参议院认为酷刑无助于追杀本·拉登

参议院认为酷刑无助于追杀本·拉登

WASHINGTON — Months before the operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly prepared a public-relations plan that would stress that information gathered from its disputed interrogation program had played a critical role in the hunt. Starting the day after the raid, agency officials in classified briefings made that point to Congress.

华盛顿——在2011年开展行动杀死奥萨马·本·拉登(Osama bin Laden)的几个月前，美国中央情报局(Central Intelligence Agency，简称CIA)秘密筹备了一套公关方案，打算强调通过有争议的审讯操作获取的情报，在追捕过程中发挥了关键作用。从突袭行动后的第二天起，CIA官员就开始在秘密汇报时向国会这样陈述。

But in page after page of previously classified evidence, the Senate Intelligence Committee report on C.I.A. torture, released Tuesday, rejects the notion that torturing detainees contributed to finding Bin Laden — a conclusion that was also strongly implied in “Zero Dark Thirty,” the popular 2012 movie about the hunt for the Qaeda leader.

但参议院情报委员会(Senate Intelligence Committee)周二发布的一份关于CIA刑讯逼供的报告，却通过一页页之前属于机密的证据，驳斥了拷打在押人员对追查本·拉登下落做出了贡献的说法。2012年颇受欢迎的电影《刺杀本·拉登》(Zero Dark Thirty)也强烈地暗示了这一结论。该影片讲述的是追捕这名基地组织领导人的故事。

“The vast majority of the intelligence” about the Qaeda courier who led the agency to Bin Laden “was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the C.I.A.’s detention and interrogation program, and the most accurate information acquired from a C.I.A. detainee was provided prior to the C.I.A. subjecting the detainee to the C.I.A.’s enhanced interrogation techniques,” the Senate report said.

参议院的报告称，有关基地组织那名信使的“绝大部分情报最初的来源，都和CIA的羁押和审讯项目无关，并且在CIA对一名囚犯使用加强型审讯技巧之前，对方就已供出了最精确的信息”。正是那名信使指引CIA找到了本·拉登。

It added that most of “the documents, statements and testimony” from the C.I.A. regarding a connection between the torture of detainees and the Bin Laden hunt were “inaccurate and incongruent with C.I.A. records.”

报告接着表示，CIA为证明拷打囚犯和追捕本·拉登之间的联系而提供的大部分“文件、声明和证词”都“不准确，且与CIA的记录不符”。

On Tuesday, the C.I.A. disputed the committee’s portrayal that it had been misleading and disingenuous about the role of that program in the hunt for Bin Laden.

该委员会认为，对于相关计划在追捕本·拉登的过程中所起的作用，CIA的表述有误导性，而且并不诚实。CIA在周二进行了反驳。

The crucial breakthrough in the hunt was the identification of the courier, known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who was the terrorist leader’s link to the outside world from his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. His significance gradually came into sharper focus.

追捕过程中的重大突破，是确认了名为阿布·艾哈迈德·科威提(Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti)的那名信使的身份，他是身在巴基斯坦阿伯塔巴德那处秘密院落的本·拉登与外部世界之间的联系。他的重要性逐渐得到了显现。

But the Senate report shows that the C.I.A. was already actively collecting information about him earlier than was previously known and long before it had obtained any intelligence about him from detainees in its custody.

但参议院的报告显示，CIA开始积极收集科威提相关情报的时间，早于之前知道的时间。还没有从在押人员那里取得任何情报之前，就已经开始了。

The United States had started wiretapping a phone number associated with Mr. Kuwaiti by late 2001, and as early as 2002, the C.I.A. had obtained from other sources — including reports from allies based on detainees in their custody — the courier’s alias and the fact that he was one of Bin Laden’s few close associates and “traveled frequently” to meet with him. It also had data on his age, physical appearance and family connections, as well as a recording of his voice — all of which proved crucial to finding him.

在2001年末之前，美国就已经开始窃听与科威提相关的一个电话号码了。并且早在2002年，CIA就通过其他来源——包括各盟国根据其关押囚犯的口供撰写的报告——得知了这名信使的化名，也得知了他是本·拉登少数几名亲信之一，且“频繁前去”与他会面。CIA还掌握了有关他的年龄、体貌特征、家庭关系的数据，并且还有他的录音。所有这些信息，后来都对查清他的下落起到了关键作用。

It was in 2004 that the C.I.A. came to realize that it should focus on finding Mr. Kuwaiti as part of the hunt for Bin Laden, after it interrogated a Qaeda operative, Hassan Ghul, who had been captured in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report concludes that Mr. Ghul provided “the most accurate” intelligence that the agency produced about Mr. Kuwaiti’s role and ties to Bin Laden.

到2004年，审问过在伊拉克库尔德斯坦俘获的基地组织人员哈桑·古尔(Hassan Ghul)后，CIA意识到应该集中精力捉拿科威提，将其作为追捕本·拉登的一部分。报告断定，CIA得到的有关科威提的角色，以及他与本·拉登之间关系的“最精确”情报，便是由古尔提供的。

But the report emphasizes that Mr. Ghul provided all the important information about the courier before he was subjected to any torture techniques and spoke freely to his interrogators. During that two-day period in January 2004, it said, the C.I.A. produced 21 intelligence reports from Mr. Ghul, who one officer said “sang like a Tweety Bird.”

