央行该向政府“交棒”

Central banks have been engaged in unprecedented monetary experimentation. Unlike scientists developing drugs, fear of the unknown has had no moderating influence on their activities. That in itself is alarming. Nor is it possible to reverse recent policies. Now governments must accept responsibility for resolving an incipient global solvency crisis.

全球各主要央行近年投入史无前例的货币实验。不像科学家们开发药物，对未知的恐惧并未对央行活动产生抑制效果。这本身就是令人震惊的。近年政策也是不可能逆转的。现在，各国政府必须承担起责任，应对一场正在露头的全球偿付能力危机。

The monetary stimulus provided repeatedly over the past eight years has failed to produce the expected expansion of aggregate demand. Debt levels have risen, especially in emerging market economies, constraining expectations of future spending and current capital expenditures. Consumers have had to save more, not less, to ensure adequate income in retirement.

过去8年一再提供的货币刺激，未能像预期那样扩大总需求。债务水平已上升，尤其是在新兴市场经济体，制约了有关未来消费和当前资本支出的预期。消费者必须储蓄更多而非更少，以确保退休后有足够的收入。

At the same time, easy money threatens two sets of undesirable side effects.

另一方面，宽松货币可能产生两组不受欢迎的副作用。

First, current policies foster financial instability. By squeezing credit and term spreads, the business models of banks, insurance companies and pension funds are put at risk, as is their lending. The functioning of financial markets has also changed, with market “anomalies” indicating hidden structural shifts, and many asset prices bid up to dangerously high levels.

首先，当前政策助长了金融不稳定。通过挤压信贷息差和期限息差，银行、保险公司和养老基金的业务模式面临风险，它们的放贷也面临风险。金融市场的运作也发生了变化，市场“异常现象”预示着隐藏的结构性转变，许多资产价格被哄抬到危险的高水平。

Second, current policies threaten future growth. Resources misallocated before the crisis have been locked in through zombie banks supporting zombie companies. And with neither financial institutions nor financial markets functioning properly, real misallocations since the crisis have been further encouraged.

其次，当前政策对未来增长构成威胁。危机之前错配的资源已被固化，因为僵尸银行支持着僵尸企业。由于金融机构和金融市场的运转都不正常，自危机以来实际错配受到了进一步鼓励。

Perhaps we need look no further for the cause of the alarming slowdown in global growth than the insidious effects of easy-money policies. Two vicious circles are at work with a wounded financial system contributing to both. On the demand side, accumulating debt creates headwinds, leading to more monetary expansion and more debt.

要寻找令人吃惊的全球增长放缓的原因，也许我们只需要考察宽松货币政策的不良效果。两种恶性循环正发生作用，而受伤的金融体系对两者都起到推波助澜的作用。在需求侧，债务积累引发逆风，导致更多货币扩张和更多债务。

This explanation contrasts sharply with the hypothesis of a “savings glut”: little more than a tautology for slow demand growth. On the supply side, misallocations slow growth which again leads to monetary easing, more misallocation and still less growth. This explanation seems far more convincing than “secular stagnation” in an era of extraordinary technological advances.

这种解释与“储蓄过剩”的假设形成了鲜明对比：那不过是需求增长缓慢的同义反复。在供应侧，错配拉低了增速，进而也导致货币宽松、更多错配和增长更加乏力。这种解释似乎远比非凡技术进步时代的“长期停滞”更令人信服。

Accepting the importance of these varied effects also undercuts the popular argument that central banks must reduce the “financial” rate of interest whenever the “natural” rate of interest (the expected rate of return on capital) declines. If expected profits have collapsed as a side effect of past monetary policies, this hardly seems to justify maintaining such polices.

接受这种种后果的重要意义，还削弱了这样一种流行说法：只要“自然”利率(预期的资本回报率)下降，央行就必须降低“金融”利率。如果预期利润大幅下滑是以往货币政策的副作用，这似乎很难为维持此类政策提供正当理由。

If central banks should not continue doing what they are doing, what should they do? One tempting option is to say “tighten up”. The problem is that damage cannot be undone. All the problems identified above have rendered both the real and financial side of the global economy enormously fragile.

如果央行不应该继续做它们正在做的事情，那么它们应该做什么?一个诱人的选项是说“收紧”。问题在于，损害无法挽回。上面列举的所有问题，已使全球经济的实际和金融层面都变得极为脆弱。

Fortunately there is a way forward, but it relies on government action rather than that of central banks.

所幸有一条出路，但它依赖政府(而非央行)的行动。

To please John Maynard Keynes, two sets of solutions are commonly suggested. First, governments with fiscal room for manoeuvre should use it. That room could be increased through legislating medium-term fiscal frameworks to ensure debt sustainability over time. Second, emphasis should be put on infrastructure investment with the private sector.

为了取悦约翰•梅纳德•凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)，经常有两套解决方案被提出来。首先，具有财政回旋余地的政府应该使用它。通过立法确立中期财政框架、确保随着时间推移债务具有可持续性，财政回旋余地还可以增大。其次，应该注重让私营部门参与基础设施投资。

To please Friedrich Hayek, two sets of solutions are also suggested. Excessive debt must be solved by write-offs and restructuring. This might require recapitalisation or closure of financial firms that made bad loans. Second, structural reforms to raise growth potential and the capacity to service debt will pay longer-term dividends.

为了取悦弗里德里希•哈耶克(Friedrich Hayek)，也有两套解决方案被提出来。必须通过减记和重组来解决过高负债的问题。这或许会要求对持有不良贷款的金融公司重新注资，或者将其关闭。其次，实施结构性改革以提高增长潜力和偿债能力，这将带来长期红利。

We must please both Keynes and Hayek. It is not an either/or world.

我们必须同时取悦凯恩斯和哈耶克。这不是一个非此即彼的世界。

Evidently, there will be obstacles. We need a paradigm shift in thinking about how the economy and policy works. Further, we need legislation to allow implementation of many of the policies suggested above. Finally, we need the political will to accept that central banks can only “buy time” for governments to act. That time is now up.

显然，前方会存在障碍。在思考经济和政策如何运行方面，我们需要一次范式转换。此外，我们需要通过立法，落实以上建议的许多政策。最后，我们需要拥有这样的政治意志，即接受央行只能为政府行动“赢得时间”。这种时间现在到尾声了。