访谈：人民币政策背后的木马战略和全球目标

China long kept a tight hold on its currency as a way to control its economy and to help its factories sell their products overseas. But China has grown in economic power and ambition, and the old restrictions are not helping a country that hopes to call more of the world’s financial shots.

为了控制本国经济，帮助国内工厂在海外销售产品，中国对自己的货币一直管得很严。但中国的经济实力和雄心都已经壮大了起来，对于一个希望在世界金融中能更多地呼风唤雨的国家，这些旧有的限制无法提供帮助。

In his new book, “Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi,” Eswar S. Prasad describes how China’s view of its currency has evolved, starting from the Han dynasty — China invented paper money, of course — to today’s globally ambitious leadership. Mr. Prasad, a professor at the Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell University and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, was formerly head of the International Monetary Fund’s China division. In an interview, he explained China’s motivations, how money can be a back door to overhauling the country’s financial system and why some people fear a financially powerful China.

埃斯瓦尔·S·普拉萨德(Eswar S. Prasad)在自己的新书《不断升值的货币——人民币的崛起》(Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi)中，自汉朝——当然，纸币就是中国发明的——到希望雄心勃勃引领全球的今天，描述了中国对其货币看法的演化。普拉萨德曾任国际货币基金组织的中国事务主管，现为康奈尔大学戴森应用经济与管理学院教授兼布鲁金斯学会高级研究员。在采访中，他解释了中国的动机、货币是怎样能成为彻底改革国家金融体系的后门的，以及为什么有些人害怕金融上强大的中国。

Why is China reconsidering the role of its currency?

为什么中国在重新考虑其货币的角色?

China is increasing its dominance in the world economy. But there was a sense that China wasn’t getting the respect that it felt it deserved. One of the manifestations of that was that its currency was not quite seen as an elite currency.

中国正在加强其在世界经济上的主导地位。但目前有一种意识，即中国没有得到它觉得自己应得的尊重。这个问题的表现之一，是中国的货币还没有被完全视为精英货币。

Chinese policy makers, especially the more reformist-minded officials, recognized that China needs to do a lot of work to get its financial markets ready before the renminbi could become a prominent international currency. Of course, there is a lot of opposition to such reforms because the system worked well for a lot of politically and economically powerful people.

中国的决策者们，特别是那些致力于改革的官员们认识到，在人民币成为重要国际货币之前，中国需要让自己的金融市场有所准备，因此有大量的工作要做。当然，有很多人反对这种金融改革，因为现行体制对许多政治、经济上强大的人很有利。

About three or four years ago, these reformist-minded officials had a very important insight: If they could get the Chinese people and leadership to sign on to making the renminbi a great global currency, that could provide a very useful mechanism for getting around the opposition and putting in place a lot of reforms. Ultimately it would be good for China, no matter what happened to the currency.

大约三、四年前，这些致力于改革的官员有了一个非常重要的洞悉：如果他们能够得到中国人民和中国领导人的支持，让人民币成为重要全球货币，这就可以提供一个非常有用的机制，绕过反对意见，让许多改革措施得以实施。不管人民币发生什么，这最终都将对中国有利。

I view this as a sort of Trojan horse strategy.

我认为这是一种特洛伊木马策略。

Making the currency international requires meeting requirements from foreign institutions like the I.M.F. At the same time, China is increasingly wary of what it calls “Western influences.” Can those external pressures still help China overhaul its financial system?

让货币国际化需要满足来自国际货币基金组织等外国机构的要求。与此同时，中国对所谓的“西方影响”越来越担心。这些外部压力还能帮助中国彻底改革其金融体系吗?

These serve a very positive role, but they must come from the right sources in the right fashion. When the U.S. Treasury or the I.M.F. tells China to allow its currency to appreciate, that is seen as something that is not necessarily in China’s best interest.

虽然这些外部压力能起一种非常积极的作用，但压力必须来自合适的地方，以对的方式进行施加。当美国财政部或国际货币基金组织告诉中国要允许其货币升值时，这种要求被视为不一定是符合中国最佳利益的东西。

When it comes to matters where the West has some sort of prize to offer, that changes the dynamic. We’ve seen some examples of that over the last year and a half. When China decided it wanted to get the renminbi into the I.M.F.’s elite basket of currencies, it felt that this would be a great way of getting more prestige for its currency in one fell swoop. The I.M.F. and China came together and decided on a checklist of things that China needed to accomplish over the next year. That checklist turned out to be very useful particularly for the People’s Bank of China [China’s central bank] in pushing out its reforms.