但该报告强调，在CIA对他采取任何拷问技巧之前，古尔就已自愿向审讯人员交代了有关那名信使的所有重要信息。报告称，2004年1月进行的为期两天的审讯期间，CIA根据古尔的供述撰写了21份情报报告。一名CIA特工形容，古尔的招供“就像翠迪鸟唱歌一样”。

“He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset,” the officer added.

“他马上就开口了，从一开始就很配合，”这名特工接着说。

In those initial interrogations, Mr. Ghul portrayed Mr. Kuwaiti as Bin Laden’s “closest assistant” and said he was always with him, identifying him as a likely courier who ran messages between Bin Laden and other leaders of Al Qaeda. He listed him as one of three people most likely to be with Bin Laden, who he speculated was living in a house in Pakistan, with Mr. Kuwaiti handling his needs.

在最初那些审讯中，古尔说科威提是本·拉登“最亲密的助手”，并称本·拉登总是和科威提在一起，并指出科威提可能充当信使，负责在本·拉登和基地组织的其他头目之间传递信息。他把古尔列为最有可能和本·拉登在一起的三个人之一，并猜测本·拉登生活在巴基斯坦的某栋房屋里，科威提负责为其采办必需品。

Nevertheless, the C.I.A. then decided to torture Mr. Ghul to see if he would say more. He was transferred to a “black site” prison, where he was shaved, placed in a “hanging” stress position, and subjected to 59 hours of sleep deprivation, after which he began hallucinating; his back and abdomen began spasming; his arms, legs and feet began experiencing “mild paralysis”; and he began having “premature” heart beats. During and after that treatment, he provided “no actionable threat information” that resulted in the capture of any leaders of Al Qaeda, the report said.

尽管如此，CIA后来还是决定对古尔使用酷刑，看他能不能再说出什么来。他被转移到了一个“地下”监狱，在那里，他被剃掉了毛发，保持“悬吊”的不适姿态，59个小时不能睡觉，此后，他开始出现幻觉;后背和腹部开始抽搐;胳膊、腿部和脚经历了“轻度瘫痪”;他还出现了“心脏早搏”。报告称，在用刑期间和用刑之后，古尔都没有提供导致基地组织的任何领导人被抓的“有实用价值的线索”。

In its statement pushing back on the report, the C.I.A. insisted another detainee, Ammar Al Baluchi, had been “the first to reveal” Mr. Kuwaiti was a courier, after Mr. Baluchi’s arrest and subjection to “enhanced” interrogation techniques in May 2003.

在反驳这份报告的声明中，CIA坚持说，另一名叫做阿马尔·巴卢希(Ammar Al Baluchi)的囚犯，才是“第一个揭发了”科威提是本·拉登信使的人，而这发生在巴卢希2003年5月被逮捕并遭受“加强型”审讯技巧之后。

But the Senate report shows that Mr. Baluchi’s claim was not recognized as a breakthrough, in part because he recanted what he had said under torture. The report also notes that to make its claim about the significance of Mr. Baluchi’s information, the agency “ignores” detailed information in its records from 2002, from several detainees in the custody of other governments, “suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier” for Bin Laden.

但参议院的报告显示，巴卢希的说法没有被视作重大进展，一个原因是，他后来否认了酷刑之下的口供。报告还指出，为了突出巴卢希提供的情报的重要性，CIA对该局2002年的记录中体现的情报细节“视而不见”。这些情报来自其他国家收押的几名囚犯，“表明科威提可能是本·拉登的信使”。

The C.I.A.’s statement also said that Mr. Ghul had provided “more concrete and less speculative” information that Mr. Kuwaiti was a courier after Mr. Ghul was subjected to its “enhanced” interrogation techniques. The Senate report called the agency’s rebuttal “incorrect,” citing contemporaneous C.I.A. reports.

CIA的声明还说，在受到“加强型”审讯技巧之后，古尔提供了“更为具体，且不那么可疑”的信息，称科威提是本·拉登的信使。参议院的报告中引述CIA同一时期的其他一些报告，指出CIA的反驳“不正确”。

The C.I.A.’s records also show that detainees subjected to the torture techniques “provided fabricated, inconsistent and generally unreliable information” about the courier throughout their detention, the report said.

参议院的报告称，CIA的记录还显示，在被关押期间，受到酷刑的犯人在本·拉登信使的问题上“提供了凭空捏造、前后不一，而且基本上不可靠的信息。”

The C.I.A. countered that statements by two other detainees playing down the importance of Mr. Kuwaiti were significant corroboration that he was a secret worth protecting. The Senate report showed that the agency pressed both detainees about the courier in the summer of 2005 and thought both were lying.

CIA反驳称，另外两名囚犯淡化科威提重要性的口供有力地证明了，科威提是一个值得保护的神秘角色。参议院的报告显示，CIA在2005年夏天迫使这两名囚犯说出了关于本·拉登信使的消息，但后来认为两人都在说谎。

But the Senate report suggested that the agency had already sharpened its focus on Mr. Kuwaiti by the time of those denials. On Sept. 1, 2005, an internal agency bulletin on the hunt for Bin Laden reported that the search for his couriers was going nowhere because detainees were being unhelpful, adding, “We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.”

不过，参议院的报告显示，在否认上述口供之前，CIA已经把更多注意力放在了科威提身上。2005年9月1日，关于追查本·拉登的内部公告称，寻找本·拉登信使的行动没有取得进展，因为囚犯的口供没有帮助。公告中接着说，“我们仍然会继续寻找阿布·艾哈迈德·科威提。”