印度借阅兵拉拢东盟抗衡中国
印度共和国日(Republic Day)阅兵是一种展示军事装备的、受欢迎的公共景观，漂亮的花车和载歌载舞的人群也为其增色不少。这也是印度的年度外交日程亮点，因为几十年来，该国保持着邀请具有战略重要性的外国领导人担任阅兵“主宾”的传统。
When India’s missiles and tanks roll down New Delhi’s Rajpath for this year’s parade tomorrow morning, the VIP dais — graced in recent years by Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, Barack Obama, the former US president, and François Hollande, the former French president — will be heavier than usual.
当印度的导弹和坦克明日上午进入新德里国王大道(Rajpath)参加阅兵时，贵宾观礼台上的阵容将比以往更庞大。近年来出现在这个观礼台上的有日本首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)、美国前总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)和法国前总统弗朗索瓦•奥朗德(François Hollande)。
Rather than a single high-profile foreign dignitary, New Delhi is hosting 10 leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a strategically important region with which India is seeking to deepen ties to counter China’s increasing sway. “India does not want an Asia that is dominated by China,” says Dhruva Jaishankar, a fellow at Brookings India, a think-tank. “And a big part of where that will be determined is Southeast Asia.”
这次，印度并非仅邀请一位引人注目的外国要人，而是要招待来自东盟(Asean)的10位领导人。东盟是一个具有重要战略意义的地区，印度正寻求与其加深关系，以抗衡中国日益增强的影响力。“印度不希望亚洲被中国主宰，”智库布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)印度中心研究员德鲁瓦•贾伊尚卡尔(Dhruva Jaishankar)说，“亚洲的很大一部分将由东南亚决定。”
India’s feelings are not unreciprocated. While China is Southeast Asia’s biggest trading partner, it is also a hegemon that many regional elites privately fear or loathe for its heavy-handed military and economic clout.
印度的感受并非单方面的。尽管中国是东南亚最大的贸易伙伴，但它也是一个霸主，许多地区精英私下里对中国强大的军事和经济影响力感到害怕或厌恶。
The South China Sea is a particular flashpoint, given Beijing’s build-up of artificial islands for potential military use. India has openly sided with Southeast Asia in the dispute, with Narendra Modi, the prime minister, criticising China’s military build-up as evidence of an “18th-century expansionist mindset”.
鉴于中国政府为潜在军事用途建设更多人工岛，南中国海(South China Sea)是一个特别的引爆点。印度在这场争端中公开支持东南亚，印度总理纳伦德拉•莫迪(Narendra Modi)批评了中国的军事扩张，称之为“18世纪扩张主义思维”的证据。
It is that sense of India’s growing resolve in the face of Chinese assertiveness that has caught Asean’s attention.
印度在中国的强硬面前变得日益坚决，引起了东盟的注意。
“What [Southeast Asian countries] are seeking — and have — in India is a partner that stands up for a rules-based international order, and that’s particularly important in the maritime space,” says Alyssa Ayres, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations. “In India, they see a global giant — a huge country that is not as big a behemoth as China on trade, but one that is willing to say to Vietnam and the Philippines, ‘We are with you on this question’. They are ready to stand up to China.”
“(东南亚国家)在印度这里寻求(并拥有)的是一个合作伙伴，这个伙伴支持以规则为基础的国际秩序，这在海洋领域尤为重要，”位于华盛顿的美国外交关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)的高级研究员阿莉萨•艾尔斯(Alyssa Ayres)说，“在印度身上，他们看到的是一个全球大国——并非一个在贸易方面像中国那样大的大国，但是一个愿意对越南和菲律宾说‘我们在这个问题上与你们站在一起’的大国。他们准备勇敢地面对中国。”
The idea of an “Indo-Pacific” region with India playing a more active strategic role has also been endorsed by Japan, Australia and Donald Trump, the US president, who spoke of a “new chapter for the Indo-Pacific” at a recent Pacific Rim summit.
由印度在其中扮演更积极战略角色的“印度-太平洋”地区的构想，也得到了日本、澳大利亚和美国总统唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的支持。特朗普在不久前的一次太平洋周边国家峰会上谈起了“印太新篇章”。
“We are talking about a new paradigm for what used to be called the Asia-Pacific,” says Thitinan Pongsudhirak, associate professor of political science at Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University. “When India is included, Southeast Asian countries see it as a potential giant that could counterbalance China. They are looking for some hedging as well.”
“我们讨论的是替代过去亚太说法的新模式，”泰国朱拉隆功大学(Chulalongkorn University)政治学副教授提塔南•蓬苏迪拉克(Thitinan Pongsudhirak)表示，“当纳入印度后，东南亚国家把它视为可以抗衡中国的潜在巨人。他们也在寻找某种对冲。”
When it comes to commercial and economic ties, New Delhi’s hesitant engagement with Asean over the past 25 years has been underwhelming. Bilateral trade was just $58bn a year in 2015, substantially less than Asean’s trade with Hong Kong or Taiwan. In contrast, Asean is bound to China by vast networks of integrated supply chains, with bilateral trade forecast to reach $1tn in 2020.
在商业和经济关系方面，过去25年印度与东盟犹豫不决的往来，并未给人留下深刻印象。2015年，双边贸易额仅为580亿美元，大大低于东盟与中国香港或台湾的贸易额。相比之下，东盟通过庞大的集成供应链网络与中国绑定在一起，2020年双边贸易额预计将达到1万亿美元。
India lacks the financial depth to match China for infrastructure funding, or underwriting bonds. But even New Delhi’s more modest goals to boost connectivity — such as a trilateral highway between India, Myanmar and Thailand agreed 15 years ago — remain unrealised.
在基础设施投资或债券承销方面，印度不具备与中国较量的金融深度。但就连新德里方面有关提高连通性的温和目标——比如15年前达成协议的印度、缅甸和泰国三边公路——仍然尚未实现。
“There is a bit of angst about the gap between promises and delivery,” says Vishnu Prakash, a retired Indian diplomat. “We do not have the resources China has and we cannot or should not try to compete there. But whatever we promise, at least we should be able to deliver on that.”
“人们对于承诺和兑现之间的差距有点担心，”已经退休的印度外交官白加尉(Vishnu Prakash)表示，“我们不具备中国所拥有的资源，我们无法也不应该试图在这一点上竞争。但无论我们承诺什么，至少我们应该能够兑现。”
But India is stepping up security co-operation with Southeast Asian countries, albeit in small but symbolically important steps. These include training combat pilots and submariners from several Asean countries, a new naval agreement with Singapore, growing technical co-operation and patrolling east of Malacca by the Indian navy.
但是印度正在加强与东南亚国家的安全合作，规模虽小但却是具有象征意义的重要举措。其中包括培训几个东盟国家的战斗机飞行员和潜艇人员，与新加坡签署新的海军协议，增进技术合作，以及印度海军在马六甲海峡东部巡航。
Many are expecting India to pursue stronger defence partnerships with Asean countries in the coming years, possibly in conjunction with other like-minded Pacific powers, such as Australia and Japan. “On the security front there have been more developments than is often appreciated,” says Mr Jaishankar. “There is no expectation that India should match China one for one. But if you can provide even part of an alternative, that is helpful.”
很多人预计，未来几年印度将寻求加强与东盟国家的防务合作关系，可能与其他志同道合的太平洋大国(如澳大利亚和日本)一起协力推进。“在安全方面，进展比人们通常意识到的多，”贾伊尚卡尔表示，“没人指望印度会与中国一对一地竞赛。但哪怕你能提供部分替代，那也是有帮助的。”
