵化的两极体系。结果，那个强大的反拿破仑的联盟两次打败他。在１８１４～１８１６年，英、普、俄、奥等国召开维也纳会议，并在会后成立了俄、普、奥三国神圣同盟，其主要目的就是让其他国家，特别是英国调整失衡的大国力量对比，其后果是有了从１８１５~１８５５年（直到克里米亚战争）的稳定。英国所建立的那种势力平衡的国际体系是一种非常灵活的体系。为了保持该体系的平衡、英国随时可以迅速地变换联盟国并果断地采取行动。它是一个精心设计的灵活体系，第一个体系不是精心设计的。第三个体系（１８６０～１９１４年）在开始时也是一个非常灵活的体系，俾斯麦利用该体系对抗丹麦、奥地利，然后又对抗法国。但在他离开政治舞台之后，德皇威廉一世掌握了完全的控制，国际体系在一开始也是非常灵活的，整个联盟都应该对任何有行为不端的国家采取行动。这一体系很快失灵，变成固定的轴心国与同盟国联盟。在冷战国际体系中，体系的灵活性很快变成固定两极对抗。我们在那期间所以能避免冲突是因为有核威慑。这里的问题是：我们能否打破那样一个怪圈？在当前的国际体系中，我们处在一个非常灵活的时期。联盟依然存在，但也在发生变化。总的思路是不要使它们变得过于固定。我们不希望再次出现两极对抗的体系，我认为这将非常不幸。我们不希望国际系变成僵化的，也不希望出现两极更加分明的情况。
陈：在对当前国际形势的分析中，您指出在一个复杂的新体系中存在着三个革命。这三个革命可能会对未来国际形势的发展带来什么影响？
宾内迪雅克：我所说的三个革命是地缘战略革命、信息革命和政府革命。一般说来它们对美国具有积极的作用。我提出的一个观点是，我希望全球化的吸引力（全球市场、可能与全球化随之而来的财富）将足以使中国、俄罗斯和其它国家希望变成那种体系的一部分。在这种全球化的过程中，会有许许多多的好处。希望全球化的趋势能产生强有力的影响，足以使我们打破“灵活－僵化－冲突”的模式。
陈：在您看来，美国当前最大的利益是什么？这些利益怎样与美国的战略需要相联系？
宾内迪雅克：我认为我们有广泛的利益.很明显,我们要保证国家的安全,确保没有对美国的直接威胁,无论这些威胁是来自俄罗斯的导弹还是恐怖主义者的武器,或是其它来源。这是我们的主要担心.我们还有另一个重大利益, 即保护诸如波斯湾那样一些对美国至关重要的地区。我们要继续保持和调整我们的联盟。俄罗斯和中国正进行的转变也对美国特别重要。
陈：在美国勾画未来国家安全战略的时候，应当考虑的主要因素是什么？您认为未来美国国家安全战略应当是怎样的？
宾内迪雅克：我认为当前美国的国家安全战略非常正确。到目前止，扩展战略主要是在欧洲实施，其思路是欢迎新的民主国家进入实行市场经济民主国家的内圈，这种努力现在看来非常成功。最显而易见的是北约东扩，但在其它地区也在进行着类似的扩展。这似乎是一个非常积极的世界性趋势。参与战略一直受到一些国家的误解，尤其是在中国，它被误解为遏制。我们现在在这里进行交谈，实际上也是参与战略的内容。那么这一战略在未来将如何发展？我认为当你展望今后３年、４年或５年，你应当确实尽可能弄清这一战略所包含的内容。它意味着使中国成为国际体系的全面伙伴。处理作为与中国打交道的一部分内容，中国需要按照国际准则行事，中国已越来越重视那些国际准则，并答应可以遵守那些准则。一旦中国同意那样做，它就能越来越多地融入国际社会。
KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 参考答案：
1.a 2.a 3.c 4. b 5. a 6. c 7. c 8.d 9.b 10.a
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