当涉及到西方可以提供某种奖励的事情时，情况就会有所改变了。我们在过去一年半中看到了一些这种例子。当中国决定让人民币进入国际货币基金组织的精英货币篮子时，它觉得这是一下子能为人民币赢得更大声望的好办法。国际货币基金组织与中国一起制定了一个清单，需要中国在之后一年里完成。这份清单被证明非常有用，尤其是对(中国的央行)中国人民银行改革措施的推出。

After the 2008 financial crisis, the United States pumped money into its financial system, which in effect lowered the value of China’s vast holdings of American debt. How has that affected China’s ambitions for its currency?

2008年金融危机之后，美国向其金融体系输入了大量货币，这实际上降低了中国持有的庞大美国债务的价值。这件事情是怎样影响中国对其货币的野心的?

It is a matter of enormous frustration for China that the U.S. has such a dominant role in global finance. Because of its old policies, China has become even more vulnerable to U.S. policy, especially monetary policy.

美国在全球金融中有如此主导性的作用，对中国来说是一个巨大的烦恼。中国过去的政策让这个国家更容易受美国政策、特别是美国货币政策的影响。

Chinese are net creditors to the rest of the world. That is, the world owes China a lot more than China owes to the world. But the net income that China’s earning — the amount paid by foreign investors minus the amount it pays out to foreign investors — is in fact negative. Foreign investors get pretty good returns in China. But China, because most of its foreign assets are in the form of U.S. Treasuries and the government securities of other advanced economies, is earning piddling rates of return.

中国是世界上其他地方的净债权人。也就是说，全世界欠中国的钱，比中国欠世界的多。但中国的净收入实际上是负的，净收入指的是外国投资者支付的金额减去向外国投资者支付的金额。外国投资者在中国有相当好的回报。但因为中国大部分的国外资产以美国国债和其他发达经济体的政府证券的形式持有，中国只得到了极低的利息回报。

The fact that the U.S. dollar is so dominant in global finance, and also that the architecture of global finance is controlled by the U.S. and the Western economies, frustrates the Chinese. I think the Chinese feel that the system is stacked against them.

美元在全球金融中占主导地位，以及全球金融体系的构架由美国和西方经济体控制的事实，都让中国人不满。我觉得中国人认为这个体系对自己不利。

Many foreign economists say China should loosen its grip on its financial system — opening the capital account, as policy wonks call it. But you quote one respected Chinese voice, Justin Lin Yifu, criticizing that view. How prevalent is that opposition?

许多外国经济学家说，中国应该放松对本国金融体系的控制，用政策人士的话说，应该开放资本账户。但你引用了批评这种观点的一个备受尊重的中国声音——林毅夫。反对的声音在中国有多普遍?

It is surprisingly prevalent even among Chinese economists who are pro-reform. There is a good reason for that: If one takes economic theory and the practical experience of emerging market countries into consideration, China is doing it exactly the wrong way.

反对的声音在中国令人惊讶地普遍，即使在主张改革的中国经济学家中也如此。其背后有一个很好的理由：如果将经济理论和新兴市场国家的实践经验考虑进来，中国正在用完全错误的方法进行改革。

The right way to do it is to make domestic financial markets more sound, improve regulatory frameworks and make the exchange rate more flexible so that it can act as a shock absorber. Then you can open up the capital account. 正确的方法是，先让国内的金融市场更加健全，完善监管框架，让汇率变得更加灵活，从而使之成为吸收震荡的工具。然后你才可以开放资本账户。

But I think there’s a logic to China’s strategy. Opening up the capital account isn’t just about money, because China doesn’t need money from abroad. But what comes with the money is very important.

但我觉得，中国的战略有其自身的逻辑。开放资本账户不只是为了钱，因为中国并不需要国外的钱。但是，伴随钱而来的东西非常重要。

One example is where the Chinese government brought in foreign strategic investors into its banks. In 2007, in particular, there was concern that there was no improvement being undertaken in the corporate and financial structure of the big state-owned banks. The idea was that those foreign investors in the banks will have an incentive to bring with them better corporate governance practices and better risk-management practices. So all these sort of collective benefits that come with the capital are what China wants.

