特朗普的对伊朗战略是玩火之举
如果唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)本周设法撕毁了2015年伊朗与美国及另外五个世界大国达成的协议——以冻结大部分核计划换取解除经济制裁——此举将成为他迄今采取的最具破坏性且无谓的行动。
Trying (and failing) to destroy Obamacare without anything feasible to replace it was vandalism. Pulling the US out of the Paris climate change accord is cosmically irresponsible, yet offset by the determination of American states and companies to meet the pact’s emissions targets. But to reopen the Iran nuclear deal is to open a strategic Pandora’s box — and Mr Trump is no strategist.
试图(但未成功)废除奥巴马医改(Obamacare)却拿不出任何可行方案取而代之，是一种蓄意破坏。带领美国退出《巴黎气候变化协定》更是极大的不负责任，虽然此举造成的影响被美国各州及企业实现该协定排放目标的决心所冲淡。但重新谈判伊朗核协议相当于打开了战略上的潘多拉魔盒——而特朗普根本称不上战略家。
Not the least remarkable aspect of the Trump administration’s Iran policy mess is that the generals surrounding the president — who are deeply hostile to Iran — all favour sticking with the nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Jim Mattis, US defence secretary and former commander in the Middle East, told the Senate last week that: Iran was in compliance with the deal; the JCPOA was in the US national interest; and the administration should stick with it. The week before that, General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, told the Senate the deal was working, and delaying any eventual Iranian development of nuclear arms.
特朗普政府的伊朗政策乱局中引人注目的一点是，总统身边那些对伊朗深恶痛绝的将军们都支持坚守伊核协议，即所谓的联合全面行动计划(JCPOA)。美国国防部长、中央司令部前司令詹姆斯•马蒂斯(James Mattis)上周在参议院表示：伊朗遵守了协议;JCPOA符合美国的国家利益;美国政府应坚守该协议。此前一周，美国参谋长联席会议主席约瑟夫•邓福德(Joseph Dunford)上将对参议院表示，伊核协议正在发挥作用，让伊朗可能最终开发出核武器的那一天推迟到来。
These are all people who want to push back against Iran, and prevent it consolidating a Shia axis from Tehran to the Mediterranean and down into the Gulf. Yet Mr Trump seems less interested in practical policies to do that than in blowing up what he keeps describing as “the worst deal ever”.
这些高官都希望压制住伊朗，阻止其巩固自己的“什叶派轴心”——从德黑兰到地中海、再到整个海湾地区。然而，特朗普似乎对实现这一目标的切实可行的政策不感兴趣，只一门心思要撕毁他口中的“有史以来最糟糕的协议”。
There is plenty of room for the US to add to its already formidable arsenal of non-nuclear sanctions, aimed at Iran’s interventionism in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, or at its ballistic missile programme. Some sanctions experts believe the cumulative effect of such measures could end by torpedoing the JCPOA — by cutting Iran off from international banks — without the opprobrium that would follow were the US to renege on a deal that the UN Security Council voted into international law. But that would all seem a bit low key for Mr Trump.
美国有足够的余地增加本已非常严厉的非核制裁措施，这些制裁主要针对伊朗核计划以外的活动——其对伊拉克、叙利亚、黎巴嫩、也门的干预，或者其弹道导弹计划。一些研究制裁的专家认为，这些制裁措施的效果加在一起，最终有可能通过使伊朗被排除在国际银行体系之外，让JCPOA名存实亡，而且这种做法还不会招致责难;背弃经联合国安理会投票通过成为国际法的JCPOA，则肯定会招致责难。但对于特朗普来说，这种做法似乎阵势不够大。
The president looks set to “decertify” the Iran deal before the October 15 deadline, after which the US Congress would have 60 days to decide whether to re-impose pre-2015 sanctions. Nothing positive can result from this.
特朗普看上去肯定将在10月15日截止日期前宣布“取消”伊核协议，此后，美国国会将有60天时间决定是否恢复2015年之前的制裁措施。此举不会产生任何积极效果。
The European states that signed the JCPOA — France, Britain and Germany — also want to curb Iranian adventurism in the Middle East. Even Russia, allied with Iran in its support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria’s civil war, finds the Islamic republic’s ambitions hard to assimilate. Moscow, for instance, has tried to rebuild Syria’s crumbling and depleted regular army; Tehran, in Syria as in Iraq, prefers to build Shia militias under its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
签署伊核协议的欧洲国家——法国、英国和德国——也希望遏制伊朗在中东的冒险主义。就连在叙利亚内战中与伊朗共同支持巴沙尔•阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)政权的俄罗斯，也难以接受伊朗的野心。例如，莫斯科一直在试图重建叙利亚溃不成军的正规军;而德黑兰更倾向于打造由伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队(IRGC)领导的什叶派民兵——在叙利亚和伊拉克均是如此。
Yet it is the US that will now be seen as in violation of an international agreement, not Iran, repeatedly certified compliant with the JCPOA by its international monitors. Mr Trump is heading for a real breach with Washington’s European allies.
