为什么通胀危机对民粹主义强人来说是个坏消息
对任何政府来说，通货膨胀危机都是坏消息，就像土耳其即将发生的那种;但对于某种类型的威权主义者，也就是民粹主义强人来说，这种危机尤其危险。
They are unusually prone to creating this sort of crisis, unusually inhibited from fixing it and unusually slow to recover. They have, on average, higher rates of inflation and more artificially undervalued currencies. Their central banks are less independent, making them less capable of intervening.
他们特别容易造成这种往往难以修复，而且恢复速度异常缓慢的危机。总体来说，他们国家的通货膨胀率会更高，货币被人为低估的程度更严重。他们的央行不是那么独立，减弱了它们的干预能力。
Potentially catastrophic on their own, these are symptoms of a set of weaknesses and liabilities that go beyond monetary policy to the core of populist strongman rule.
这些表现本身就有可能是灾难性的，它们是一系列直抵民粹强人统治核心的弱点和不利，远不仅限于货币政策。
Before Turkey, there was Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, who oversaw their country’s plunge from prosperity to ruin, partly by plowing into an inflationary crisis.
在土耳其之前，有委内瑞拉的尼古拉斯·马杜罗(Nicolas Maduro)及其前任乌戈·查韦斯(Hugo Chavez)，该国在他们的执掌下从繁荣走向毁灭，部分原因正是因为国家陷入通胀危机。
When this happens in democracies, elected leaders are typically replaced with new ones who eventually rein in inflation. It happened many times in Latin America alone: in Nicaragua, Chile, Peru and Argentina. Other sorts of authoritarianism, run by a party, military or monarchy, may collapse, as happened in Brazil, but often they have the will and flexibility to impose some sort of reform.
当这种情况发生在民主国家时，民选领导人通常会被新领导人所取代，他们将最终控制通货膨胀。仅在拉丁美洲，这样的事情就发生过多次：尼加拉瓜、智利、秘鲁和阿根廷。由政党、军队或君主管理的其他各种威权主义，则有可能崩溃，就像在巴西发生的那样，但他们往往有推行某种改革的意愿和适应力。
Populist strongmen — because of their relationships to their citizens, their fellow elites and to their own policymaking apparatus — tend to be different. Maduro printed more money, worsening the crisis dramatically. A decade earlier, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe did much the same thing to much the same effect.
因为与其公民、权贵阶层和自己的决策机构的关系缘故，民粹强人往往是不同的。马杜罗印了更多钞票，导致危机加剧。十年前，津巴布韦的罗伯特·穆加贝(Robert G. Mugabe)也做了几乎一样的事情，效果差不多。
Whether Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ultimately follows the same path, he already is repeating the familiar patterns of a ruler constrained and guided by his system in ways not always in the country’s long-term interests.
不管土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)最终是否也会走上同样的道路，他眼下已经在重复着人们所熟悉的统治模式，受到一个对国家长远利益不见得有帮助的体制的桎梏和导引。
Turkey’s meltdown, more than just a product of Erdogan’s powergrabs, is a microcosm of the pathologies inherent in his style of governing, and that of other populist strongmen. And it is a reminder that, although their system seems to be rising in the world, it comes with special risks that make it, on average, more likely to collapse.
土耳其的崩溃不仅仅是埃尔多安集权的产物，还集中体现了他和其他一些民粹强人的执政风格中所固有的沉疴。它也提醒着人们，虽然他们的体制似乎正在世界崛起，但也带来了特殊的风险，通常，这令其更易崩溃。
What Inflation Threatens 通胀的威胁
Any dictator knows that inflation — which erodes legitimacy with the public and angers powerful elites who expect payouts — can pose existential risks. Elected leaders will merely lose office (most of the time), but an authoritarian state can more easily collapse outright.
每个独裁者都知道，通货膨胀可能会带来生存危机，它会侵蚀其面对公众的执政合法性，激怒期待得到回报的权贵阶层。经选举产生的领导人只是下台而已(大多数时候)，但专制国家却更有可能出现彻底崩溃。
In 1989, workers angered by inflation in China joined idealistic students in protests that the government answered with one of the modern era’s bloodiest crackdowns.
1989年，被通胀激怒的中国工人加入了理想主义学生的抗议行列，政府的回应行动，则是现代最为血腥的一次镇压。
Inflation can be so dangerous for authoritarians that it can also prompt otherwise unthinkable reforms.