一个例子是，中国政府将外国战略投资者引进银行。特别是在2007年，人们当时担心大型国有银行的公司和财务结构没有得到改善。中国的想法是，让外国投资者参与中国银行，将刺激他们把更好的公司治理实践和风险管理实践带到中国来。所以，所有这些随资本而来的共同利益才是中国想要的。

The Chinese government prizes stability. Will it give up control?

中国政府以稳定为本。它会放弃控制吗?

China represents a grand and fascinating experiment in managing these two fundamentally contradictory impulses: trying to let the markets work freely versus trying to maintain stability and control in the market. We see that in a variety of contexts, and the currency is no exception. The Chinese government would like the currency’s value to be more market-determined because they see that as important in terms of increasing the renminbi’s prominence.

让市场自由运转，还是试图保持市场的稳定和对市场的控制，在管理这两个根本上相互矛盾的冲动上，中国代表着一次壮丽且迷人的实验。我们在几件事情中都看到这点，货币也不例外。中国政府希望本国货币的价值更多地由市场决定，因为他们认为那对提升人民币的地位很重要。

They view the stability of the currency as an important marker of their ability to manage the economy well. This is going to create a number of stumbles and missteps in the future, and indeed it already has.

他们将货币的稳定性视为自己能良好管理经济的重要标志。这将在未来制造一些失误和失策，这其实已经发生了。

Should the world be concerned about China’s growing financial ambitions?

世界应该担心中国日益增长的金融野心吗?

There is a positive view about this — that having China become more engaged with the international community is a good thing. Rather than saying that it is a developing country and should be handled by different standards, China might recognize that ultimately having good rules governing international trade and finance would be to its own benefit.

对这个问题有一种正面的看法，让中国更多地参与国际社会是件好事。与其让中国说自己是一个发展中国家，应该按不同的标准受到对待，不如让中国意识到，从根本上采用有关国际贸易和金融的良好规则将对其自身有利。

But I think there was also a fear that China could end up parlaying its economic heft into a more strategic influence that then feeds into its somewhat expansionist tendencies. In the past, and in fact until fairly recently, China took a fairly brute-force approach, using its economic clout to gain economic and political influence.

但我认为也有一种担心，那就是，中国可能最终希望把自己的经济力量转化为更具战略意义的影响力，然后将其注入某种扩张主义倾向。在过去，事实上直到最近，中国采取的方法都相当粗暴，用自己的经济实力来获得经济和政治影响力。

Now China has adopted what I think is a much more savvy and disciplined approach to its international engagement. First, it’s increasing its influence in existing international institutions, which allow it to influence the rules of the game from the inside. Second, it is setting up its own institutions like the A.I.I.B. [Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank] that allow it to redefine the rules of the game from the outside. Third, it is bringing lifelines to countries, and bringing them [other countries] into its embrace by setting up institutions with them.

现在中国在国际事务的参与上，已经采取了在我看来是更加精明且更符合准则的方式。首先，中国正在增加其在现有国际机构中的影响力，这将让中国能够从内部影响游戏的规则。第二，中国正在建立自己的机构，如亚投行(亚洲基础设施投资银行)，这将让中国能够从外部重新定义游戏的规则。第三，中国在为一些国家提供生命线，通过在这些国家建立机构，将它们纳入自己的怀抱。

China is very effectively gaining what I like to think of as a multilateral sheen for its effort to build closer economic relationships with other countries.

在为本国与其他国家建立更密切经济关系的努力上，我认为中国正在卓有成效地获得一种多边光辉。

At a time when the political rhetoric in the U.S. is about disengaging and questioning traditional lines both economic and political, I think China stands ready to fill in the void. That is not intrinsically a bad thing. But we have to remember many of the values the U.S. in particular has fought for, or tried to expand, like supporting democratic forms of government, by-and-large free markets, freedom of expression and so on. All those are anathema to China.

美国目前的政治词藻都是关于脱离、质疑传统经济和政治路线的，在这个时刻，我觉得中国已经做好了填补空缺的准备。这本身不是一件坏事。但我们必须记住那些价值观，尤其是美国为之奋斗、或试图推广的，比如支持民主形式的政府、大体上自由的市场、言论自由等等。所有这些都是为中国所仇视的东西。