信用违约互换正在为中国银行业“挡枪”
信用违约互换(CDS)是华尔街的一项发明。2008年金融危机期间，CDS重创了许多重要的金融公司。但如今此类工具在哪里最受欢迎?不是美国(尽管你可能会这样认为)，而是中国。
The China Financing Guarantee Association, a quasi-governmental body that regulates the guarantee companies (in other words, the issuers of the swaps), says it has 194 member institutions, though their ranks have thinned in recent years. Many guarantee companies have simply not bothered to become members of this club.
担保公司(即CDS发行方)的准官方监管机构——中国融资担保业协会(CFGA)称旗下拥有194家会员单位，尽管近年来队伍有所收缩。还有许多担保公司只是懒得申请成为该协会会员。
In a parallel with the American obsession with home ownership that led to the formation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal housing finance agencies, the Chinese government has in the past few decades done its best to promote small and medium-sized enterprises by providing them with credit guarantees. Tens of thousands of state-owned, private and hybrid guarantee companies have come into being.
中国政府过去几十年一直致力于通过提供信用担保促进中小企业的发展，这与美国人对自有住房的痴迷类似，这种痴迷导致了联邦住房融资机构——房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)的成立。因此，成千上万的国有、民营及混合所有制担保公司在中国应运而生。
And just like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, China’s guarantee companies are all thinly capitalised. This is due partly to the misconception that a third-party guarantee is sufficient for SMEs to tap commercial credit.
就像房利美和房地美一样，中国的担保公司普遍资本不充足。这部分源于一种误解，即认为第三方担保足以让中小企业获得商业贷款。
Mispricing in China’s CDS market is severe and chronic. The guarantee companies typically charge only 2-3 per cent to the borrowers, but assume the full risk of their loan delinquency. When the economy was growing fast, from the 1980s through to the early 2010s, these guarantee fees seemed like manna from heaven — so much free money. But when the economy began to slow from 2012 onwards, default rates rose, and many guarantee companies disappeared.
中国CDS市场中的错误定价很严重，且由来已久。担保公司通常只向借款人收取贷款额2%至3%的服务费用，但要承担贷款违约的全部风险。当经济快速增长时(从1980年代到2010年代早期)，这些担保费用就像天上掉下的馅饼——如此多的白得之财。但自中国经济2012年开始放缓以来，违约率开始上升，许多担保公司也销声匿迹。
Only then did people begin to question the business model and the pricing of guarantees. However, nobody seems to know how to correct the problem of mispricing.
直到那时，人们才开始质疑这种商业模式和担保的定价。然而，似乎没人知道如何纠正错误定价的问题。
Unlike CDS in the US, credit guarantees in China have the following deficiency: usually, they cannot be traded. Some observers argue this is probably an advantage for the industry because it forces deal originators to “eat what they cook”, minimising irresponsibility and recklessness in their origination process.
与美国的CDS不同，中国的信用担保有以下缺陷：通常，它们无法交易。一些观察人士辩称，这或许是该行业的一个优势，因为它迫使担保交易发起方“自产自食”，最大限度减少交易发起过程中的不负责任和鲁莽。
It is estimated that the total size of China’s market for such instruments is more than $500bn, excluding the credit enhancement these guarantee companies provide to SMEs’ bond sales and asset-backed securities. But no one knows the size of the market for sure.
据估计，中国此类金融工具的市场总规模超过5000亿美元，还不包括这些担保公司为中小企业的债券发行及资产支持证券提供的信用增级。但没人知道确切的规模。
The number of guarantee companies still operating has reduced significantly since the peak in 2011. Today, their main mission is to unwind their long-duration guarantees and liquidate the collaterals they have repossessed — dubious equity stakes here and there, land or real estate. There are some healthy operators, but they are few and far between.
自2011年达到峰值以来，仍在运营的担保公司的数量已大幅减少。如今，他们的主要任务是解除各种长期担保，变卖收回的抵押物——分散于各地的问题股权、土地或房产。有一些运转良好的担保公司，但数量极少。
Why should this story be of interest to the Chinese public and, indeed, to outside observers? Because it is key to understanding the strange longevity of China’s credit bubble.
为什么中国公众以及外部观察者应对这些感兴趣呢?因为这是理解中国信贷泡沫长期不破裂这一奇怪现象的关键。
It is true that the country’s credit market is far too big, but against the doomsday scenarios some analysts have painted, it has refused to burst because of the many non-bank financial institutions that have served as plumbers for the banks.
没错，中国的信贷市场太大了，但与一些分析师描绘的末日景象相反的是，中国的信贷市场并未崩盘，因为许多非银行金融机构为银行充当了“管道工”。
China’s economic slowdown in the past five years has decimated its microcredit sector and, to a lesser extent, the trust companies. Their destruction has also helped shield the commercial banks.
中国经济过去5年增长放缓已经导致小额信贷行业大幅萎缩，同时萎缩的还有信托公司，但程度较小。它们遭受重创也帮助保护了商业银行。
As one grateful commercial banker recently remarked to me, CDS, bridge loans and wealth management products have served as the banks’ sewage pipes. Half-jokingly, he described the CDS issuers as “selfless and heroic”.
正如一位对此心存感激的商业银行家最近对我所言，CDS、过桥贷款、理财产品充当了银行的排污管。他半开玩笑地形容说，CDS发行方“无私而且英勇”。