然而，如今将被视为违反一项国际协议的是美国，而非被国际核查机构一再证明遵守协议的伊朗。特朗普正走向与华盛顿的欧洲盟友的真正决裂。
His belligerence is already strengthening hardliners in Iran, grouped around Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, and the IRGC. This is happening at the expense of pragmatic conservatives and reformist supporters of President Hassan Rouhani, who has twice won elections pledging to use the nuclear deal to open Iran and its economy to the world. Mr Trump is not interested, as he showed at the Riyadh summit in May at which he called on Saudi Arabia to lead a Sunni coalition to isolate Iran.
特朗普的敌对态度已然让伊朗国内的强硬派更加得势，这些人集结在伊朗最高领袖阿里•哈梅内伊(Ali Khamenei)和伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队周围。与此同时，受到打击的是支持总统哈桑•鲁哈尼(Hassan Rouhani)的务实保守派和改革派。鲁哈尼两度赢得总统大选，他承诺利用伊核协议让伊朗及其经济对外开放。特朗普对此并不感兴趣，正如他在今年5月的利雅得峰会上的举动所示(他在会上呼吁沙特阿拉伯领导建立一个逊尼派联盟，以孤立伊朗)。
That was already an act of geopolitical arson. It showed little grasp of the real leverage the US has in the region — which has since diminished further. US military might is without parallel. Yet in Syria and Iraq it depends on Kurdish fighters in the fight against Isis. The Trump administration is proposing to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. It makes a good tweet. But the US is at war with Sunni jihadis, not Shia terrorists, and is fighting in alignment, if not alliance, with Iran.
这简直是一种地缘政治上的纵火行为。此举根本未认清美国在这一地区的真正影响力，自那以后，这种影响力已经进一步削弱。美国的军事实力或许无与伦比。但在叙利亚和伊拉克，美国要依靠库尔德武装打击ISIS。特朗普政府拟将伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队认定为恐怖组织。这条消息在Twitter上发出来将是一则爆炸性推文。但美国正在打击的是逊尼派圣战分子，而非什叶派恐怖分子，而且正与伊朗并肩(如果不是联盟的话)作战。
Iran is often caricatured as ideologically rigid. Yet it has shown persistent agility in turning the policy errors of the US and the west to its advantage. It was the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the vacuum the west left for jihadis to fill in Syria after 2011 — not the 2015 nuclear deal — that furnished the tools for Tehran to forge its Shia sphere of influence.
伊朗常被讽刺为意识形态僵化。然而，在将美国和西方的政策错误转化为自身优势方面，伊朗表现出了一贯的灵活性。正是美国2003年领导的入侵伊拉克战争以及2011年后西方国家在叙利亚留下的被圣战分子填补的真空，为德黑兰提供了打造什叶派势力范围的条件。
The 2015 deal is a rare example of a diplomatic triumph, one that found a medium-term formula to deal with a nuclear threat that could have set off a regional arms race. It stands in strong contrast to North Korea. The Trump administration seems to have no policy there except threats to contain Pyongyang’s threatening nuclear activity — and now wants the same approach for Iran.
2015年达成的伊核协议是一场罕见的外交胜利。面对原本可能会引发地区军备竞赛的核威胁，该协议找到了一种中期解决方案。伊核协议的达成与愈演愈烈的朝鲜核问题形成了鲜明对比。除了威胁遏制平壤危险的核活动之外，特朗普政府似乎拿不出任何政策——如今却想以同样的方式对付伊朗。
The parallel here is George W Bush’s repudiation in 2002 of the Agreed Framework — the accord painstakingly fashioned by Bill Clinton’s administration in 1994, with a mix of carrot and stick — which brought Pyongyang to the table. After President Bush kicked the table over, North Korea restarted its weapons programme. Similar histrionics will no doubt work equally well with Iran.
不应忘记的是2002年乔治•W•布什(George W Bush)宣布废除了把平壤带到谈判桌前的《框架协议》(Agreed Framework)——比尔•克林顿(Bill Clinton)政府1994年胡萝卜与大棒并举、煞费苦心打造的协议。小布什总统踢翻谈判桌后，朝鲜重新启动了核武器计划。毫无疑问，类似的装腔作势同样将彻底搞砸伊核问题。