对于威权主义者来说，通胀可能非常危险，甚至可能带来之前难以想象的改革。
Vietnamese leaders, worried that a run of inflation in the 1980s could bring down the communist system, shifted to a more market-based economy.
在上世纪80年代，越南领导人担心通货膨胀可能会导致共产主义制度的垮台，于是转向了更加市场化的经济。
Iran’s inflation surge, in 2013, fed into public dissatisfaction deep enough that the hard-line supreme leader stood by as voters ushered a relative moderate into the presidency.
2013年，伊朗通胀飙升引发了公众的强烈不满，以至于在选民选择了一个相对温和的总统时，立场强硬的最高精神领袖也未加干预。
All forms of authoritarianism are susceptible: one-party states (think China or Cuba), monarchies (Saudi Arabia) or military dictatorships (Thailand today, others in the recent past).
所有形式的威权主义都容易受到影响：一党制国家(比如中国或古巴)、君主制国家(比如沙特阿拉伯)或军事独裁(比如今天的泰国，以及近代的其他例子)。
But a strongman — a charismatic leader, consolidating power for himself and smashing institutions that might challenge him — can make such crises easier to spark and harder to contain.
但作为富有魅力的领袖，强人巩固自己的权力并粉碎可能挑战自己的拦路虎，这会导致这类危机更有可能滋生，也更难以控制。
When Growth Becomes Dangerous 当增长变得危险
Much of that has to do with how strongmen typically come to power: by rising within a flawed democracy or, in some cases, a military or one-party regime. This leads them to dismantle the old system, which they see as a threat. That is often where the trouble starts.
这种情况很大程度上与强人得到权力的典型方式有关：在一个有缺陷的民主国家内部崛起，或者在某些情况下，在一个军政府或一党制政体中崛起。这令他们需要拆除被他们视为威胁的旧系统。麻烦通常就是从这里开始的。
“Insecurity over their futures can incentivize them to make choices that are bad in the long term,” said Erica Frantz, a scholar of authoritarianism who teaches at Michigan State University.
“对自身未来的不安全感会刺激他们做出从长远来看很糟糕的选择，”任教于密歇根州立大学的专制主义研究学者埃里卡·弗兰兹(Erica Frantz)说。
As they slash away at institutions and rivals, undermining their own legitimacy, they are more desperate for growth and more panicky about seeing it slide.
随着他们削减制度和竞争对手，破坏自身的合法性，他们更加渴望经济增长，并且看到它出现下滑会感到更加恐慌。
This often prompts dangerous overspending or, in Erdogan’s case, overborrowing. His government encouraged firms to spend wildly on foreign currency loans, driving tremendous economic growth, which protected Erdogan’s popularity even as he restricted political rights. But the debt set up a now-exploding currency crisis.
这通常会引发危险的超支或过度借贷，埃尔多安的情况就是后者。他的政府鼓励公司疯狂投资外币贷款，推动惊人的经济增长，这让埃尔多安在限制政治权利的同时可以保住支持率。但债务导致了现在爆发的货币危机。
China has seen its share of boondoggle infrastructure projects and overinvestment. But dictatorships run by an entrenched royal, military or party bureaucracy have something that strongmen often feel compelled to destroy: institutions.
中国已经看到了它在基础设施项目和过度投资方面的风险。但是，那些由根深蒂固的贵族、军队或政党官僚机构管理的独裁国家，有一种强人统治者常常觉得需要摧毁的东西：制度。
Even if authoritarian institutions are hardly fair or just, they are at least predictable and can be, within limits, independent. That makes them better able to manage or forestall problems. Particularly the central bank.
威权制度尽管不公平或公正，但至少是可预测的，并且可以在一定限度内保持独立。这使得它们能够更好地管理或预防问题。特别是中央银行。
If a dictatorship’s central bank is seen as credible and independent, research finds, inflation is easier to restrain. But if the central bank is seen as susceptible to arbitrary or erratic political meddling — as often happens with institutions in strongmen-dominated systems — then inflation can rise out of control.
研究发现，如果独裁政权的央行被视为可信和独立的，通胀就更容易受到限制。但如果央行被视为容易受到任意或不稳定的政治干预——强人统治体系中的制度经常发生这种情况——那么通货膨胀可能会失控。
Strongmen like Chávez or Erdogan, who installed his son-in-law as finance minister, tend to meddle with their central banks, both to juice short-term growth and out of a tendency to see independent institutions as threats rather than partners. Inflation rises, a precursor of worse to come.
像查韦斯或埃尔多安这样的强人统治者(后者安排他的女婿担任财政部长)倾向于干涉央行，既是为了实现繁荣的短期增长，也是出于将独立机构视为威胁而不是合作伙伴的倾向。通货膨胀的上升是恶化的前兆。
How Strongmen Create Crises 强人统治者是如何制造危机的
Such leaders undermine their economies in other ways. When a country’s legal system erodes, according to a 2008 study, inflation tends to surge.
这些领导者还以其他方式破坏经济。根据2008年的一项研究，当一个国家的法律体系受到侵蚀时，容易出现通货膨胀的急升。
Even if rule of law is only weakened in a few sectors, this eventually catches up with central bankers, who come to act less as independent stewards than as loyal, or fearful, cronies.
即使法治只在少数几个部门被削弱，这最终会波及央行的管理者，他们的行为将不再像是独立的管理者，而是忠诚或恐惧的亲信。
Bureaucratic dictatorships like China’s often try to bolster their legal systems as a way to cement their rule, even if those legal systems remain deeply flawed. But a leader like Erdogan, who purged swathes of his country’s judges, tends to see the judiciary as a threat.
像中国这样的官僚独裁经常试图加强法律体系，以巩固自己的统治，即使这些法律制度仍然存在严重缺陷。但像埃尔多安这样清洗其国家法官的领导人，倾向于将司法机构视为威胁。
Under strongmen, economic management tends to be less competent, and therefore likelier to fuel a bubble or debt rather than growth. Lower-level officials know their first duty is to please and glorify the leader, so are more prone to overpromising or covering up. Loyalty trumps competence.
在强人统治之下，经济管理的能力往往不足，因此更有可能助长泡沫或债务，而不是增长。较低级别的官员知道他们的首要任务是取悦和赞美领导者，因此更容易做出过度的承诺或掩盖问题。对他们来说，忠诚胜过了能力。
The result is often that strongmen do not just overspend or overborrow — they do so unwisely, erratically and with little sanity imposed from central banks or other institutions. They can careen into crises that other countries would at least try to steer around.
结果往往是强人统治者不仅过度支出或过度借贷——而且这样做的过程还是盲目而忙乱的，并且没有来自央行或其他机构的任何理性。他们会一头冲进其他国家至少会试图避免的危机。
A High-Risk Political System 高风险的政治体系
The strongman’s relationship to powerful elites may make things worse. Maduro, for instance, grew more fearful of a coup as the economy declined, so he siphoned off resources to military leaders and the handful of other powerful insiders he could count on.
强人统治者与权贵阶层的关系可能会让事情变得更糟。例如，随着经济下滑，马杜罗越来越害怕发生政变，因此他从军事领导人以及他可以指望的少数权势人物手中抽走了资源。
Strongmen, dedicated as they are to crushing rivals, tend to enjoy the support of only some members of their country’s elite, so need to keep them happy. That can distort the economy, as those members often belong to sectors that were lucrative when they came up but may have grown outdated. Erdogan’s zeal for construction, where much of the overborrowing took place, may be instructive.
致力于打击竞争对手的强人统治者往往只得到一部分权贵的支持，所以需要讨好他们。这可能会扭曲经济，因为这些成员所在的行业往往在他们刚崛起时是有利可图的，但渐渐已经过时。埃尔多安对大兴土木的热情可能很说明问题，过度借贷大部分就是这样来的。
For years, analysts thought this pattern might doom China. Its most powerful figures controlled vast steel and construction empires, which benefited from policies at odds with the consumer industries the country needed to transition its economy. Many assumed the old industrialists would block such changes.
多年来，分析人士认为这种模式可能会毁灭中国。在中国，最有权力的人物控制着庞大的钢铁和建筑帝国，它们所受益的政策与该国经济转型所需的消费产业是矛盾的。许多人认为旧工业势力会阻挠中国的经济转型。
Instead, the steel barons were brought to heel — something more easily done by a vast authoritarian bureaucracy than a lone strongman who needs to worry about his inner circle. Even Saudi Arabia, a monarchy with its own collectives and institutions, though deeply troubled, has forced through changes that disfavor a certain old elite.
然而钢铁大亨们最终被迫就范——一个庞大的专制官僚体制，比一个需要担心自己内部圈子的孤独强人统治者更容易做到这一点。即使是沙特阿拉伯——一个拥有自己的集体企业和机构的君主政权——虽然深受困扰，也依然能够艰难地实行一些不利于旧权贵的变革。
